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ABSTRACT
AN ENTANGLED HISTORY:
NATIVE AMERICAN AND EURO-AMERICAN
NATIONAL AND CULTURAL IDENTITIES (1768-1833)
by
Paul Jentz
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Joe Austin
This study examines political and cultural interactions between Native Americans and
Euro-Americans during the transition from imperial colonialism to settler colonialism. It
employs the concept of entanglement to convey the inextricable linkages that arose between the
two groups over time, linkages also marked by the dissimilar effects of contact between them. As
such, this study adopts a world history lens, arguing that no culture has historically existed in
isolation, so no culture can be effectively studied in isolation. Five case studies explore
accelerated tensions between Indians and Whites that resulted through the shifts in negotiations
of power between them as settler colonialism gained traction, and as it did so increasingly
challenged the understandings that Native Americans held regarding the integrity of their land
base. These case studies argue that one of the means by which some Native Americans attempted
to retain their sovereignty was through the adaptation of Euro-American political and cultural
ideas into their tribal identities. Consequently, there evolved national Native identities which
served as an adjunct to tribal identities, yet the defense of Native sovereignty, the foundation of
national identity, was increasingly challenged through settler colonialism, so this study explores
how Native nations continued to assert their rights of sovereignty regardless of the provisional
status granted them as “domestic dependent nations” by the government of the United States.
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Introduction
Entangled History: Entangled Lives
The word “entangled” first appeared in the English language in the mid-sixteenth
century.1 Indeed, the term’s initial documentation is traceable to a description of Columbus’s
second voyage when, attempting to portray the dense vegetation encountered by Columbus and
his crew as they made their way through the island of Cuba, in 1555, the English writer Richard
Eden2 turned the noun “tangle,” a term designating seaweed, into a verb:

When they hadde passed ouer the woode, they came into a greate playne full of grasse
and herbes, in which appeared no token of any pathe way. Here attempting to goo
throwgh the grasse and herbs, they were soo entangled and bewrapte therin, that they
were scarsely able to passe a myle, the grasse beinge there little lower then owre rype
corne.3
Later the term “entangled” appears in Eden’s account of a violent encounter between the
Indigenous inhabitants of the island and the Europeans. So the word not only describes the nature
of the physical impediments Europeans encountered as they trekked inland, it also designates the
difficulties Europeans faced as they tried to flee the island:

A thousande of the Barbarians assayled theym unwares and unprepared. By reason
wherof, they were put to flight, and dyvers of them flayne in the chase. Many that fledde
towarde the shippes were entangled in the mudde and maryshes nere unto the shore.
Twentie and two, were slayne with arrows, and the resydewe for the most parte,
wounded.4
1

Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, s.v. “entangle.”
Eden’s book, Decades of the Newe Worlde, combined his translations of Peter Martyr’s 1530
Latin work De Orbe Novo “On the New World” and Gonzalo Oviedo’s 1535 Spanish work La
Historia General de las Indias, with other contemporaneous works regarding the New World.
3
Richard Eden, Decades of the Newe Worlde, in The First Three English Books on America,
edited by Edward Arber (Westminster: Archibald Constable and Company, 1895), 77.
4
Ibid., 187.
2

1

Though the term “entangled” and its contexts in these earliest records concern Caribbean
encounters between Europeans and Indigenous Peoples, echoes of the word seem well suited for
describing the historical relationships between Native Americans and Euro-Americans that will
be undertaken in the following pages. For as this study sets out to investigate episodes of
political and cultural interactions between both groups over the course of approximately two
generations from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, the explorations of these
episodes relies on the verb “entangled” to drive them. Moreover, reflecting on the meaning of
that word as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, that is “to intertwist (threads, branches,
or the like) complicatedly of confusedly together; to intertwist the threads or parts of (a thing) in
this way,”5 the term’s core characteristics of complication and confusion in turn seem to define
the historic asymmetries of power between Indians and Whites. The definition also speaks to the
fact that both groups originated in two different worlds, so political and cultural confusions
between them invariably informed their interactions over time. As their histories grew
increasingly intertwisted, it becomes increasingly untenable to analyze either group in isolation
from the other.
Additionally, the asymmetries of power that have marked the historical relationships
between Native Americans and Euro-Americans, and the multiple threads that have formed new,
complex, inextricable, and often intimate webs between them, together suggest the difficulties of
separating various kinds of agency in an interdependent world. These are the features of an
entangled history, and as such this study adopts a definition posited by Ralph Bauer and Marcy
Norton: “Entangled histories attend to the multiplicity of sources, agencies, directions of

5

Oxford, ibid.
2

influence, and modalities of intercultural connectedness. [They] attend to the permeability of
borders; the negotiations of power [. . .]; the dynamism of intercultural processes; and the
inextricability of material and symbolic factors.”6 Moreover, entanglement itself is not an
outcome, it does not “dissolve into a final product,” as Karen Graubart observes, and as she
further notes it “suggests ongoing confrontations, shifts, and revisions: a state of mutual learning
and pushback”7 Another scholar, Eliga H. Gould, proposes “entangled history” as an alternative
model for comparative histories that examine more than one national community.8 Though the
communities that he interrogates are the Spanish and British empires, his approach to them as
both interconnected and dissimilar in power relationships finds its an analogous application in
An Entangled History, which seeks to illustrate historical power imbalances between EuroAmericans and Native Americans.

A World History Lens
Comparative in nature, world history views any given culture as a combination of
influences from any number of other cultures. Because no culture has historically existed in
isolation, no culture can be effectively studied in isolation. So adopting a world history lens, An
Entangled History explores aspects of Indigenous and Euro-American cultures in a mutually
informing and always evolving context, and it borrows Patrick Manning’s dictum that “the world
historian’s work is to portray the crossing of boundaries and the linking of systems in the human

6

Ralph Bauer and Marcy Norton, “Introduction: Entangled Trajectories: Indigenous and
European Histories, 1 -17 (Colonial Latin American Review 26, 2017), 3.
7
Karen Graubart, “Shifting Landscapes: Heterogenous Conceptions of Land Use and Tenure in
the Lima Valley (Colonial Latin American Review 26, 2017), 64.
8
Eliga H. Gould, “Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a
Spanish Periphery,” 764 – 786 American Historical Review (June 2007), 768.
3

past.”9 So An Entangled History distinguishes itself from current discussions of both Native and
non-Native national identities primarily because it views them as intersecting and crossfertilizing, while national identity scholarship generally views them as separate entities. More
troubling, such scholarship often gives Native Americans little to no coverage.
Recently, for example, Carrol Smith-Rosenberg’s This Violent Empire: The Birth of an
American National Identity10 contains an illuminating section on the Tammany Society, but her
scant material on Native Americans depends exclusively on a simplistic binarism with the Indian
merely occupying the space of the Other. Jill Lapore’s These Truths: A History of the United
States11 barely mentions Native Americans in her vast canvas of the nation’s political and social
history that claims to identify the central principles that unite the republic. David Waldstreicher’s
conceptualization of nationalism as performance makes his canonical In the Midst of Perpetual
Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-182012 relevant to sections of An Entangled
History that regard the stage as a vehicle for nationalism. His definition of nationalism as a
political strategy “responding to the strategies of other groups” is also relevant to some of the
issues that the book will cover.13 However, Waldstreicher’s comparative work relies principally
on English and French nationalisms, a cross-Atlantic orientation that precludes the Native
dimension central to An Entangled History.

9

Patrick Manning, Navigating World History: History Create a Global Past (New York:
Palgrave, 2003), 3.
10
Carrol Smith-Rosenberg, This Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
11
Jill Lepore, These Truths: A History of the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2018).
12
David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism,
1776-1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
13
David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism,
1776-1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 6.
4

There are several other studies, none of which compares Native American and European
notions of nationhood that will, nevertheless, provide valuable material for my comparative
work. To mention only three works on Native American nationhoods that will find application in
my study, first, James Taylor Carson’s Searching for the Bright Path: The Mississippi Choctaws
From Prehistory to Removal14 explores the conflicting strategies in Choctaw politics concerning
the best way forward as a nation confronting settler colonialism. Of course, such debates
occurred universally among Native nations, so the situation of the Choctaw will be part of the
book’s wider discussion on the impact of colonialism. Second, Stephen C. Hahn’s The Invention
of the Creek Nation, 1670-176315 will serve as one of the vantage points from which to explore
Creek entanglements with Spanish, French, and English imperial designs. As my study will
argue, their conflicts with foreign powers helped to forge their own identity as a nation. And
third, David Andrew Nichols’ Red Gentlemen and White Savages provides insight into the postrevolution geopolitical landscape, especially by arguing that several leaders of the Chicasaw,
Iroquois, and Cherokee nations promoted the establishment of the federal government because
they feared the motives of state governments. Moreover, it appeared that an alliance with a single
government would prove more stable than alliances that entailed the navigation of multiple
jurisdictions.16
The following chapters establish several categories of entanglement. However,
entanglement by nature resists clear borderlines, such categories are to be understood as porous
and mutually informing, as “tendencies.” Together such tendencies will at least provide an
14

James Taylor Carson Searching for the Bright Path: The Mississippi Choctaws From
Prehistory to Removal (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003).
15
Stephen C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2004).
16
David Andrew Nichols, Red Gentlemen and White Savages (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2008).
5

organizing principle. Thus, among other matters, they will help to tease out the political, cultural,
and diplomatic entanglements in marriages between European colonials or Euro-Americans and
Native Americans. Offspring of such unions had roots in both Native and non-Native worlds.
These children embodied a multi-level entanglement that led to degrees of bilingualism and
included differing religious beliefs and divergent cultural practices. What could be termed
entanglement by blood grew only more complex with each succeeding generation, as offspring
of initial cross-cultural marriages themselves perhaps married across cultural lines. At times
perhaps complementing entanglement by blood, political entanglement tended to involve local,
national, and international issues. Two types of entanglement between nations possess an ironic
inter-relatedness. First, Native nations arose as entangled constructions because they contained
components of both republicanism and indigenous governing systems. This situation constitutes
an entanglement by political appropriation. Second, White appropriation of Indian history and
culture through various media — through novels and theatre, for example— constitutes an
entanglement by cultural appropriation. The later darkly mirrors the entanglement by political
appropriation noted above.
Over the years Native and non-Native peoples would navigate intertwining political and
personal worlds in increasing proximities to each other. The characteristics of these worlds
changed significantly in the transition from the imperial colonialism typical of the French to the
settler colonialism of the Euro-Americans. Broadly, French imperial colonialism focused on the
establishment of trade with Indigenous peoples and was not primarily focused on attaining the
land itself. Euro-American settler colonialism aimed at the appropriation of Native land, hence it
worked in tandem with federal Indian removal policies to expand White settlement.

6

Initially, French maps, for example, never matched the reality of Native dominance on
the ground. However much the empire’s maps boasted the broad geographic swath termed New
France, Indians had lived on the continent for millennia. Without Native guides, the French may
never have made even their relatively meager inroads. Until the ascendance of the United States
and the machinery of its settler colonialism, Native Americans retained the upper hand on much
of the continent during the centuries of the European imperial colonial era. As White Americans
attempted to disentangle themselves from Native Americans through Indian removal policies,
such attempts often resulted in ironic outcomes: White Americans appropriated aspects of Native
American cultures and rewrote them to serve their own cultural identities.

What is a Nation?
As noted above, some Indigenous peoples adopted aspects of republicanism into existing
tribal governments. This phenomenon originated approximately in tandem with the experiment
in republican government that the United States undertook following its political separation from
England. Again, the premise of this book being that Native Americans and Euro-Americans are
historically interwoven, one of the stories within this weave concerns nationhood, or perhaps
more properly speaking, nationhoods.
The Revolutionary War led not only to the evolution of a national identity for the United
States. Native Americans too, particularly those who fought in the war for either rebel or British
forces, also entered a new era of evolving identities as nations, at times invoking the same
founding documents sacred to Euro-American identity while simultaneously maintaining the
kinship-based identities that had historically defined them as individuated groups.

7

Though keen differences certainly existed, each national identity held firm beliefs in the
rights of sovereignty. But to assert -- and defend -- these rights required the exercise of power.
Native power and Euro-American power took different forms. Chief Justice John Marshall
exercised his judicial power and famously blurred the issue of Native sovereignty by ruling in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) that the Cherokee (and therefore all other Indian peoples) do
not belong to a separate sovereign nation, but to a “domestic dependent nation.” Marshall’s
ward/guardian trope denied sovereignty to Indian nations, subjecting the very notion of a Native
national identity to a provisional status. This book examines the strategies that Native nations
undertook to assert their sovereignty -- to declare their own power -- and how many shaped
hybrid political structures that combined Indigenous economic, political, cultural, and social
modes with those of Euro-America. Moreover, in each instance these hybrids were analogous to
the construction of the United States as a nation, itself a product of European political ideas as
applied to American historical conditions, conditions that include wide-ranging historical
relationships with Native American nations. By their nature, all nations entangle one another.
An Entangled History builds on Thomas Bender’s argument that a “nation cannot be its
own historical context,”17 and on Pauline Turner Strong’s and Barrick van Winkle’s argument
that “Just as the existence of Indian nations within the boundaries of the United States constitutes
a challenge to American nationalism, so too the complex imaginings of national identity found
among Native Americans call into question some of the basic presuppositions of modern
nationalism.”18

17

Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill
and Wang, 2006), 4.
18
Pauline Turner Strong and Barrick Van Winkle, “Tribe and Nation: American Indians and
American Nationalism,” Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural
Practice, 33 (September, 1993): 9-26, at 20.
8

Indeed, questions of what defines a nation and what determines a sense of nationalism
have fueled a wide range of scholarship. Moreover, changes in meaning that the word “nation”
itself has undergone over the centuries speaks to that concept’s inherently fluid nature. As words
tend to do, its redefinitions grew from cultural needs to express new ideas as they arose. Only
relatively recently has the word come to entail concepts of citizenship and sovereignty. How and
why the European concept of nation -- along with its components of citizenship and sovereignty
-- manifested itself in Native American societies that combined it with their own political
principles tells us the definition of nation continues to evolve.
“Nation” originates in the Latin natio (birth; species/race/stock). In ancient Rome natio
usually referred to a putatively identifiable foreign group, such as “Germans” (who were
anything but united in culture, language, or political organization). In the thirteenth century,
“nation” referred to the region of one’s language or approximate land of origin. At the
University of Paris, for example, students were roughly divided among four linguistic or regional
“nations” -- France, Normandy, Picardy (the Low Countries), and England. Later, during the
Hundred Years’ War, Germany replaced England. Delegates to the Roman Church’s Council of
Constance (1414-18) voted by nation – England, France, Italy, and Germany (Poles,
Scandinavians, and Hungarians were lumped into the German “nation”) – with each nation
having one vote. In early sixteenth-century England, the word came to designate the people of a
country as members of a unique national identity, a nationality. By the time of the American and
French Revolutions, “nation” took on the primarily political meaning recognized today as a

9

collectively sovereign body of citizens. However, nations are not static; they are long-term
processes of ongoing redefinition.19
The term “nationalism,” however, entails certain usage problems for the following pages.
After all, it was first coined in 1844,20 and this, strictly speaking, makes it an anachronism to the
time frame of the present study’s end date of 1833. But severe adherence to this eleven-year gap
would appear to cause more harm than good. So the construction, “what would in 1844 be
identified as ‘nationalism,’” will be henceforth implied. Moreover, the discussion of nations
could not effectively proceed without the concept of nationalism lingering close by. Multiple
theories of nations and nationalism complicate issues regarding the cultural and historical
preconditions for nationhood, the determining factors of nationhood itself, and the relationship
between nations and nationalism. Below, in broad outline, are some of the more influential
concepts of nationhood that have attempted to answer the question, what is a nation?
Anthony D. Smith argues that nations originate along ethnic lines, with “myths of
origin and descent” providing the community with an explanation of origin, growth and destiny:

A myth of descent attempts to provide an answer to questions of similarity and
belonging: why are we all alike? Why are we one community? Because we come from
the same place, at a definite period in time and are descended from the self-same
ancestor, we necessarily belong together. The “explanation” brings together the Greek
term ethnos, the idea of living together and being alike in culture, but adds the secondary
meaning of the term, namely, a sense of tribal belonging through common family ties.21
19

Guido Zernato and Alfonso G. Mistretta “Nation: The History of a Word,” The Review of
Politics 6 (July, 1944): 351-66, at 351-52. E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 14-16. Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins
of Nations (Malden, Mass., Blackwell, 2002), 212. Kevin Blackburn, “Mapping Aboriginal
Nations: The ‘Nation’ Concept of Late Nineteenth Century Anthropologists in Australia,”
Aboriginal History 26 (2002); 131-158; at 131-132.
20
Gale Stokes, “How is Nationalism Related to Capitalism?” 591-98. Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 28 (July 1986), 591.
21
Smith, Ethnic Origin, 24.
10

Smith further argues that nationalist aspirations have transformed and complicated such
ethnic origins: the nationalist conceives of the world as one filled with nations, each unique, and
with all political power centered in each nation alone, which also experiences tensions because
the nationalist drive leaves people with allegiances divided between nation “and a lingering but
explosive solidarity to their own ethnic origins.22
Regarding the issue of divided allegiances within Native nations as hybrid constructions
containing aspects of the American nation, Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle raise concerns
not unlike those of Smith. For example, they argue that in Native American societies “the simple
fact of being born establishes both citizenship and, as the individual grows, a homogeneity of
purpose and outlook. Customs, rituals, and traditions are a natural part of life.” One the other
hand, the homogeneity of diverse peoples through American citizenship tends to rely on the
formalized understanding of written documentation regarding the rules, regulations, and
principles of good government.23 How then, what Smith identifies as “a sense of tribal belonging
through common family ties” and the political realities of what historically develops as Native
nations existing simultaneously “inside” the nation of the United States goes to the heart of the
entanglement of cultural and political identities of Native Americans and Euro-Americans.
On the other hand, Ernest Gellner posits that a nation is an artifact of modernity. Shared
convictions and loyalties of those who occupy a certain territory or speak the same language
become a nation if and when members mutually recognize certain rights and duties. Thus a

22

Ibid., 130.
Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lyte, The Nations Within: the Past and Future of American
Indian Sovereignty (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 18.
23
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nation arises through self-determination, not as some naturally occurring cultural condition.
Moreover, he argues that “nations maketh man,” and herein originates the machinery that drives
nationalism. Coincident with the industrial revolution, nationalism gained traction as economic
foundations transitioned from relatively localized agrarian forces to an increasingly global
market-driven condition.24 Gellner further argues that nationalism is a product of false
consciousness forged by a society’s elites. Through its control of education systems and
publishing industries, elites claim to defend an old folk society, “while in fact helping to build up
an anonymous mass society.”25 In short, only with the rise of industrial society did the tools of
reason and science provide the intellectual means for constructing nations. This top down
bequeathal of nationhood depends on literacy and the standardization of society based on mass
education. Uniformity as Gellner’s common denominator for nationhood, would appear to leave
little room for the concepts of Native nationhoods as hybrid constructions within the national
boundaries of the United States. But at the same time his arguments underscore the challenges
faced by Indigenous Peoples as their own national identities evolved during the period covered in
the present study.
Thongchai Winichakul’s theory of nationhood stands somewhere between Ernest
Gellner’s argument against nations as naturally occurring cultural phenomena and Benedict
Anderson’s concept of a nation as an “imagined political community,” to be discussed below.
Thongchai argues that modern geography and its political maps overlaps the territorial concepts
of indigenous geography, with modern geography usurping “properties of indigenous
knowledge.” A nation as a bounded territorial entity, as one defined by a modern political map,
is what he terms a geo-body. The geo-body differs from the geographical understanding of
24
25

Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 7.
Ibid., 119.
12

indigenous peoples who formerly occupied – and still occupy -- the territory of a mapped nation.
Moreover, the national map as a political statement creates of its own meaning and generates its
own history. This sets the stage for nationalism which renders the increasingly marginalized
indigenous populations in the mapped region as the historical property of the nation-state, and
consequently they become increasingly controlled by it.26
Mark Warhus’s examination of Native American maps follows a contour similar to
Thongchai’s argument regarding the usurpation of indigenous knowledge by the nation builders
of Siam. For as Warhus argues, the cartographic and physical transformation of the North
American continent relied on “the geographic information they received from Native Americans.
This information was often appropriated and then translated into western maps where it was used
to fill in the details of a land now claimed in the name of western empires and nation states.”27
Aligning himself with Gellner, E.J. Hobsbawm argues that any criteria for defining a
nation based on “language, ethnicity or whatever [are] fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous” and are
useful only to the propagandist. He sees the concept of nation neither as primary nor as
unchanging. It belongs to a historically recent period, and it is a social entity “only insofar as it
relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state.” He considers nationalism, however unevenly
understood within a society, as the maker of nations. As a Marxist, Hobsbawm regards nations
and nationalism as products of social and economic development. He warns against reliance on
nationalist ideologies constructed by elitist spokespeople. Their class interests preclude their

Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 60.
27
Mark Warhus, Another America: Native American Maps and the History of Our Land (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 138.
26
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ability to discover the interests of the “ordinary” people.28 Hobsbawm’s narrow view of language
and ethnicity as mere tools for the propagandist -- however valid this view is considering the
racist programs historically fostered under the banners -- not only differs from Vine Deloria Jr.
and Clifford M. Lytle, it may also may appear to problematize any room in his Marxism for
concepts of Indigenous nations.
However, the so-called “politics of recognition,” which concerns the demands for
recognition by oppressed groups, have been fueled by Marxism, especially as argued by Charles
Taylor who sees the community as the means by which individuals orient their sense of identity
and self worth. Conversely, if the group is demeaned, its members suffer the consequence.
Taylor argues that the demand for recognition is one of the driving forces behind Indigenous
national movements in politics, and “the struggle for recognition can find only one satisfactory
solution, and that is a regime of reciprocal recognition among equals.”29
But another scholar with Marxist underpinnings, Glen Sean Coulthard, regards
recognition on Taylor’s terms as a flawed effort. It leaves Indigenous Peoples unable to grapple
with the consequences of colonialism, because “recognition among equals” attempts
reconciliation with the irreconcilable violence historically committed by the state. Rather, he
argues for Indigenous self-recognition and deploys a modified understanding of Marxism in what
he calls a “place-based foundation of Indigenous decolonial thought.”30
As Benedict Anderson notes, Marxism has cast a long shadow over definitions of nation
and nationalism. The same can be said for his own influential theory of “imagined communities.”

28

E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 (New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2012), 9-11.
29 Ibid.,50.
30
Glean Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014), 54.
14

He defines a nation as “an imagined political community,” and it “is imagined as limited because
even the largest of them [. . .] has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.”
Furthermore, he argues that the concept of nation “was born in an age in which Enlightenment
and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic
realm.”31 He argues that the late Middle Ages saw a decline in the cohesive forces of religion and
dynastic rule, and the narrow literacy controlled by a theologically oriented intelligentsia
loosened because explorations of non-European worlds widened cultural horizons. Reports from
afar found increasingly wide European audiences. As publication of such reports continued to
expand, printing itself became an increasingly powerful and influential industry. So the “great
religiously imagined communities” deteriorated in the face of an expanding world of print
culture. Anderson’s neo-Marxism leads him to conclude that the origin of national consciousness
resides in the book, “the first modern style mass-produced industrial commodity.” In other
words, the proliferation of print -- especially novels and newspapers -- widened literacy led to a
new type of imagined community, one secularized and further consolidated through at least
rudimentary state sponsored education.32
But how other types of “imagined communities” might arise, especially considering the
potency of the trope itself, might remain an open question. After all, the concept of nationhood
travelled far from its European origins, and it eventually led a more complicated life across the
Atlantic where Native nations arose within the nation of the United States. This situation has
meant that ideas of nationhood multiplied, especially as Native Americans asserted their own
identities specific to their own histories as foundations for their concepts of nationhood.

31
32

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 1993), 6-7.
Ibid., 12 – 38.
15

Regarding the foregoing theories, relative consensus among scholars is matched only by
wide latitudes of convergence among them as to what exactly constitutes a nation. Indeed,
invoking Anderson once more, “Nation, nationality, nationalism -- all have proved notoriously
difficult to define.”33 At the very least then, assumptions as to what constitutes a nation remain
problematic. The politically flexible nature of nationhood and issues of self and group identity
entailed by it perhaps makes this so. On the other hand, as abstract as are any concepts of
identity, arguably the material root of a national identity is land. Therein lies the core historical
conflict between Native Americans and Euro-Americans. For this reason, issues regarding land
and the control of its resources and borders are threaded throughout An Entangled History.

Intersections Between Nationhood and Kinship
Europeans brought the word nation to North America, but it would be centuries before it
signified any level of self-identity for Native Americans. Even when the word began to show up
in treaty negotiations, the foundation of Native self-identity rested on kinship, and when ideas of
Native nationhood took root, identities attached to it generally remained secondary to identities
derived through kinship. In brief, Native American history cannot be understood without
studying the role of kinship networks.34
Many colonials could not hope to flourish in the New World unless they too understood
the importance of these networks. For example, in North America’s interior, where the
population of Europeans remained for several centuries proportionally insignificant to the Native

33

Ibid., 3.
Heidi Bohaker, “Nindoodemag”: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the
Eastern Great Lakes Lakes Region, 1600-1701,” William and Mary Quarterly, 63, no. 1, 25.
34
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population, French fur traders found that their livelihoods depended on their acceptance into
Native communities by establishing kinship ties, often through marriage with Indian women.35
With each passing generation, family bonds created by intermarriage between the French
and Native peoples grew increasingly complex. Indeed, The Métis, a First Nations people, trace
part of their ancestry to these intermarriages. Michif, the Métis language, belongs to both the
Algonquian and Indo-European language families, as it combines Cree, French, Ojibwe, and
English, linguistically testifying to a history of cultural cross-fertilization reaching back to the
early years of contact between Europeans and Indians.36
Scholars divide types of kinship into two groups. Blood kinship refers to ties created by
marriage and descent. Fictive kinship encompasses ties established by alliances between
individuals or groups. Gift exchange cements the bonds of kinship. To maintain these bonds,
mutual gifting on a regular basis demonstrates the willingness of the parties involved to continue
good relationships. Gift exchange occurs within the context of diplomacy. Diplomacy keeps lines
of communication open. The gift itself symbolizes the renewed bonds of alliance, of kinship.
Failure to reciprocate a gift sends a message of dissatisfaction with the relationship. Former
bonds can then grow frayed; those who at one time united in kinship can become enemies.37
Thus good diplomatic relations depended on the health of Indigenous kinship networks.
The complex and fluid political and social structures of these networks either established or
continued to affirm formal alliances between individuals and groups. The degrees to which
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French and English commercial and diplomatic efforts succeeded depended largely on the depth
of the alliances that they formed with Native Peoples. But as U.S. Indian policy developed, its
need to rely on Euro-American/Indian kinship networks grew more apparent than real.
Ethnohistorian Sebastian Felix Braun conceives of kinship as a tool for understanding
“the position of individuals within local and regional communities, and ultimately universal
communities they build through kinship relations.”38 Accordingly, the understanding of kinship
can and perhaps should be widely cast enough to better appreciate the degrees of its social,
cultural, and political entanglements. And however much kinship stands at the core of Native
American societies, Europeans and Euro-Americans have historically also been part of those
networks to one degree or another.
For example, in 1774 Virginian Jacob Hite attempted to acquire 150,000 acres of
Cherokee land, and his tactic for doing so relied on the Cherokee kinship connections available
through George Pearis, the Métis son of his business partner. George Pearis’s mother was a
Cherokee, so Cherokee headmen saw him as a useful diplomatic bridge to the British and they
were willing to promote his interests, thus they agreed to give him the 150,000 acres that he had
requested. However, George Pearis then turned around and sold the land to both his father,
Richard Pearis and to Jacob Hite. Fearing the sale could anger the Cherokee, a South Carolina
court voided the deal in order to avoid the formation of an ant-British confederacy. The salient
point here, however, is that the initial grant of the land made to George Pearis by the Cherokee
would not have been possible without his Cherokee kinship ties.39
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Kinship ties were essential for conducting diplomatic relations between the British and
the Indians. As Woody Holton notes: “Substantial intermarriage produced children with one foot
in each world.” For example, Alexander McKee, apparently the son of a British trader and a
Shawnee matron, was the British government’s principal informant on the Upper Ohio Indians.40
Another episode regarding the confluence between diplomacy and kinship concerns a wampum
belt presented to Wabash chiefs by a Shawnee headman. Indeed, the presentation illustrates that
the wives of the chiefs played significant roles in diplomatic relations, as the headman
proclaimed: “all of the Wives of as many Tribes as there is Marks upon the Belt received the
Wabash women’s peace initiative with pleasure.”41
Diplomacy and kinship could also contain a racial component. During a Spring 1769
attempt by the Shawnee to convince the Cherokee to join an anti-British coalition, a Shawnee
diplomat urged Indians to unite with those “of the same Colour.” As Holton argues, this signified
a transformation from tribal to racial self-identity as a foundation for political unity.42 This sense
of political unity spanned intertribal and inter-nation kinship identity and expanded fictive kin
ties for the groups involved.
Diplomatic encounters constitute the meeting of national identities. Thus diplomacy
between Native peoples and Europeans, and later Euro-Americans, figures significantly in the
following pages. Diplomacy entangles nations. Successful diplomacy requires compromise, or
reciprocation, which is manifested in many forms. Reciprocal agreements that made, for
example, the Iroquois confederation possible, as will be explored in chapter 1, have been
common historically between Native nations. And in their diplomatic relations with Native
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Peoples, European colonials generally attempted to adhere to principles of reciprocation. But one
means by which the United States has expressed its national identity has been through Indian
policy. As chapter 2 illustrates, the ability to impose policy meant the ability to wield power. In
turn, the power it wielded manifested itself as the colonialism of Native Peoples.
Moreover, policy is contained within the rubric of diplomacy. Policy designates the
decisions reached by governing bodies regarding political, economic, and/or social courses of
action intended either within or between any number of mutually recognized polities. Though
Indian policy histories tend to concern any one or any combination of imperial, colonial, and
federal policies, the above definition also applies to the policy-making institutions, and to the
policies developed by them, of Native Americans.
For example, Anishinaabeg policy decisions arose through council deliberations in which
representative bodies of all community members partook. Individuals, both men and women,
could add their own voice if they so desired. The time devoted to arrive at a decision had little
bearing on the process. Consensus opinion stood always as the goal of the proceedings, and this
goal could not be rushed. Councils undertook issues concerning all aspects of village affairs,
including matters of national and international importance.43
Many of the first representatives of Young America were missionaries who ventured into
the western Great Lakes region with growing frequency at the dawn of the nineteenth century.
Although these missionaries primarily focused on spreading the gospel, they also embodied the
American political and cultural values of their time. Thus, by degrees, through the schools
missionaries established and the textbooks they used, and through their roles as liaisons between
American and Native nations in commercial affairs and during treaty negotiations, the realms of
43
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their sacred and the secular responsibilities tended to blur into each another. How early
nineteenth century Anishinaabeg dealt with the influx of American missionaries, most of whom
were Protestant, relied in part on a history of interaction with Catholic French missionaries who
had come and gone throughout the previous centuries. The Jesuit program included a long-range
gallicization of the Indians; similarly, American missionaries arrived with a political agenda in
tow. They worked to not only convert Indians to Christianity but to transform them economically
and culturally, that is, to Americanize them.44
Though any given policy frames a nexus of political, social, and economic objectives
intended by the signatories, degrees to which parties honor policy implementation provide fuel
for historical arguments regarding challenges inherent to cross-cultural communication, larger
geopolitical agendas of the parties involved, and the extent to which any policy could adequately
address the needs of individuals or sets of groups within the wider populations of the region and
its associated polities. Diplomatic relationships and their concordant policies that arose between
the federal government and Native Peoples throughout the cis-Mississippi region examined in
this study provide lenses through which to compare different cultural values and perspectives at
work. Simultaneously, the interrogation of these relationships will shed light on the formation of
Indigenous nations as deliberately crafted hybrid constructions.

Entangled Lives
The five case studies in the following pages concern Native nations east of the
Mississippi River and their political and cultural interactions with European colonial and EuroAmerican powers. Two inter-related considerations have determined my study’s geographical
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and temporal parameters. Since my primary intention is to explore some of the ideological
influences of the Revolutionary War on the genesis of Native national identities, the years
directly preceding the American Revolution to the years directly following the 1830 Indian
Removal Act appear most immediately consequential. Moreover, those Native nations that to one
degree or another played roles in the revolution itself originated in cis-Mississippi regions. The
time frame -- 1768 to 1833 -- allows for the examination of some key moments within the arc of
the revolutionary period as contextualized first through the examination of some immediately
historical preconditions regarding British/Native relations, and then finally to the consequences
that the growing assertions of American national identity had for Native nations, namely their
increasingly aggressive acts of Indian removal.
Chapter 1, “International Diplomacy and National Identities: The 1768 Treaty of Fort
Stanwix,” first examines the pre-European contact kinship and diplomatic systems of Eastern
Woodlands Indians as it worked interconnectedly with intertribal trading networks. It then
addresses the relationship between kinship, diplomacy, and trade between English colonial and
Native polities. Exploration of the Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 will provide the means for
understanding the development, maintenance, and renewal of kinship-based alliances.
Furthermore, the chapter will explore the Covenant Chain, the alliance between the English and
the Iroquois, especially as Iroquois diplomats consistently reminded English diplomats that both
parties were bound by the Covenant Chain to negotiate the treaty in good faith. Also compared in
detail throughout the chapter will be the historical significance of the strings and belts of
Iroquois wampum and the legal world that the English documented in writing. The treaty
brought Native nations and the English nation onto the single space of the treaty grounds, thus
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the chapter will explore differing diplomatic protocols as they reveal aspects of national
identities.
Chapter 2, “Shifting Entanglements: Kinship, Native Polities, and Colonialism in the
Great Lakes Region,” examines the transition from an era of imperial colonialism practiced by
France and England to the settler colonialism of the United States in the Old Northwest. It will
argue that settler colonialism undermined the value of kinship networks as structures for
diplomatic relations between Indians and Euro-Americans. The chapter will explore the imperial
colonialism of France and England, particularly as it was focused on the extraction of fur
resources and on the need to maintain working relationships based on kinship with the Indians
who supplied the fur. The chapter will compare this to settler colonialism, in which the land itself
constituted the resource, so access to it required the displacement of its indigenous inhabitants.
Chapter 2 will also examine the significance of Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as a model for
state building not only in the Old Northwest but in the trans-Mississippi west as well.
Chapter 3, “A Crossroads of National Identities: Lafayette’s 1824-1825 Visit to the
United States,” pivots its examination of national identities on Lafayette’s visit. The reasons for
this narrative design are multifold. Lafayette, known as the citizen of two nations because of his
service in the Revolutionary War, serves as a narrative vehicle for examining relationships
between European and Euro-American concepts of nation. Furthermore, his extensive interaction
with Indians during the Revolutionary War and his reacquaintances with them during his tour of
the then-existing 24 states opens the chapter to the analysis of Native nationhoods, which is
explored through the stories of several significant Indian leaders. One of the central stories here
is that of Joseph Brant, who was internationally recognized as the single most influential
Mohawk leader of his time. Another Mohawk leader, Karonghyontye (known also as Captain
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David Hill), figures prominently. Karonghyontye sided with the British, and following the
revolution, spoke passionately for Mohawk independence. Other figures that will be studied
include Seneca leaders Cornplanter and Red Jacket, Choctaw leaders Pushmata and
Mushalatubbee, and the Creek leader, Chilly McIntosh. The stories of these individuals help to
illustrate the tensions inherent to Native struggles for independence, especially as they faced
increasing pressures from the Indian removal policy of the United States.
Chapter, 4, “Cultural Appropriations: American National Identity and the Genre of the
Indian Play in the Early Antebellum Era,” examines the appropriation of Native American
cultural and historical experiences by Euro-American nationalist interests. But furthering the
trope central to other chapters in my study, this chapter examines the entangled nature of
American national identity and builds on Timothy J. Reiss’s argument that, “Cultural categories
must float. ‘Borders’ are more than just porous. Cultures are mutually defining. The fault of
European culture was to believe that they are not, that the burden of definition lay wholly on it. [.
. .] The challenge [. . .] is to avoid the trap of that belief. Simplified binarisms will not do it.”45
So while the appropriation of certain aspects of Native American culture can be reads as a type
of theft, at the same time it points to the entangled nature of American national identity. And at
the intersection of Native American cultural appropriation and American nationalism stands the
Indian play, a genre popular throughout the Antebellum Era. This chapter focuses on the
examination of several significant plays in order to interrogate their relationships between
cultural appropriation and burgeoning nineteenth-century American nationalism, particularly
through their adoption of the stereotype of the Noble Savage as a symbol of American liberty.
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Chapter 5, “A Quest for Political and Religious Sovereignty: The Mashpee Revolt of
1833,” will examine the conditions that led up the successful effort by the Mashpee to establish
tribal sovereignty. It will also explore the equally complex Mashpee campaign to expel
Congregationalist minster Phineas Fish in preference to the Mashpee Baptist preacher “Blind
Joe” Amos. Central to the chapter will be the examination of the role played by Pequot minister
William Apess. Furthermore, the chapter will advance an issue significant to the overall direction
of An Entangled History by examining the manners in which the Mashpee argued that the same
rights of sovereignty claimed by the founders of the United States applied equally to them. Also,
as will be seen in the chapter, by comparing themselves to the American revolutionaries who
threw off the yoke of British tyranny, the Mashpee leveraged an argument that gained steady
traction in the courts and in the press.
An Entangled History interrogates the intersections of Native American and EuroAmerican national and cultural identities and builds on Philip J. Deloria’s argument that, “the
almost unavoidable categories ‘European-Indian’ have always had a perverse way of mapping
seemingly coherent political identities onto complex and contradictory social relations and
cultural productions.”46 It further attempts to dismantle simplistic notions of victim/victimizer
binarism, for this approach too easily mistakes a political agenda for historical analysis and
proves particularly invalid as a means for approaching concepts of nationhood. Indeed as Cheryl
Walker argues:

The general assumption in the critical literature has been that Native Americans were the
victims of nationalist discourse pure and simple, that they resisted attempts to impose an
idea of nation that derived from European models on their Native and essentially tribal
Philip J. Deloria, “Afterword,” in Native Acts: Indian Performance, 1603-1832, ed. Joshua
Bellin and Laura L Mielke (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011), 315.
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structures of governance and knowledge, because such ideas obviously threatened many
aspects of their cultures. But the truth is more complicated than this view allows for,
because by the end of the first third of the nineteenth century, there were several
understandings of nation at play among both Euro-Americans and Native Americans.”47
Degrees of political and cultural entanglement varied widely among Native and nonNative peoples during the period examined in the following five chapters. Moreover, An
Entangled History seeks to ground the abstractions of political and cultural entanglements
through biographically intended snapshots -- of case studies as historical moments taken in a
deep focus that reveals the interplay of larger historical forces and individual human beings that
both produce and are swept up by them. Hence to a wide degree biography is the means through
which the book explores the issue of national identity for Native Americans and for EuroAmericans. An Entangled History is first and foremost the story of entangled lives.
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Chapter 1
International Diplomacy and National Identities:
The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix

In the autumn of 1768, over 3,000 Indians from 16 tribes1 participated in treaty
negotiations at Fort Stanwix, a crumbling and soon-to-be abandoned post near present day
Rome, New York. Many of these participants reached the fort by crossing a nearby three mile
carrying place between Wood Creek and the Mohawk River called the Oneida Carry by
European traders, but known as Deowainsta to the Iroquois.2 Deowainsta stood at the heart of
Haudenosaunee territory. Also, it linked the Great Lakes and the Mohawk River Valley,
effectively connecting North American interior waterways with the Atlantic. Across it had
travelled representatives from the six nations of the Confederacy as well as Chugnut, Conoy,
Delaware, Minisink, Nanticoke, Shawnee, and Tutelo embassies.3 Most negotiations involved
only the six Iroquois nations that managed to broker a deal with Sir William Johnson and
William Croghan in which they sold a vast stretch of Ohio Valley land to the English. However,
the land did not belong to them: the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo claimed it, but were not
extended the courtesy of consultation during the proceedings.
This geopolitical entanglement of Native nations was further complicated by English
imperial designs and by the ambitions of colonial land speculators and traders. Indeed, the drama
at Fort Stanwix played out in the theater of international politics. Moreover, negotiations on the
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treaty grounds proceeded not only along lines of political entanglement but of cultural
entanglement as well. Therefore, this complex interplay of politics and cultures can be brought
into focus perhaps most effectively through a world historical lens. This will help sharpen an
understanding of some of the ways that nations constructed on culturally differing foundations
also shared certain common principles. The founding of Iroquois nations, especially as members
of a confederacy, also differed from that of other Native nations covered in subsequent chapters.
Briefly, as will be explored below, the Confederacy arose in a relatively autonomous manner.
European models did not directly influence the construction of its nations. Whereas other nations
– the Creek, Cherokee, and Mashpee, for example, did arise syncretically by incorporating EuroAmerican ideas of government into their own existing governments. While examining each of
these nations in isolation may be possible, the broader contextual analysis made possible by
world historical methods hopes to underscore the interconnectedness of these human stories.
What could be termed treaty ground entanglement was on display in 1768. Three aspects
of the proceedings conducted between the Iroquois and the English contributed to this
entanglement. Also, these entanglements were non-equivalent because power differentials
between Native and non-Native groups have been historically in flux, and because mutual
influences between these groups varied over time. Indeed, this non-equivalency informs every
type of entanglement studied throughout An Entangled History.
But regarding the first of the three aspects noted above, the Iroquois negotiated from a
position of political, cultural, and economic power. The English could not effectively advance
their interests without recognizing this. Indeed, as characterized by William N. Fenton: “In the
crucible of Indian and White relations the patterns that had governed Iroquois life for centuries
became compelling and forced White people to approach the Indian in a highly ritualized way
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that was completely foreign to European ways of thinking.”4 Six chiefs of the Confederacy
signed their marks to the treaty: Tyohansere (Little Abraham) made a knife blade for the
Mohawks; Conoghquieson, a tree for the Oneida’s; Sequarusera, a cross for the Tuscaroras;
Otsinoghiyata (Bunt), a hill for the Onondagas; Tegaaia, a pipe for the Cayugas; and Guastrax, a
hill for the Senecas.5 Each mark stood not so much for the individual signatory as it did for the
entire nation represented by him. Scott Richard Lyons argues that such marks affixed to treaties
between Native peoples and both European and American governments constituted signifiers of
coercion in agreements made “when there seems to be little choice in the matter. To the extent
that little choice isn’t the quite same thing as no choice, it signifies Indian agency. To the extent
that little choice isn’t exactly what is meant by the word liberty, it signifies the political realities
of the treaty era.”6 Lyons also underscores the historical shift in Indian politics that came with
the arrival of the Europeans. Among the Iroquois, for example, wampum belts recorded formal
agreements between polities, but the belts contained no signature component.

Before the arrival of the whites, communities dealt respectfully with each other in a way
that encouraged different peoples to retain their ways of life, while at the same time
establishing territorial boundaries, conditions of trade, and what would now be called
“diplomatic relations.” Treaties were different. When made with Europeans -- and
especially later when made with Americans -- treaties increasingly introduced new and
unfamiliar concepts that situated peoples, parties, lands, and relationships between them
differently. Treaties compelled Indians to change how they lived. They addressed the
parties who signed treaties in a new way too -- as nations.7
4
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Secondly then, the six Confederation signatures on the 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty stood
affixed by individuals born into a world in which Europeans had been making treaties with
Indians for generations. But pre-European contact diplomatic systems of the Eastern Woodlands
Indians worked interconnectedly with intertribal trading networks.8 For example, by 1606, and
likely earlier, production and distribution of wampum beads centered among the Shinnecock,
Pequot, and Narrangasett who traded them primarily through northeastward routes as far away as
Nova Scotia.9 The bead trade occupies a place of particular historical significance since wampum
belts provided, among other things, a means of documentation for both inner and inter-tribal
diplomatic agreements. Pottery and copper also travelled the Eastern Woodland trading network.
Goods could not have successfully exchanged hands within the network without the existence of
complex human relationships built up over time, and as, as Robert A. Williams argues: “These
kinds of extended trading connections probably could not have existed or been sustained [. . .]
without benefit of tribal diplomacy. Some form of negotiations over issues of safe passage and
other privileges is usually necessary to sustain trade between groups.”10
Recognition and examination of diplomatic modes that developed concurrently with the
exchange of goods in the Eastern Woodland trading networks helps inform an understanding of
the Iroquois tactics and strategies employed during treaty negotiations with Europeans. However,
the European concept of trade corresponds only roughly with the Iroquois institution of gift
giving. As with Native peoples elsewhere, gift giving, not buying and selling as associated with
8
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the concept of trade networks, cemented kinship ties and served diplomatically as a means for
building bonds through reciprocal obligation.11 As argued by Colin G. Calloway: “What
Europeans called diplomacy and what they called trade [. . .] tended, at least on one level, to be
identical for people of the Five Nations.”12
And thirdly, treaty ground entanglement played out in the cross-cultural link between
diplomacy and trade. This link meant that when the English negotiated with the Iroquois the
relationship between the two by no means seemed alien. The difference arose in the manner in
which two polities expressed the relationship, a process that often led to the invention of a type
of syncretism in the legal realm. Here Europeans introduced the language of jurisprudence to the
Indigenous political landscape, but the European legal framework did not simply cancel out
Native law. Rather, a legal pluralism operated during treaty negotiations that resulted in the
creation of new legal meanings, a process expressed in Robert M. Cover’s notion of jurisgenesis.
Jurisgenesis “takes place always through an essentially cultural medium. Although the
state is not necessarily the creator of legal meaning, the creative process is collective or social.”13
Rules regulating the manner in which diplomatic encounters took place between the English and
the Iroquois arose in a creative process of compromise, one particularly challenged by the fact
that the two cultures operated within frames of reference with only approximate equivalencies
between them, at best. However, The collective meaning that did arise established the laws
governing diplomatic engagement.
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The Fort Stanwix Treaty of 1768 provides an example of a jurisgenesis that combined the
tradition of English jurisprudence with the tradition of Iroquois constitutional structure, one
based fundamentally in the development, maintenance, and renewal of alliances. Consistently,
Iroquois negotiators at Fort Stanwix reminded their English counterparts that the long-standing
Covenant Chain -- the alliance -- between the two powers entailed mutual responsibility for its
endurance; furthermore, the sanctity of the relationship depended on an atmosphere of good
feelings — a sincere desire to assure each other’s best welfare. Control of the structure in which
diplomatic encounters occurred meant control of the diplomatic message.

The Longhouse
The function of both trade and law in the pre-European contact diplomatic systems of the
Eastern Woodlands Indians cannot be understood without examining the fundamental operation
of kinship networks. As noted in the Introduction, Native American history in general cannot be
effectively approached unless premised on the examination of kinship. And regarding the
relationships between the Iroquois Confederacy and the English, the function of kinship was
essential to the Covenant Chain. European colonials could not enter into trade or diplomacy with
Native peoples unless entering into kinship relationships with them.
In Iroquoia kinship and nationhood were linked through the longhouse. The longhouse
served the Iroquois not only as a place of residence but also as a symbol of identity. Indeed, the
Seneca word Haudenosaunee, meaning “the extended house,” “the whole house,” or “The
Longhouse,” provides the metaphor of collective self-identity, of nationhood, whereas the word
Iroquois, derived from the Algonquian language family and lacking clear definition, arose as a
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French descriptor.14 Physically, longhouses usually measured about twenty feet in width and
averaged about one hundred feet in length, though houses up to two hundred feet in length were
common. Length depended on the number of fires; with one fire for each family, each family
sheltered within its walls added about twenty-five feet to the longhouse’s length. Each individual
within a longhouse drew his or her identity from membership in a kinship network that provided
social and political cohesion within and between longhouses.15
Through interconnected planes of social, cultural, and political identity, Longhouse
families belonged to clans, to moieties, to the nation, and to the confederacy. An Iroquois clan is
composed of two or more maternal families in which members of all generations are considered
siblings. If links with an original maternal family fade from memory, the family itself becomes
extinct: “its ashes get cold.” However, clan identity continues. One or more clans constitute a
moiety. The typical Iroquois community contained two reciprocating moieties. Historically, for
example, when the Seneca council met, two moieties faced each other with the council fire
between them. Discussion of a given council issue continued until both moieties reached a
mutually satisfactory course of action regarding it. The Grand Council of the Iroquois League
adopted this system, one microcosmically represented in the fireside family in which an
individual family member could pursue two lines of appeal, the mother’s line and the father’s
line. The two lines defined duties and obligations, particularly to one's mother's brother, who
might be the clan chief, but also to one's father's kin. This kinship structure was thus projected
into that of the confederacy.16
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Any Iroquoian national identity is linked to the land itself, so the concept of Iroquois
nationhood is both kindred and territorial, as the several bands, tribes, or nations are built on the
model of the longhouse, which implies both kin and territory. Moreover, the basic patterns of
social structure and local organization also extended to the Iroquois view of alliances and
treaties. If allied, different nations became members of a kinship network, and, for example, this
informed the metaphorical “chain of friendship” between the Iroquois Confederacy and the
British Empire. The principles of duality and reciprocity operated throughout alliances.17

The Founding of the Iroquois Confederacy
Many stories describe the founding of the Iroquois Confederacy, established at some
point between 1400 and 1600. They present Iroquois national life as one grounded in kinship
loyalties. Stories often concern the transformation of belligerent individuals and groups into
states of peaceful coexistence. They are stories of nation-formation. They describe the origin of
the Confederacy’s infrastructure; moreover, they illuminate the relationships between oral
traditions, religion, and national identities.18
Four individuals figure prominently in these traditions -- Tarenyawagon, Deganawida,
Hiawatha, and Tadadaho. Levels of historicity for all four remain matters of ongoing debate.
The following brief distillation of stories concerning the founding of the confederacy, or league,
relies on Christopher Vescey’s compilation of the many fragments recorded over time. First
comes Tarenyawagon, who defeated monsters, cleared obstructions from the water, indicated the
best places for fishing, and established principles for humans to follow. He taught five families
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the art of war and the right of expansion. His actions set the stage for instituting the Iroquois
constitution. However, a disagreement arose, and the five families dispersed, each speaking a
separate language. Deganawida came upon some hunters whose village had been destroyed by
intertribal warfare. He told them, “The Great Creator from whom we all are descended sent me
to establish the Great Peace among you. No longer shall you kill one another and nations shall
cease warring upon each other.” Next he visited Djigonsasa, the Mother of Nations, who fed
warriors along the road. He told her to stop supplying the war parties and explained his
principles of righteousness, peace, and power. She was the first one to accept his message, thus
giving clan mothers priority in Iroquoia.19
The creation of wampum is attributed to Hiawatha. He cut Elderberry Twigs into lengths
and strung them into three pieces, saying, “This I would do if I found anyone burdened with grief
even as I am. I would console them.” He came upon a lake, startling the ducks there. When they
flew off they took all the water with them. Hiawatha then gathered shells along the lake bottom
and strung them into beads. Nearby a Mohawk village he sat in a cornfield making wampum. A
woman saw him and told the chief of his presence. The chief then sent messengers out to invite
him to the village itself. Hiawatha taught the villagers the proper way to deliver messages with
wampum and, when asked, explained that he lived a life of wandering ever since Tadadaho
killed his family. Next, Hiawatha met Deganawida, who consoled him using eight of the thirteen
wampum strings gathered by Hiawatha. His mind clear after the ceremony, he helped
Deganawida create the laws that that they would present to all Iroquois, and each nation in turn
accepted them. United, and led by Deganawida, the nations sought out Tadadaho in order to
transform him, singing the Peace Hymn, which Deganawida taught and which could “soothe the
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angry feelings” of Tadadaho, reconstructing his mind “so that he may again have the mind of a
human being.” The song thanked the League, peace, ancestors, warriors, women, and kinship.
The procession reached Onondaga, performed ceremonies at the edge of the woods, and
explained its message to Tadadaho. The procession rubbed him with wampum until his evil spirit
left him completely. He agreed to an alliance with them after the procession promised to make
him the firekeeper, the main chief, with Onondaga as capital.20
In sum, oral tradition claims that Deganawida and Hiawatha established national peace
and tranquility throughout Iroquoia. They created one people, united as one great family, and
declared that if any one nation was attacked, the injury was felt by all of five nations. They
created a confederate government with local autonomy, a constitution, civic order, and law, with
each item of law represented by wampum. The League also developed foreign policy. It created
laws of adoption, emigration, and laws regarding the rights of foreign nations. The League
determined that it shall be a place of refuge for other nations and sent delegations out to
Cherokees, Ojibways, and other Indians. If foreign aggressors did not heed warnings, war would
be declared. The League reserved the right to battle any “obstinate opposing nation that has
refused to accept the Great Peace.” The League established the condolence ceremony, a reenactment of the rite performed by Deganawida for Hiawatha and repeated by them both for the
cleansing of Tadadaho. One moiety would console another, when someone -- especially a chief - has died. The condolence eliminates the mourner’s crippling grief and reaffirms life, thus
reconciling the living with death and with one another. The thirteen wampum strings of
Requickening helps maintain the stability and health of the League’s officials and of the League
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itself.21
The stories provide the source for Iroquois ritual life -- especially The Condolence ritual,
the Peace Hymn, the Ritual at the Edge of the Woods, and Requickening -- and for the political
protocols of diplomacy and alliance, as illustrated, for example in the ritual decorum of
Hiawatha’s invitation to enter the Mohawk village. Also, as illustrated in the transformation of
Tadadaho and his integration into the League, the duality of the Iroquois worldview does not
preclude the incorporation of an adversary. Thus dualisms are complementary, and reciprocation
and compromise are foundational to the Iroquois League. The League then is envisioned as a
kinship state, a system of mutuality that extends the kinship structure of the longhouse to a
concept of nationhood also based on kinship.22
Just as Tarenyawago clears obstructions from the water, Hiawatha’s wampum clears the
way for the Confederacy. Wampum belts bind nations in alliance. They establish a means to send
messages and record agreements. Instrumental in diplomacy, they assure peace. Wampum
provides the means for consolation, and just as Tadadaho can be healed, blood feuds can be
reconciled. Thus to confront grievances between nations and establish an alliance, diplomacy
also required condolence as a means to heal losses inflicted by warfare. Wampum provides the
means by which the principles and agreements of the League can be recalled and passed down to
future generations, thus it serves as a type of constitution.
Furthermore, the stories illustrate the intervention of the divine in human life.
Supernatural power – orenda -- is manifested through the heroes. They are embodiments,
incarnations, or messengers of Tarenyawagon; therefore, the institutions they create possess the
power that derives from the supernatural, so the Confederacy exists as a direct reflection of
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divine law and the result of divine intervention. Thus Deganawida instructed all chiefs to give
thanks to the Creator, “the source and ruler of your lives,” and the wampum created by Hiawatha
served as a channel that led to “communion with the Great Spirit.”23
The structure of Iroquois diplomacy relied on alliances and reciprocity between its five,
and later six, member nations, a structure that operated in concert with leader/follower
configurations within Iroquois villages. Within every level of this structure, leaders and powerful
orators functioned as Iroquois diplomats, the dignity of their offices symbolized through the act
of linking arms. Leader responsibility entailed the accurate conveyance of constituent positions
during national or international council meetings. Central to Iroquois diplomacy stood the goal of
maintaining and expanding alliances not only among humans but also among other-than-humans
and animals as well. Thus diplomacy depended on linking arms between physical and
metaphysical dimensions, though the Iroquois sense of seamlessness between the two eluded
European worldviews. All beings within these dimensions possessed power that could be either
harmful or helpful. The best interests of the individual depended on the negotiation of alliances
with these powers that would be of greatest benefit to him or her. These negotiations depended
upon relations between leaders, defined by Mark Druke Becker as “people whose talents and
traits were valued and respected,” and followers, defined by her as “those who were influenced
by the qualities leaders were deemed to possess.”24
The foundation of leader/ follower alliances stood on kinship networks. Iroquois
diplomacy depended on multilevel personal relationships that bound leaders and followers
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together through kinship and clan membership, so if an individual moved from one community
or nation to another, he or she did so within a network of alliances. Alliances between similar
leader/ follower structures opened opportunities for strengthening the sense of value and power
for all members involved because one group did not absorb simply another. Rather, alliance
members maintained independence but at the same time extended their relationships. Selfidentity stood inextricably linked with group identity.
A circle of fifty wampum strings symbolized the fifty sachems of the Iroquois
Confederacy, but all stood as individual leaders who joined to form the council of chiefs. The
League consisted of “an alliance of distinct parts forming a united, and therefore stronger, front
than any nation or coalition alone could provide.”25 The power of Iroquois diplomacy depended
on links formed between member nations, though the diplomatic structure provided opportunity
for individual nations to take positions on issues advantageous to their own interests.
Alliances extended outside of the Confederacy as well. Nations endeavored through their
spokespeople, their leaders, to link arms with one another, an act that symbolized consensus
linked with alliance. Reciprocal gifting assured effective intertribal diplomacy. Iroquois council
meetings depended upon continued renewal of personal, national, and international alliances as
well as upon fundamental respect for consensus, regardless of the time required for all voices to
be heard. Deliberations included the repetition of proposals to ensure their clear understanding
by all present.26 Becker contends that the act of linking arms and the political connotations
represented by it accurately captures the structure of Iroquois diplomacy.
As noted earlier, treaty negotiations between Iroquois nations were held at council fires.
But treaties presented a means of resolving tensions not only within Iroquois society but in
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international Iroquoian relationships as well. Regarding the later, the Iroquois premised their
society on the idea that everyone should have a name and a niche in its kinship system, and one
way of attaining both was through adoption. Therefore, colonial governors were adopted into the
Iroquoian kinship network and assigned names, and to maintain peace instead of war, the
alliance was reaffirmed by the exchange of wampum belts. In sum, the 1768 Treaty of Fort
Stanwix cannot be understood outside of the Iroquoian institution of kinship networks and of the
Iroquoian concept of nationhood.

Intercultural Preparations for the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix
Fort Stanwix represented English presence in the northeast; the Oneida Carry, across
from which the fort stood, represented the Iroquois dominion. The geographical space of the
negotiations stood at the confluence of two cultural centers whose physicality embodied
significant symbolic power for the treaty’s signatories. The staging of the negotiations involving
the largest single land cession at that point in North American history could not have been
enacted at a more appropriate location.
Preparations for the treaty negotiations at the fort began with the invitations. Iroquois
council protocol required their issuance by the party desiring a treaty conference; both message
and accompanying wampum went by runner to those invited.27 Proper comportment regarding
the dissemination of invitations to foreign states stood as a long-standing counterpart in
European diplomatic history. A protocol unfamiliar to Europeans involved the use of wampum
by the Iroquois as a method of communication. But European diplomats understood the need to
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conform to the protocol of the Indians with whom they desired to negotiate treaties. For example,
on 8 October William Johnson “Sent off two Mohock Indians as Messengers [. . .] and a Belt to
hurry the [Ohio nation’s delegates] to come to the Congress.”28 Also, on 18 October Johnson
“sent an Indian Express with a String of Wampum to Conoghquieson chief of Oneida &ca.
acquainting him that he had been there a month at Fort Stanwix without seeing them, and
therefore desired them to come there without delay.”29 News travelled by wampum belts.
Michael K. Foster describes wampum “as a kind of recording device, somewhat in the way we
conceive of the function of a tape recorder. Reading a wampum would then be analogous to
playing back a taped message.”30
From the ceremonial opening of negotiations on 24 October to the actual signing of the
treaty on 5 November 1768, the process allowed little room for improvisation. The script had
been in rehearsal for years. Fenton characterizes treaties as “A species of drama in which the
Iroquois were the playwrights, the directors and teaching actors, and the joint producers with the
colonial hosts. [. . .] The Indian treaty, like much of American culture, was the product of the
interaction of the two cultures.”31 The substantive contents of the treaty itself represented the
designs of the treaty’s signatories that had been in development since a 8 May 1765 meeting
between Iroquois, Delaware, and English diplomats at Johnson Hall. William J. Campbell notes:
“Johnson may have been required to formalize treaty proceedings, but much of the bargaining
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that took place in the years, months, weeks, and days prior to the opening ceremonies involved
careful politicking”32
The treaty drawn up in May 1765 marked the beginning of formal negotiations between
the Iroquois and the English to set the cession boundary that extended the 1763 Proclamation
Line to include the Ohio country, far to the west of Iroquoia. One group of Delawares who lived
along the Susquehanna River east of the Alleghany Mountains and another group from the west
of the mountains -- the Delawares of the Ohio -- signed the treaty. The treaty also declared that
the Delawares occupied a status subordinate to the Iroquois.
The Iroquois negotiators did not initially sign. They demanded that the Indian side of the
line include a region in which several white settlements had already been established.33 One
negotiator told Johnson: “We think to continue the line up [the Susquehanna] River to Cherry
Valley Lake, and from thence to the German Flatts.”34 Though the Iroquois would agree to a
slightly westward modification of the line before signing the treaty, the goal of this opening
gambit had its desired effect: to put Johnson on notice that the Iroquois would tolerate no white
settlement on their side of the line. Johnson agreed in principle that the boundary should be one
“which no White Man shall dare to invade,”35 but controlling white settlement on the eastern
borderlands of Iroquoia had already become a daunting task for the English. To preserve as much
of their own homeland as possible, the Iroquois used the Ohio River Valley -- mostly Shawnee
land -- as their bargaining chip. However, the Shawnees did not have a place at the negotiating
table that May. Three years later at Fort Stanwix they still would not have a place.
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Protocol for Opening the Negotiations
Early on the morning of 24 October 1768, William Johnson opened proceedings at the
fort with a condolence ceremony “agreeable to the ancient custom established by our
forefathers.”36 The ceremony exemplifies Fenton’s observation that Europeans recognized the
need to perform in a “highly ritualized way [foreign to their] ways of thinking.” Johnson had
long been acquainted with Iroquoia and had established deep bonds of trust with many of its
peoples.

With this string of Wamp: I do, on behalf of His Majesty & all His subjects wipe away
the Tears from your eyes which you are constantly shedding for your late deceased
Chiefs [. . .]. With this String I clear the Passage to your Hearts that you may speak
cheerfully and candidly [. . .]. With this Belt I light up, anew your several Council Fires
[. . .]. With this belt I dispel the darkness which for some time past has overspread your
several Countries [. . .]. I do now [. . .] take the clearest water and therewith cleanse your
inside from all Filth and every thing which has given you concern. [. . .]. In performing
these ceremonies I can not omit the necessary part, which is, that as there are but two
Council Fires for your confederacy, the one at my house and the other at Onondaga, I
must desire that you always be ready to attend either of them, when called upon, by
which means business will I hope, always be attended & properly carried on for our
mutual interest [. . .].37

Strings and belts of wampum affirmed the truth and sincerity of messages. They
functioned to stress the importance of the words themselves while at the same time serving as
mnemonic instruments and records of significant historical events, including agreements made
between treaty parties. Though each nation retained belts significant to its own transactions,
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particularly important belts went to the Onondaga Council House where a designated wampum
keeper took charge of them. Periodically, each belt underwent a rehearsal, the readings necessary
to maintain “memory of the particular verbal stream [and] recalled and taught by association
with the character and design of the particular belt.”38 Absence of wampum at treaty negotiations
would have been inconceivable to the Iroquois.
As Johnson’s use of wampum demonstrates, the legal structure of negotiations required
the incorporation of Native terms of at least equal weight to the terms of European legal
traditions. The resulting jurisgenesis suggests that treaty negotiations occurred in a conceptual
space designed to ensure a sense of trust between the signatories. The words of the treaty itself
combined with wampum to establish an agreement recognizable to all parties as legally binding
within their different frames of legal reference.
For the Iroquois, legitimation of the treaty’s provisions depended on adherence to the
form taken by the negotiations themselves. Daniel K. Richter identifies this relationship:

Treaty making was essentially an extension of the Great Peace to a broader stage. The
condolence rituals, words of peace, and exchanges of gifts mandated by the Good News
of Peace and Power provided the basic paradigm for diplomatic relations with outsiders.
In treaty councils between villages and nations, ceremonial repetitions of oral traditions
about the history and ties between the peoples paralleled the recitation of the
Deganawidah Epic at League councils.39
The condolence ceremony resonated deeply for the Iroquois, and as incorporated into the
Fort Stanwix negotiations, it did so with many of its aspects intact, though presented in
juxtaposition with English worldviews of legality. Moreover, as Michael M. Pomedli argues, the
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use of symbols and ritual language in the condolence ceremony indicates it spiritual basis, one
that runs parallel to the “stenographic and legal language” of the Europeans.40
The first area of the condolence ceremony, “Journeying on the Trail,” concerned the core
obligation of the host to graciously provide provisions and allow time for guests to rest from
their travels. Pomedli notes that the original form also included songs, laments for loss of any
ritual knowledge, the enumeration of hereditary titles, and the announcement of bereaved
families as they arrived.41 Johnson exhibited keen awareness of his responsibilities as a host.
Preparations commenced 4 May when Guy Johnson -- William Johnson’s protégé and son-in-law
-- requested General Gage to use his best judgment but suggested: “If their Number is not greater
[than over a thousand] 50 Barrels of Pork, and a proportion of Flour, will be found little enough
for them [. . .].42 As the number of expected attendees elevated over the course of the summer, so
did requests for food and housing supplies. On 16 October, with thousands of Indians having
already arrived, A frantic William Johnson wrote John Glen at Schenectady: “I [. . .] desire You
will Send a large quantity of provisions up here as Soon as possible, otherwise it must overset the
design of this Congress, as it cannot be Supposed that Hungry Indians can be kept here, or in any
temper without a Bellyfull.”43
The next phase, “Welcome at the Woods Edge,” clears a metaphorical path between the
Europeans and the Indians to indicate one another’s open and friendly intentions exhibited by
expressions of peace accompanied by gift-giving. The full ritual contained congratulations and
condolences between clan members and demonstrations of concern for one another’s safety and
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health, ministrations accompanied by the kindling of a fire and a pipe smoking ceremony.44
Johnson’s opening words of the condolence ceremony that he conducted indicate his sensitivity
to the ceremony’s protocol: “I take you by the hand and heartily bid you all welcome to this
place where I have kindled a Council Fire for affairs of importance. [. . .] I now, agreeable to the
antient custom establishd by our Forefathers, proceed to the ceremony of condolence usual on
these occasions.”45 Further along in his presentation he exclaimed: “With this belt I light up
anew your several Council Fires.”46 Johnson also knew that gifts served as measures of sincerity
and generosity, essential elements for a leader and for a host. He lavished the Indian dignitaries
with gifts in the form of merchandise as well as cash, together requiring about £2000 drawn from
the Crown treasury.47
“Requickening,” the third phase, centered on rituals for “opening eyes and cleansing ears
and throats.” Its complete form prescribed a procession of condolers to the longhouses of the
mourners with singing and the recollection of individual titles read from mnemonic canes and
wampum strings.48

The Requickening ceremony is neither a funeral ceremony nor a memorial service. The
ceremony ensures that the number of federal chiefs remains undiminished. [. . .] The
rituals of condolence and installation preserved [. . .] political integrity and welfare. Yet
[the Iroquois] had to admit one power, that of death, was sinister and overpowering.49
Here again Johnson demonstrated adherence to Iroquois protocol in his role as a
condoler:
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“I [. . .] wipe away the Tears from your eyes which you are constantly shedding for your
late deceased Chiefs, and I clear your sight that you may look cheerfully at your bretheren. [. . .]
I clear the passage to your hearts that you may speak cheerfully and candidly [. . .] and remove
all sorrow & uneasiness from you. [. . .] I am greatly concerned for the many losses you have
sustained in your several nations since our last meeting & sincerely condole with you for them
all.”50
The next phase, “Six Songs of Farewell,” contained an invocation of dead ancestors and a
thanksgiving for the League. Johnson addressed the later with particular concern for the Shawnee
and the Delaware, lest they forget their obligations as dependents of the Iroquois:

I must also advise you to be unanimous among yourselves & reside in your respective
Countries, and not think of scattering or settling amongst other Nations [. . .] to the great
weakening of your confederacy [. . .] I give you a pouch with a String of Wampum in it,
which you are to make use of when you here of the loss of any of the Confederacy, and
rise up on such occasions without delay in order to condole for the same. [. . .] I now
supply you with a torch or candle which you are to travel with by night upon any
extraordinary emergency.51
“Over the Great Forest,” the fifth phase, involved two parts: lament for loss of ritual
knowledge; and recognition of the succession of new chiefs and recognition of the death of any
Confederacy chiefs. This phase, as well as “Six Songs of Farewell,” constituted adjournment
procedures. Adherence to any element relevant to the fifth phase does not appear evident at Fort
Stanwix. The final act of the negotiation consisted primarily of the treaty’s signing, a strictly
English procedure. Johnson’s journal states only: “The Deed to His Majesty, [. . .] to the
Proprietors of Pennsylvania, [and] to the Traders being [. . .] laid on the Table [. . .] The Chiefs
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of each Nation received the Cash which was piled on a Table [. . .] and then proceeded to divide
the Goods amongst their People.”52
The condolence ceremony centered on the need to unify grieving individuals, tribes and
nations in order to comes to terms with death and then to recognize the need to transcend sorrow.
Michael J. Pomedli notes: “In treaty celebrations [. . .] Native leaders used the rite as a camping
ground in which they freely moved and used its customary words and actions. English leaders
also moved within this camping ground, making their own the sentiments, style, and actions of
this rite.”53 Iroquois form intertwined with English function to create the space necessary to
conduct international affairs between the two powers. Mutual recognition that equal powers sat
at the treaty-signing table constructed the essential fiction upon which the authority of the treaty
itself rested.

Mutually Beneficial Political Fictions
As William J. Campbell argues, a symbiotic political fiction allowed the English to gain
the Ohio country by claiming to recognize the Shawnees and the Delawares as Iroquoian
dependents due to the Six Nation’s right of conquest over them. Therefore, the valley could be
sold to the English Empire without either Shawnee or Delaware approval. In turn, the Iroquois
signatories hoped to gain legitimation of their imperial ambitions because of Whitehall’s
recognition of their authority. The mutual fiction bound the Iroquois Confederacy with the
English Empire:
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The 1768 land cession agreement reveals the extent to which those seeking to create and
project the authority of either the Grand Council or Crown benefitted from working in
concert. Many Iroquois may have laughed at the idea of their obedience to a European
king, but the Grand Council was well aware of the benefits of appearance and collusion.
[. . .] Both authorities became dependent on the survival of the other.54
Thus, the Treaty of 1768 served as a point of intersection between the Iroquois and the
English in which mutual interests built a legal foundation to secure mutually beneficial status and
authority in the Northeast and in the Ohio Valley.
On Tuesday afternoon, the day following Johnson’s opening address, Oneida Chief
Conoghquieson addressed the assembly. He acknowledged Johnson's message from the previous
day, thanked him for adhering to the ancient customs of the Six Nations, promised Johnson that
the chiefs would consult with their young warriors, and assured him that all "the six nations, with
the Shawanese, Delaware & all their dependents as far as great Plains of the Sioto," would
observe Johnson’s recommendations.55 However, he did not mention that the recommendations
stood as the product of three years worth of negotiations between the Iroquois and the English.
As William J. Campbell argues: “Johnson's ‘decisions,’ [came] as no surprise to those gathered
at the Oneida Carry.”56
The first portion of Conoghquieson’s speech went unrecorded by the treaty scribe who
remarked only: “Gave 3 Strings Then repeated all that Sir William had said on the Black Belts
given at the Condolence.”57 Conoghquieson’s words susbsequent to the reported wholesale
repetition did enter the record. But the narrative structure of that speech relied largely on the
repetition of Johnson’s own phrases to which Conoghquieson amended words of appreciation
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and gratitude. Conoghquieson’s response followed Iroquois Council protocol. Repetition served
as a ritual acknowledgment that a speaker’s words had been heard and understood.

In contrast to impatient officials, who wanted quickly to get to their point and who
stressed a concluding document -- the treaty -- the Iroquois emphasized the slow process
of discussion. [. . .] From an oral culture, the Iroquois recognized but distrusted the power
of written documents. [. . .] Indians preferred the methodical and rhythmic repetition of
shared sentiments and histories expressed through prolonged rituals and speeches.58
The speeches of both Johnson and Conoghquieson also recognized that the Grand
Council fire of the Confederacy, traditionally kept by the Onondogas, burned in parallel with the
fire at Johnson Hall: dual flames that symbolized a bond of alliance between the two empires. As
Johnson noted in a speech quoted earlier, “There are but two Council Fires for your confederacy,
the one at my house and the other at Onondaga, I must desire that you will always be ready to
attend either of them [. . .] for our mutual Interest.”59 Emblems and expressions of solidarity
between the Iroquois and the English made multiple appearances throughout the proceedings at
Fort Stanwix.
Conoghquieson played a major role during the thirteen days of official negotiations.
Ceremonially “raised up” in 1755 and given the same name as his deceased predecessor to
become one of the fifty League chiefs, he both defended the right of the Iroquois people to
remain in their lands and, in conversations with William Johnson predating the treaty, advocated
the sale of the Ohio Valley to the English Empire.60 Thus the role he played at Fort Stanwix in
1768 had long been in rehearsal.
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Along with the Oneida chief, other Iroquois chiefs played significant roles at Fort
Stanwix that culminated in their treaty signatures. For example, Mohawk chief Tyohansere
(Little Abraham), who fought prominently during the Seven Years War and later negotiated to
save Mohawk land from speculators,61 also served as one of William Johnson’s translators at
Fort Stanwix.62 Tyohansere’s village stood east of the proposed line.63 On 26 October he
demanded that Johnson change the treaty boundary to protect his region. Adjusting the line
exceeded the Administrator’s authority; however, that night “Sir William had a private
conference with the Chiefs of the most influence with whom he made use of every argument to
bring matters to an agreeable issue.”64 The line would be adjusted.
At nine o’clock on Sunday evening, 30 October, six Oneida chiefs came to see Johnson
and proposed a boundary line that would keep the Oneida Carry in their hands. Johnson rejected
the idea, offered $500 to the Oneida nation, and promised “a handsome present for each of the
Chiefs” if they could persuade the nation to give up the Carrying Place. The chiefs withdrew for
the evening then returned at ten o’clock the next morning to tell Johnson “that the people
positively refused to agree to any other Line than they had proposed the last night [. . .] as by
Keeping horses and Carriages there [. . .] to carry over the Traders Goods, they might earn
somewhat for the support of their families.” Johnson countered by declaring his surprise because
they had “neglected carrying goods for so many years.” The Oneida chiefs responded with their
final offer. They would take $600 “over and beside the several Fees which were given in
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Private,” and they would share the Carrying Place with the English. Johnson “acquiesced for the
present leaving it to be confirmed or rejected by his majesty.”65`
Johnson’s quarters served as the site for many similar conversations as Iroquois chiefs
either singly or in groups demanded adjustments beneficial to their interests. Since the sale of the
Ohio valley had been worked out to the satisfaction of both the Iroquois and the English, the
Iroquois focused their last minute negotiating energies on retaining control of areas in near
proximity to their own homeland. They drove hard bargains, as illustrated by the demands made
by Tyohansere and by the Oneida Chiefs. Johnson exceeded his authority to accommodate the
demands, but reprimands from the Crown would be perfunctory; the larger prize for the English,
clear title to the Ohio country, would more than compensate for any relatively minor legal
infractions. Land speculators and Whitehall recognized the treaty for what it truly represented:
the largest American land cession in the colonial history of the English Empire.
The Iroquois chiefs knew that they negotiated from a position of power. They controlled
-- or claimed to control -- something that the English wanted: the Ohio country. For example, on
Friday, 28 October, Tyohansere told Johnson that the Crown needed to recognize Iroquois claims
to land beyond the Kanawha River with a "very good & clear Title to the Lands as far as the
Cherokee River, which we cannot allow to be right of any other Indians without doing wrong to
our Posterity and acting unworthy those Warriors who fought and conquered it.”66 Thus,
Tyohansere claimed an Iroquois right of title based on right of conquest over a region counterclaimed by the Cherokee nation. He knew that the English maintained high regard for the
sanctity of the right of conquest and would recognize it as a legally valid means for trumping
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Cherokee land claims. Johnson accepted Tyohansere’s argument and redrew the line.67

The Suffering Traders and the Cessions
Iroquois negotiators navigated talks not only with Crown officials but also with a group
of land speculators, the Suffering Traders. Their primary spokesman, William Croghan,
demanded Johnson’s assistance in securing compensation for property allegedly lost at the hands
of western Indian nations during the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s Rebellion. Two other
Suffering Traders, William Trent and John Hughs, had bought the rights to claims of other
traders who claimed losses in the wars then transferred those rights to the Illinois Company.
Johnson’s work on behalf of the Suffering Traders began in earnest with in the May 1765
conference with representatives from the Delaware and Iroquois nations, the conference that
established the land cession’s general outline that would be finalized at Fort Stanwix three years
later. Johnson told the Iroquois negotiators that they would need to agree to the trader’s grant or
risk losing them as valuable trading partners. The Confederacy’s negotiators agreed to include
land north of the Ohio River to compensate the traders “in order to shew that we love justice, we
expect the Traders who suffered by some of our dependents in the wars five years ago, may have
a grant for the Lands we now give down Ohio, as a satisfaction for their losses.”68 The traders
received about one quarter of present day West Virginia. The Iroquois also granted William
Johnson two hundred thousand acres in New York to further show their “Love for the King and
make his people easy.”69 Acquiescence to the Suffering Traders empowered the Iroquois since it
provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate their largesse to the English, regardless of
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Shawnee and other Ohio country Indian protests against the right of the Iroquois to sell the land
to the English in the first place.
The cession went forward regardless of Ohio Country protests. The Indians there had
been effectively disenfranchised by the Iroquois Confederacy, a situation enabled by its collusion
with the English Empire. The self interests of both parties required sacrificing the interests of
Ohio Indians. Within the Iroquois perspective, mutual interests between the two powers relied on
a long-standing alliance, the Covenant Chain, and on Tuesday, 1 November Tyohansere read
from the Covenant Chain wampum belt “of 15 rows with human figures at each end.”70

On our first Meeting [. . .], when you came with your ship we [. . .] entered into an
alliance with you, [. . .] we entered into a Covenant Chain [. . .] and fashioned your ship
therewith, but being apprehensive the Bark would break and your ship be lost we made
one of iron [. . .] but perceiving [it] was liable to rust; we made a silver chain. [. . .]
We now tell the King that we have given him a great and valuable Country, and we know
that what we shall now get for it must be far short of its value — We make it a condition
of this our agreement concerning the Line that His Majesty will not forget or neglect to
shew us His favor or suffer the Chain to contract Rust, but that he will direct those who
have management of our affairs to be punctual in renewing our antient agreements. [. . .]
Our words are strong and our resolution firm & we expect that our request will be
complied with in so much as we have so generously complied with all that has been
desired .71
Thus Tyohansere reminded the English that a state of long-standing alliance existed
between the two peoples. Furthermore, the bond only grew stronger over the years. The Iroquois
demonstrated a willingness to continually renew and improve the covenant -- from bark to iron
to silver -- so they expected the Crown to honor the alliance at Fort Stanwix by adhering to the
conditions of the treaty.
The Covenant Chain symbolized a dynamic network of alliances that the Iroquois
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Confederacy entered into with other nations. The manner in which the Covenant Chain in its
conceptual flexibility actually functioned as a political instrument continues to drive scholarship.
Arguabley, however, Tyohansere may have enlisted its service as a political tool to remind the
English that they and the Iroquois stood on the same imperial plain. Accordingly, the treaty
signified an agreement between equal powers. Iroquois generosity came with the condition that
the English reciprocate by showing favorable treatment of the Iroquois that included continual
renewal of the alliance.
Another point firmly and successfully argued by Iroquois negotiators concerned the
Mohawk Valley, which had become increasingly populated by settlers and threatened by
speculators. The Mohawk nation demanded its rights for border security in the region.
Negotiators managed to extract guarantees from the English that led to the insertion of a clause
in the treaty underscoring Mohawk control over unpatented land east of the boundary with
authority to sell it to the buyers of their choice. The Mohawk negotiators intended to take
advantage of the market to earn lucrative rewards for them.72
On Saturday, 5 November 1768, the Iroquois and European negotiators convened for the
treaty signing ceremony. On the fort grounds that morning stood the largest amount of currency
and merchandise collected to date for an exchange between North American Indians and
Europeans. Over twenty boatloads of goods had been transported to the site.
The opening paragraphs of the treaty listed those nations that the Iroquois brought under
the roof of the Longhouse of the League: "To all to whom These presents shall come or may
concern; We the Sachems & Chiefs of the Six Confederate Nations, and of the Shawanoes,
Delawares, Mingoes of Ohio and other Dependent Tribes on behalf of ourselves and of the rest
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of our Several Nations."73 The treaty listed names of thirty-seven leaders along with tallied
numbers of all groups in attendance: over two hundred Mohawks, four hundred Oneidas, three
hundred Tuscaroras, three hundred Onondagas, eight hundred Cayugas, four hundred Senecas,
and seven hundred Nanticokes and Conoys.74 The power of numbers provided a powerful
illusion, one meant to demonstrate the treaty’s legitimacy through broad support of all parties
with a stake in the cession.
However, as stated by William Campbell: “All signatories sacrificed the fate of the Ohio
nations by promoting the authority of an empire that promised to protect their self-interests.”75
Within a few years of the treaty, thousands of settlers had moved into southwestern
Pennsylvania, western Virginia, and Kentucky. Droves of surveyors in the employ of land
speculators mapped new tracts for settlement.76 Tensions escalated between Shawnees and
settlers in particular. Though Iroquois right of conquest over the Ohio Country justified the
Confederacy’s right to dispose of it as they saw fit, at least in the eyes of the English, this did not
negate the reality of Ohio Country Indian resistance to settlement. Conditions in Ohio Country
rose to the level of an Imperial crisis for the British. Whitehall weighed the cost effectiveness of
maintaining a military presence in the region to protect the settlers and opted for retrenchment.
Abandonment of frontier outposts in the Trans-Appalachian west, particularly the 1772 closure
of Fort Pitt, led to escalating chaos, and, as characterized by David L. Preston, “on the eve of the
Revolution [. . .], the Ohio Valley was utterly decentralized, unstable, and verging on anarchy.”77
The entry point of the Ohio country chaos could be found in the fiction of Iroquois
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hegemony over the region, a fiction in which the English Empire had invested heavily. As
Stephen Warren argues, the English colonial officials had for decades worked to construct the
narrative of Iroquois conquest of the Ohio country. For example, William Penn’s secretary,
James Logan, worked with Conrad Weiser and Oneida diplomat Shickellamy “‘to inflate the Six
Nations authority over the lands and affairs of the Shawnees, Delawares, and other allies in the
region.’”78 The Mohawk nation considered Conrad Weiser as one its member. This, along with
his fluency with the Mohawk language, positioned him with authority enough to sign the 1737
Walking Purchase on the Nation’s behalf.
Warren notes that during the Seven Years’ War British and Iroquois negotiators signed a
series of treaties that divested the Shawnees, Delawares, and others of their western
Pennsylvania lands. Furthermore: “Between 1754 and 1760, the British laid claim to Iroquois
military history and used it to creatively imagine British sovereignty, from the Atlantic Ocean to
the Mississippi River. British cartographer John Mitchell explicitly linked Iroquois and British
military history [. . .] in his 1757 map.”79 Mutual recognition of each other’s imperial status
served the interests of both the Iroquois and the English. The Iroquois gained by English
recognition of their presumed authority over the affairs of the Ohio Indians and stood to profit by
this recognition; the English gained by creating a legal channel through which to acquire the
Ohio Country. These geopolitical machinations required extraordinary diplomatic skills to move
each part into its proper place, and both the Iroquois and the English knew what they wanted at
Fort Stanwix in 1768.
The international diplomacy conducted at Fort Stanwix led to profound geopolitical
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shifts, particularly in the Ohio Country. Both the Iroquois and the English worked in concert to
profit off of the region, and at the same time they worked to benefit their own self-interests.
Curiously, however, as William Campbell states, there has been a tendency of historians to
bypass the treaty’s full significance and present it “as a passing reference to the myopic policies
of the Crown on eve of the American Revolution, or within the context of [. . .] William
Johnson’s land-speculating interests.”80
The American Revolution uprooted of the Iroquois/British alliance, so Iroquois
negotiators had to reshape their national course in order to continue to promote their own selfinterests, and to reposition themselves as a political power on the stage of international
diplomacy as they bargained with diplomats from young America. Furthermore, as argued by
Mary A. Druke: “The protocol of Iroquois councils in which Euramericans were involved was
primarily Indian in form with modifications arising through interaction.”81
Interactions between the Iroquois and the English explored in this chapter serve as only a
single snapshot of historical entanglement. Moreover, the chapter has attempted to be both
integral and unique to the upcoming pictures of entanglement that will be brought into focus in
each of the following chapters. The integral aspect has been its focus on intersecting political and
cultural points between Native and non-Native worlds. Its unique contribution has been its
examination of the treaty grounds as a point of intersection between these two worlds. Also, the
forgoing analysis of kinship and of diplomatic entanglement is further integrated into the wider
work as these issues remain perennial to issues undertaken throughout An Entangled History. For
example, kinship will receive further investigation in the next chapter’s focus on the
Anisshinaabeg, as the geographical focus shifts from the eastern Great Lakes to the western
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Great Lakes, and diplomatic entanglement will take on new dimensions as this study’s temporal
focus shifts and charts the course from Native entanglements with imperial colonialism to that of
settler colonialism. And regarding issues concerning the construction of Native national
identities, the Iroquois provide a relatively unique case because, as discussed at length in this
chapter, the construction of their nationhoods generally relied on their own historical and cultural
conditions. However, the post-revolutionary era introduced a new phase regarding Native nation
building. The following chapter provides one of the remaining four pictures in this study, each
taking up different aspects of new entanglements out of which new types of Native Nations arose
by incorporating elements of Euro-American republicanism into their existing forms of
government.
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Chapter 2
Shifting Entanglements:
Kinship, Native Polities, and Colonialism in the Great Lakes Region

The Anishinaabeg lived within kinship networks -- nindoodemag – based on bonds of
mutual dependency between individuals and between groups. Such networks encompassed
similar bonds between humans and those termed “other than human,” a category that includes
manitous (spiritual beings), the animals the Indians hunted, and an array of spiritually animated
plants and minerals. Reciprocal obligations existed between humans and other than humans. For
example, the later may, as spiritual grandfathers or grandmothers, at times take “pity” and come
to the aid of the individual in need.1 Nindoodemag identities were inherited from fathers. These
inheritances ultimately linked back to other than human progenitor beings such as catfish, crane,
beaver, and bear, to name only a few.2 Moreover, reciprocity in the form of gift giving signified
the mutual obligations inherent to kinship. In diplomatic and political affairs, the mutual
exchange of gifts established and maintained kinship networks in Anishinibeewaki and
elsewhere throughout the Great Lakes region. Kinship made diplomatic relations possible.
Gifting both initiated and sustained those relations.3 Because gift giving and the implied kinship
obligations attached to it were essential ingredients in acts of diplomacy, breaches in gift giving
jeopardized diplomatic relationships between people.
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The seamlessness between metaphysical and physical realms illustrates an entanglement
central to the individual and group identities of the Anishinaabeg. Moreover, these identities
should not be divided into separate spiritual and temporal categories, as this would introduce a
false dichotomy alien to the Anishinaabeg worldview. Kinship-based relationships cross such
categories, and the symbiotic nature of these relationships serves as a sort of baseline principle
that informs many aspects of Anishinaabeg life, including the diplomatic and political decisions
made by village councils.
Anishinaabewaki inter-village and international diplomatic concerns and other village
matters were deliberated in councils that considered all viewpoints during lengthy discussions
before reaching consensus regarding a given issue. The leading women and men of a village
voiced their positions during council discussions as well as during informal meetings on matters
of war and peace, adoption of captives taken in war, treaty-making, usufructory rights, trade
relations with other polities, and other issues relevant to community life. Persuasion, not
coercion guided council decisions; furthermore, consensus among leaders depended upon the
consensus of the wider community.4 Honoring multiple viewpoints took time, and the process
adhered to few deadlines. The viewpoints expressed during such village wide discourse can also
be seen as separate strands of thought interwoven. Acknowledgment of the importance of each
voice and the derived consensus demonstrated the entanglements that arose due to council
protocols.
When Euro-American fur traders and American missionaries and military officials
wanted to build in native communities, they needed first to receive council permission and then
present it with annual gifts. These gifts maintained fictive kinships -- the basis for alliances,
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without which animosity and conflict would result.5 Without gift-giving there would be no
kinship; without kinship diplomatic relations would not be possible. Acceptance of a gift
signaled agreement with the gift-giver’s political terms and served as a record of them; rejection
of the gift signaled rejection of the terms.6 The fictive kinships thus established also served to
broaden entanglement cross-culturally. Moreover, the Anishinaabeg defined two groups, the
inawemaagan and meyaagzid, the insider and outsider, kin and non-kin, though the extension of
either fictive or blood kinship ties remained paramount.7 Kinship, as the preferred means for
establishing alliances, institutionalized entanglement, which in turn combined spiritual, social,
and economic elements.
Before the advent of Euro-American interests in Anishinibeewaki, French fur traders
learned that by integrating themselves into long-established kinship networks through both gift
giving and marriage they could enter into the kind of binding business relationships analogous to
their familiar world of written contracts that stated legally-binding trade agreements between
parties.8 Kinship ties with fur traders provided the Anishinaabeg with access to French manidoog
-- power -- as manifested in the iron tools and the firearms of European manufacture exchanged
for beaver peltry that the Anishinaabeg hunted. But the diplomatic protocol that made the fur
trade possible in the first place remained rooted in the Anishinaabeg practice of gift giving,
which included marriage that exogamously extended families outward when daughters became
wives of other groups, effectively becoming “precious gifts given from one family, band, or clan
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to another,” and provided a “conduit for cooperation between social groups.”9
Such marriages constituted another example of cross-cultural entanglement. Indeed,
profoundly so because the offspring of these unions had roots in both Native and non-Native
worlds. The offspring embodied a multi-level entanglement that led to degrees of bilingualism
and included differing religious beliefs and divergent cultural practices. They lived between
worlds, and they were to one degree or another torn between these worlds but at the same time
perhaps found multiple means for reconciling differences between them. What could be termed
entanglement by blood grew only more complex with each succeeding generation. Offspring of
initial cross-cultural marriages themselves perhaps married across cultural lines. Such lines may
even have grown less distinct with each succeeding generation.
Alliances between the French and the Anishinaabeg were established on what has been
called “a middle ground” that “merged the French politics of empire with the kinship politics of
the village.”10 Tension between the French concept of the father as a coercive authority figure
over his children and the Anishinaabeg understanding of the father as one who bears a
noncoercive obligation for the welfare of his children marked the fictive kinship based alliances.
Alliances depended on “creative misunderstandings” a hybrid of practices, rituals, and beliefs
neither distinctly French nor distinctly Anishinaabeg. Both groups forged alliances maintained
through gift giving.11
The theory of the middle ground provides a means for broaching the issue of political
entanglement between the French and the Anishinaabeg. In an alliance cemented through
kinship, the hybrid understandings -- or misunderstandings -- between the two groups were at the
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core of an evolving political relationship. However analogous to the blood entanglement
discussed above, political entanglements effectively involved local, national, and international
issues. They did not generally touch on the personal terrains of individuals bonded by marriage.
Yet this matter of scale perhaps only underscores the growing complexity of entanglement
between Native and non-Native peoples. Over the years both groups would navigate intertwining
political and personal worlds in increasing proximities to each other. Indeed, as will be seen later
in this chapter, the characteristics of these worlds changed significantly in the transition from the
imperial colonialism typical of the French to the settler colonialism of the Euro-Americans.

Nindoodemag and Diplomatic and Cultural Entanglements
The central aim of Native American diplomacy consisted of negotiations for alliances.
The foundation of alliances stood on dual pillars -- the determination to extend fictive kinship
networks and the desire to enhance the solidarity of clan membership. Heidi Bohaker employs
linguistic evidence and oral history to support her argument concerning the deep antiquity of
kinship networks and clan identities in the Algonquian worldview. Indeed, her linguistic
evidence points to a Proto-Algonquian origin of the term nindoodemag, or kinship networks. She
also traces the significance of iconographic signatures affixed to the 1701 Montreal peace treaty,
itself a product of decade long diplomatic negotiations between the Haudenosaunee and the
French and their multiple Indian allies.
“An amalgam of European and Native American diplomatic protocols”12 preceded the
signing ceremony for several weeks. In addition to French signatures, treaty documents contain
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nearly forty pictographic signatures of Indian diplomats, though names of only twenty-five
Indian polities appear in the document’s language. Noncorrespondence between the number of
polities and the number of signatures “foregrounds the challenge of understanding Native
American collective identities.”13 Twenty images bear similarity to those appearing on lateeighteenth- and nineteenth-century treaties concerning the Ojibwe, Odawa and Potawatomi that,
as Bohaker argues, represent nindoodemag, or kinship networks, of Anishinaabe signatories.14
The treaty itself, as true for treaties in general between Indians and Whites, entangled
both worlds, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. And following Bohaker’s argument
concerning the 1701 treaty, Native signatories expressed collective identities rooted in kinship.
Affixed to the same document, French signatories represented the interests of the French empire.
Two types of identities met in the document. And that document, however much a legal vehicle
of European origin, entangled the interests of the French empire with those of the Indian
diplomats who represented their own kinship based polities.
Moreover, the historical context of the treaty involved an entanglement of power
differentials. Fundamentally, imperial illusions of French maps never matched the reality of
Native dominance on the ground. Indeed, the demographic insignificance of the French presence
in North America compared to the Indigenous populations with whom they traded indicates a
central weakness in French imperial ambitions. However much the empire’s maps boasted the
broad geographic swath termed New France, Indians had lived on the continent for millennia.
Therefore, the Native geographic knowledge base ran both deep and wide.15 Without Native
guides, the French may never have made even their relatively meager inroads. As characterized
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by one scholar, a 1669 French map of North America remained “blank space revealing both the
fantasy and the reality of empire.”16 French political and economic influence dropped off
precipitously beyond Montreal. Furthermore, as noted by Mark Warhus, “The maps Native
Americans made for Europeans before and during the French and Indian War portray the conflict
from their perspective, [and] Native American scouts and geographic information were essential
for both the British and French military campaigns.”17 Regardless of future power shifts,
particularly with the ascendance of the United States and the machinery of its settler colonialism,
Native Americans retained the upper hand on much of the continent during the centuries of the
European imperial colonial era.
Regarding French attempts to understand the Native world, in the mid to late seventeenth
century, French missionaries and traders recorded oral traditions concerning nindoodemag. For
example, Nicolas Perrot’s Mémoire sur les moeurs, coustumes et relligion des sauvages de
l’Amérique septentrionale attempted to explain its basis in the connections made between an
individual and an other-than-human progenitor. But further complicating this relationship, as
explained by Bohaker, Nindoodem transcends physical realms: “The Great Lakes region is a
political space that accommodated and still accommodates a more inclusive category of
personhood.”18
Based on evidence drawn from observations of cyclical migrations across the land,
kinship networks also entail relationships between geographic space and collective identity.
These “politically negotiated movements”19 involved the understanding that existed between
different groups of Anishinaabe peoples that usufructory rights were mediated by kinship
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networks. However, collective identities did not depend on possession, occupation, or
geographic boundaries; “but in shared descent from other-than-human progenitors, in spiritual
practices, and in origin stories.”20 Aadizookaanag, or the grandfathers, consisted of stories that
explained how all beings originated and how each being stood in relationship to one another.
This collective sense often stood at odds to European worldviews. Indeed, French
organization of indigenous populations into distinct nations attempted to politically reify them.
The French failed to recognize that annual patterns of relocation followed carefully negotiated
routes based on environmental concerns, trade, and the expansion of kinship networks through
intermarriage with geographically distant peoples.21 Kinship expansion equaled the expansion
and renewal of alliances negotiated between culturally and politically distinct neighbors. The
diplomatic entanglements of kinship dominated the political landscape on which the Indians and
the French met. But to certain degree, the French attempt to define Native peoples as members of
nations at least foreshadowed a time when the Indians would themselves adopt national
identities. As will be seen, these evolved as hybrid identities that retained tribal political
structures, which in turn depended on kinship.
Kinship networks held together through gift exchange assured the health of regional and
trans-regional political relationships. Gift exchange established a need-based relationship in
which “the social obligation to assist was more important than equalizing the assistance given.”22
But the diplomatic nature of gift-exchange did not translate well in Anishinaabeg relations with
Europeans and Euro-Americans whose cultures prized both economic and social self-support.
This individualism, which often attached an economic value to goods and services exchanged
20
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between parties, did not recognize gift exchange as an act of diplomacy, rather it viewed the act
generally through an economic lens.
Dependence meant weakness in the Eurocentric value system, so the mutual obligation of
gift exchange expected by the Anishinaabeg, to whom dependence meant strength, did not
register. To the Anishinaabeg, independence signified hostility, an unwillingness to enter into an
alliance, into a fictive kinship. The resulting diplomatic failure contributed to growing tensions
between Euro-Americans and the Anishinaabeg. Indeed, American officials (mistakenly) blamed
their French and British predecessors for using gifts as bribes to coerce Indians into alliances.23
Kinship networks eventually controlled much of the Great Lakes fur trade, an evolution
with a strong Catholic component as many Native women converted to their husband’s faith,
thus providing a means for the further extension of familial bonds when these marriage partners
served as godparents to the children of others in the trade. Because both Catholic and Indigenous
kinship networks operated simultaneously, Native wives of fur traders retained significant
authority as mediators during the exchanges of fur for trade goods.24 The Catholic component
constituted another stratum of entanglement that informed Native identities in the Great Lakes
Region. The legacy of Jesuit inroads, Catholicism, however, did not replace Indigenous religious
beliefs but tended to serve as an adjunct to them.
Official fur trade policies for Native/non-Native unions navigated what other colonial
authorities regarded problematic in marriage à la façon du pays between women from Ojibwe,
Cree, Chinook, and other nations and traders who worked for the Hudson’s Bay Company and
the Northwest Company. Within French fur trade society, such unions remained unsanctioned by
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the Church, so Jesuits condemned them. But both companies either overtly or covertly gave their
blessings to these marital ties made “after the custom of the country” for reasons directly related
to the fur industry’s financial well-being.25 The fruits of economic entanglement effectively
cancelled out qualms registered by moral authorities regarding entanglement by blood.
The establishment of a distinctive Métis population in the western Great Lakes fur trade
communities of Michilimackinac and Green Bay, among others, served as a particularly
significant example of entanglement by blood. Indeed, these descendants of French traders and
Native women exemplified “the malleable boundaries that characterized colonial society.” The
Métis also wielded a degree of economic power that may have leveraged bids made by some
nineteenth-century Indian communities to avoid removal, as their agraraianism assisted in their
“construction of whiteness [and] facilitated indigenous persistence over Native lands in the
western Great Lakes.”26 On the other hand, some Métis opposed mid-nineteenth-century Ojibwe
leaders whose agrarian plans appeared to threaten their fur trade livelihoods. These Métis argued
that settled farms would limit habitat for fur-bearing animals, and traders also feared the decrease
in the number of Ojibwe whose agricultural pursuits left them with little or no time for trapping.
Métis ethnic identity and political stature both came under attack by American settlers
who began to populate the region. By the 1850’s, the destruction of their familiar economic order
based on the fur trade left the Métis impoverished and largely marginalized by both Ojibwe and
American societies.27 A few decades earlier, the Métis community at Mackinac faced
Americanization following the War of 1812, and through the 1830s generally managed to make
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adaptations but to retain their customs when possible, thereby “perpetuating the middle ground.”
Indeed, by reaffirming their Roman Catholicism, the Métis asserted a central component of their
identity, one that provided a firm foundation as their society adapted to changes at Mackinac.28
The variety of historical trajectories experienced by the Métis illustrates the contingencies of
entanglement by blood, which must be further contextualized by the interplays of political,
economic, and diplomatic entanglements.
A further illustration of these multi-layered entanglements concerns the roles common to
women who married fur traders. Because of their knowledge base in the language, culture, and
landscape of Anishinaabewaki, women served in valuable political positions as diplomats for
their fur trade husbands. The economic and political role of Ojibwe women indicates that the fur
trade functioned with a complexity far greater than a simple male-centered exchange of goods
for furs. Furthermore, mixed-heritage children extended European/Ojibwe community ties, thus
creating likely alliances that culturally fused two otherwise disparate identities and concepts of
family.29 The children of Ojibwe women and fur traders generally recognized their mother’s kin
and retained aspects of Ojibwe culture, yet clan descent being patrilineal, and since Europeans
did not have clans, these children remained outside the Ojibwe clan system. At the same time,
their fluency with Ojibwe, French and/or English meant that as intercultural brokers they played
a valuable diplomatic role in Anishinaabewaki.30
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As Euro-American settler colonialism encroached on the Old Northwest the role of
Ojibwe women as cultural brokers began to disintegrate, as it did, for example, with the onset of
the lead rush in the early 1820s. Until then, mines had been in Indigenous hands for at least four
thousand years. But as thousands of Americans flooded the region and seized most of the mines - traditionally worked by women -- lead mining community culture deteriorated. The dearth of
relationships -- especially marital relationships -- between Indian women and American men
meant that the diplomatic role of women as cultural brokers could not easily take root, as it did
among the French. Thus language barriers prevailed between Americans and Indians, and respect
for economic spheres traditionally controlled by women failed to materialize. Though miners
tended to be itinerants and not settlers, the license they took with the region’s Indian peoples and
their resources speaks to the larger pattern of encroachment.31
A July 1829 meeting between Federal officials and Winnebago representatives provides
one example that illustrates the clash between settler colonial interests and Native interests.
Serving the interests of the lead mining industry, the government demanded Winnebago land
cessions for mine development, but Winnebago leader Huwanjkga (The Little Elk) denounced
the demand. He enumerated the waves of encounters between his people and European colonials,
then he declared angrily that only the Americans hungered for the land itself.

The first white man we knew, was a Frenchman [. . .], he painted himself, he smoked his
pipe with us, sung and danced with us and married one of our [women], but he wanted to
buy no land of us! The “Redcoat” came next, he gave us fine coats, knives and guns and
traps, blankets and jewels: he seated our chiefs and warriors at his table [. . .], but never
asked us to sell our country to him! Next came the “Blue Coat,” and no sooner had he
31
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seen a small portion of our country, than he [. . .] wished us to sell it all to him. [. . .] Why
do you wish to add our small country to yours, already so large? When I went to
Washington, to see our great father, I saw great houses all along the road, and
Washington and Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York are great and splendid cities. [ . .]
You ask us to sell all our country, and wander off into the boundless regions of the West.
We do not know that country, and the deer, the elk, the beaver, the buffalo and the otter
now there, belong not to us, and we have no right to kill them. Our wives and our
children now seated behind us, are dear to us, and so is our country, where rest in peace
the bones of our ancestors. Fathers! Pity a people, few in number, who are poor and
helpless. [ . .] Do you want our wigwams? You live in palaces. Do you want our horses?
Your’s are larger and better than our’s. [What] can be your motive?32
The French attempted to meet the Indians on their own terms. These European visitors
valued the cultures with which they dealt and recognized the importance of integrating
themselves into them, of forming kinship based alliances through marriage. What they did not
desire was the land itself. The British brought trade goods, and they treated the Indians with
respect. They too, like the French, did not seek to buy Indian country itself. Finally, in
comparison with their French and English predecessors, the Americans are described by
Huwanjkga through an impassioned litany of the crimes he feels they committed against his
people. The Americans were both alien and alienating. The litany is driven by the question, “why
do you wish to add our small country to yours, already so large?” This fundamental absurdity
appears to defy any basis in Anishinaabeg rationality. Furthermore, the designs that the
Americans have for the Native Peoples themselves lack any understanding of Native historical,
cultural, and spiritual attachment to the land itself. Huwanjkga rejects the idea that Indians could
simply exchange one piece of land for another, and could travel far away and somehow resume
their lives in a region that was already home to other Indians. By turning the tables on his White
audience, he underscores the hypocrisy in its hunger for land. Why do want our wigwams if you
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live in palaces? Why do you want our horses, you who already possess far better horses?
Reiterating the absurdity that Huwanjkga sees in the entire American project, he demands to
know what kind of worldview drives such hunger for possession. He attempts to appeal to the
American conscience, perhaps by appealing to his audience’s better angels. How that particular
audience itself reacted went unrecorded. However, the larger arc of settler colonialism generally
appeared to justify the program of westward expansion. That justification occurred on a number
of levels, and it only gained momentum as U.S. Indian policy focused increasingly on serving
settler interests.
Such interests effectively served to reverse the history of French and English cultural and
political entanglements, those of blood and diplomacy as explored thus far. In other words,
White Americans attempted to disentangle themselves from Native Americans. However, as will
be seen below and in succeeding chapters, this disentanglement often resulted in ironic outcomes
on many levels in American society.

The 1787 Northwest Ordinance and Settler Colonialism
Beginning with the earliest days of the Republic, Indian policy commonly served the
interests of settler colonialism at the expense of Native American sovereignty. Though settlers
chafed against federal interference, they also relied on federal machinery -- its laws and it
military force -- to defend their claimed land against Indians and for Indian removal. Yet this
machinery took time to construct. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, initially launched piecemeal
with little federal or territorial coordination, did usher in the “treaty polity” that ostensibly
legalized the transfer of Indian land into federal hands. However, following the War of 1812, “a
new national confidence redoubled Antebellum American’s postcolonial expectations, and it
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bolstered the central government’s conviction of its authority over Indian nations.”33 The period
of years between the 1787 Ordinance and the War of 1812 set the stage for disentanglement by
policy, the chief feature of which was an increasingly aggressive Indian removal.
Settler colonialism is marked by ownership of land and the creation of new societies upon
it, yet settler colonialism in American history has not operated as such a monolithic force that it
precludes Native American resistance.34 Indeed, the pan-Indian movement arose in opposition to
settler colonialism. But the movement was often undermined by Anglo-Americans who fostered
ethnic and regional rivalries among Indians. One scholar sees the pan-Indian movement as an
expression of nativism, which sought “native-directed solutions, based primarily upon a
cosmology composed by Native Americans, to the problems of European, and more particularly
Anglo-American, ambition.”35 Moreover, the transformation of Indian country into titled
ownership by White Americans relied not only on the complex process of legal, economic, and
cultural justifications for disentanglement on institutional levels. This process also took place on
the ground in sometimes peaceful and sometimes violent personal interactions between Indians
and Whites on a daily basis.
The transition from imperial colonialism to settler colonialism marked the transition from
a kinship economy based on reciprocity to a market economy based on title. Kinship
relationships served little purpose in this new regime, though treaty language sometimes retained
a nominal kinship vocabulary. Moreover, the notion of the Great White Father speaks to the
paternalism of United States Indian policy. Dissimilar to the “creative misunderstanding” of the
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father in the theory of the middle ground, the Great White Father tended to be an instrument of
Indian removal. And in part, the trade instrumentality central to the father of the middle ground
appeared motived to drive Indians off land by driving them into debt.
Settler colonialism could not unmake the entanglements by blood across many
generations that bonded Native and White lives together. However, as Saler further argues, “a
central part of the transformation of a trading economy into one based on private property was
the replacement of kinship with the American national state -- the political instrument of an
abstracted American ‘people’-- as the governing agent.”36 For example, the 1796 Trade and
Intercourse Act that established the factory system aimed to change local trade from a reciprocity
economy to a more depersonalized exchange. “Ideally, prices were to be fixed according to a
monetary standard; gift-giving or establishing personal relations had no part in the factors'
instructions."37
In part, the first Trade and Intercourse Acts strove to slow the supposed extinction of
Native Americans by protecting them from unscrupulous White traders, essentially an act of
paternalism that saw Indians as children unable to look after their own interests. American fur
companies regarded the Acts as hindrances to their trade with Indians, arguing that Congress’
ban on the sale of liquor to Indians permitted an unfair advantage to less scrupulous traders and
to British and French rivals operating on U.S. soil. The 1796 act that established the factory
system further angered the fur companies. The idealized driving force behind the factory system
stemmed from benevolent designs to ensure that Indians could purchase quality goods at
reasonable prices.
Long-range national security interests also operated through the factory system. Good
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trade relations could help build military alliances in the event of future conflict with the
Canadian English. Indeed, the War Department managed trans-Mississippi factories like armies,
as “The North American Indian trade wasn’t merely a commercial or diplomatic enterprise—it
was also war by other means.”38 At the same time, Jefferson reportedly saw the factory system as
a beneficial means for drawing Indians into debt with the U.S. government. To pay off the debt,
Indians would be forced to cede their land.39
The 1787 Northwest Ordinance provided the legal mechanism that arose in response to
the demographics of White settlement and paved the way for the ongoing westward migration of
newly minted White American citizens. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance built on two previous
ordinances. Among other measures, the 1784 Ordinance called for the creation of new states,
following a period of political incubation as territories, in the land north of the Ohio River and
between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River--a region acquired from England
by the 1783 Treaty of Paris. Moreover, the ordinance granted settlers the right to territorial and
state self-government. Central components of the 1785 Ordinance established a land survey
system and provided a mechanism for land sales to settlers, following, of course, the federal
acquisition of the land itself by treaties with Indian peoples. Finally, the 1787 Ordinance
established a greater degree of federal guidance over western territories than that formerly
granted in 1784 by replacing temporary settler-driven self-governments with what amounted to a
temporary colonialism of these territories. The ordinances contained not only political blueprints
for the uniform admission of new states to the union. In line with leading intellectual lights of the
time, they articulated the social and cultural uniformity expected of the Union’s new republican
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citizens. Above all else, the virtuous citizen must, following the classical republican model, place
the common good above self-interest: moreover, the vision of gendered agrarian households
migrating westward in civil harmony remained foremost in the minds of the nation’s planners.40
However, conditions on the ground in the Old Northwest militated against notions of
social, cultural, and political uniformity. Two hundred years of French and, later, British inroads,
and above all else, thousands of years of Native American presence in the region made for a
multicultural polyglot geopolitical reality unaccounted for in distant Philadelphia where the
nascent republic’s congress chartered its domestic colonial empire according to rational
Enlightenment ideals. Adding further complexity to the Northwest, early American settlers there
hardly conformed to the notion of placing national interests above their own struggle for survival
and hopes for prosperity. The transformation into states controlled by White Americans, and the
necessary orchestration of an interdependent relationship between states and the federal
government, therefore required significant social, economic, and political engineering. But
before any headway in that direction could be made, Indians must first be cleared from the land.
The advent of settler colonialism marked another shift in power differentials between
Native Americans and Euro-Americans. As discussed above, Native Americans continued to
maintain a significant -- even overwhelming -- demographic edge over colonizing powers for
hundreds of years following the initial point of European contact. This translated into longstanding and advantageous positions of Native political and economic power. However, the rise
of Young America and its rapidly expanding White population base began to tip the scales of
power.41 Euro-American demographic superiority over Native Americans reconfigured power
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differentials, and this led to a growing existential threat to Native Peoples, and to an escalation of
Native resistance to White encroachment.

Native Resistance and Origins of Native National Identities
Native Americans in the western Great Lakes grappled with settler colonialism as a new
historical condition. To survive it required innovative political solutions. Also, to a certain
degree throughout the region east of the Mississippi, Native identities cohered around the
challenges arising from White encroachment. Here too may be traced some of the early ideas out
of which evolved increasingly complex Native nationhoods. Usually hybrid constructions,
Native nations would tend to combine Indigenous social, economic, and political structures -kinship, communal land ownership, and consensus driven tribal councils -- with republican
innovations that included elections, term limits, and written constitutions. Local and regional
contingencies invariably informed unique features of specific Native nations. The examples
below, along with those of the following chapter and in this book’s final chapter, will attempt to
give some sense of the variety of forms taken by tribes as each added national identity to an
existing tribal identity. Growing alarm over White encroachment may provide at least one point
of departure out of which Native national identities evolved.
In the years following the Revolutionary War, a cooperative network of resistance against
White trans-Appalachian settlers drew Native Peoples together across great distances, giving
common cause in a line stretching from the southeastern Creeks to the Great Lakes Ojibwes.
This network fit within a larger historical context of pan-Indian movements that originated in the
mid-eighteenth century during a “Great Awakening” led by charismatic Indian prophets. Though
united in their desire to rid their world of White people, some prophets adhered to passive
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measures while others demanded militant approaches.42
From the Revolutionary War years through the 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers, militant
nativists in the Northwest sometimes received ammunition and other goods from the British,
augmenting their resolve to prevent trans-Appalachian American settlement. In October 1790,
Shawnee warriors under Blue Jacket, Miami warriors under Little Turtle, along with support
from the Delawares, Potawatatomis, Chippewas, and Ottawas, forced Josiah Harmar’s troops
into retreat. On the Wabash River in 1791, American forces suffered their greatest defeat by
Native forces in history, with Arthur St. Clair, first governor of the Northwest Territory, losing
nearly half of his 1,400 men in a single battle against a combined force of warriors drawn from at
least nine Northwest Indian tribes. Elsewhere, a Creek, Cherokee, and Shawnee alliance
prevailed against Americans in the Cumberland region.43
On October 7, 1792, The Shawnee leader Painted Pole spoke to a council leaders from
over a dozen tribes that met at the Glaize, near present-day Defiance, Ohio. He attributed recent
victories against the Americans “to the Great Spirit who governs all things and who looks on us
with much or perhaps more compassion than those of the fairer complexion.”44 Painted Pole’s
message attracted military cooperation as well as the exchange of religious ideas and the
recognition of cultural common grounds between Indian peoples throughout the transAppalachian region.45
Against the resolve of united Native forces, the United States government stood little
chance for negotiating land cessions from Indian nations in the Northwest. Also troubling,
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British/Indian alliances -- actual or perceived -- continued to haunt American settlement projects.
What happened at Fort Miami during the 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers dealt a significant blow
to such alliances and meant a setback to ongoing Native militancy against White settlers.
Defeated on the field, Native forces fled to the British for aid at Fort Miami, but the British
refused to open the fort gates to them. In the following months, the Americans solidified their
victory by establishing posts from Cincinnati to Fort Wayne.46
The 1795 Treaty of Greenville that resulted from Wayne’s success at Fallen Timbers
marked the end of two decades of militant nativist cooperation. (Also, in 1795, Jay’s Treaty
resulted in British flight to Ontario, further severing their support for Northwest Indians. The
treaty required English surrender of several pre-revolutionary forts on the Great Lakes to the
United States; however, British and French traders could remain at the forts and operate on
American soil.) Not only did the Treaty of Greenville’s signatories agree to the cession of most
of present day Ohio, it instituted the annuity system, and instead of cash payments, leaders could
opt for annuities in the form of agricultural tools and supplies, an option that White authorities
believed instrumental in the “civilizing” mission to transform Indians into yeoman farmers.
Overall, as Dowd characterizes, “The annuities gave the Americans a permanent lever within a
tribal power structure formalized in concurrence with federal agents.”47
The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix served as a colonial template for securing land cessions
from Indians that would be repeated by the United States until the end of the treaty era in 1871.
As addressed n the previous chapter, Indian signatories of the 1768 treaty received twenty
boatloads of goods and £10,000 for several million acres of Ohio land in the largest land cession
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in American colonial history.48 Competing claims by tribes not represented in the treaty
negotiations led to decades of inter-tribal warfare throughout the Ohio River valley. At the same
time, militant Native resistance to White settlers remained ongoing. The newly formed United
States inherited this volatile situation as it sought entitlement to formerly held British claims.
Indeed, in the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix federal authorities promised to protect the Oneidas
and Tuscaroras because they had supported the Americans revolutionaries during the war.
However, the fledgling federal government possessed little authority. Powerful interests in the
state of New York led by Governor Clinton bought a large tract of land from the Oneidas
through the 1785 Treaty of Fort Herkimer, and subsequent land deals took Onondaga, Cayuga,
and Seneca land, though Indian signatories had understood that they were merely leasing their
land, not selling it.49 Similar power struggles between land companies and state and federal
authorities (though private land interests commonly prevailed among these authorities) would
inform the Marshall Court’s findings regarding the authority of the Federal government over
Indian land cessions.
Early attempts to stipulate that only the U.S. government could deal with transactions
with Indians were stated in the Trade and Intercourse laws. The 1790 Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act banned states from purchasing Indian land; however, the 1793 Act allowed states
to buy Indian land under federal supervision. Both the 1796 and 1802 Acts called for the
distribution of agricultural supplies to Indians with the aim of “civilizing” them.50 But overall, as
Francis Paul Prucha argues, “The laws were not primarily ‘Indian’ laws, for they touched the
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Indians only indirectly. The legislation, rather, was directed against lawless whites and sought to
restrain them from violating the sacred treaties.”51
A further complication requiring resolve by the Supreme Court involved settler
encroachment on Indian lands that often led to conflicting claims. Such claims also informed the
sanctity of borders, and the need to enhance existing border controls, in Native national
identities. The issue of border control arose in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), which addressed the
case of two claimants to the same land. Johnson received title to a parcel of land from the
Piankeshaw, and McIntosh claimed the same parcel through a patent that he received from the
government. The court upheld McIntosh’s claim. This meant that Indians could sell land only to
the federal government, not to states or individuals. Prucha argues that early-nineteenth-century
U.S. policy assumed that White settlement would continually advance while Indians
simultaneously withdrew westward. Moreover, the government hoped to maintain this process in
an orderly fashion, further hoping to preserve good relations with Indians so that they would
continue to cede land, while adhering to the ultimate aim of “civilizing” Indians so that they
would assimilate into White society. But the government usually did not remove illegal settlers
on Indian land and more often sided with settler interests by seeking further cessions from
Indians through treaties, thus rewarding and perpetuating White encroachment.52
Chief Justice John Marshall’s interpretation of the doctrine of discovery guided a series
of decisions -- the Marshall trilogy -- that profoundly influenced the federal government’s legal
relationship, especially as expressed in its treaty relationships, with Indian peoples throughout
the United States. The doctrine of discovery, as Marshall noted, belonged originally to European
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states that “discovered” lands across the Atlantic. According to their own legal traditions, such
discovery automatically granted to Europeans a title to those lands, a title superior to that of
Indigenous populations. Having defeated Great Britain in the Revolutionary War, the United
States inherited that nation’s rights of discovery. However, as understood by both Great Britain
and the United States, the doctrine did not entail their absolute sovereign authority over the land,
as both nations believed that Indians did retain a type of ownership of the soil, however different
it may be to a fee-simple title that could be transferred through sale. Accordingly, the United
States gained title then only to the land that Great Britain had already purchased from Indians.
Marshall creatively built on a legal understanding of the conditional rights to the land that were
retained by Indians and how such rights could be transferred to the U.S. government.53
The War of 1812 stood as a watershed in United States Indian policy. During the war,
Indians belonged to one of three categories-- pro-British, pro-American, or neutral. After the
war, the federal government abandoned cis-Mississippi Indian assimilation efforts and
transitioned fully to a policy of Indian removal, though assimilation efforts would re-emerge
following the Civil War.54 Moreover, the removal experience for Native Americans preceded the
1830 Indian Removal Act and continued throughout the nineteenth century.55 One scholar says
that this calls for a reconfiguration of Indian removal history in order to recognize “the pure
relentless power of the removal and dispossession that framed the lives of Indian men and
women,” and move removal stories from the periphery to the center of our histories of White
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settlement.56
The issue of tribal sovereignty stands at the heart of removal, as demonstrated by
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). Asked whether the Cherokee Nation constituted a foreign
state, Marshall said no; rather, he defined it as a “domestic dependent nation,” a contradictory
political concept that continues to inform the legal relationship between the federal government
and Indians. Marshall’s 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia refined the earlier decision and
affirmed Cherokee sovereignty. President Jackson ignored the Worcester v. Georgia decision
and declared that Cherokee removal would commence on May 23, 1838. Thus began the Trail of
Tears.
But the Trail of Tears has overshadowed the removal experience of Indian nations in the
Old Northwest that underwent removal on a smaller, but no less traumatic, scale, than the
Southeastern Indians.57 Indeed, the Sauk removal resulted in the Black Hawk War, initiated
when Black Hawk, a Sauk war captain led approximately one thousand followers across the
Mississippi River in 1832 to reoccupy ceded Illinois land. Combined state and federal forces
commanded by Brigadier General Henry Atkinson annihilated the Sauk band after four months
of combat, even as it attempted to return back across the Mississippi. But the war cannot be
explained merely as the effect of a White landgrab. This would not explain why over seven
hundred Menominees, Dakotas, Ho Chunks, and Potawatomis forged a pan-Indian alliance with
Black Hawk to combat Atkinson’s forces.58 These allied forces had each attempted to navigate a
means for avoiding removal, and while some Ho Chunk and Potawatomi bands, for example,
joined Black Hawk, others feared federal reprisal. Thus some bands allied with the United States
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against Black Hawk. But those who allied with the government did so not as manipulated pawns,
but as “architects of an alliance that served their own ends first and always,” by fighting against
traditional tribal enemies and leveraging economic and political gains from the Americans. 59
Decisions to ally with either Black Hawk or with the Americans always occurred on the local
level, so they did not represent “tribal” alliances. But as John W. Hall succinctly states, after the
four month long Black Hawk War, “the last chapter of the colonial history of the western Great
Lakes gave way to the subsequent narrative of Manifest Destiny.”60
Northwestern removal history must also take into account the experiences of tribes that
successfully resisted removal, as the outcome of the Wisconsin Death March illustrates. The
attempted removal of the Wisconsin Ojibwe to the newly created Minnesota Territory that led to
the deaths of an estimated 12% of their population resulted only to strengthen the resolve of
Wisconsin’s Ojibwe bands to resist any further attempted removals. Redix sees the tragedy as an
act of ethnic cleansing: “worthy of inclusion in narratives of Minnesota history and American
history.”61
The transition from imperial colonialism practiced by France and England to the settler
colonialism of the United States undermined kinship networks as structures for diplomatic
relations between Indians and Euro-Americans. Generally, imperial colonialism focused on the
extraction of the Great Lake region’s fur resources and on the need to maintain working
relationships based on kinship with Indians who supplied the fur. In settler colonialism, the land
itself constituted the resource; access to it required the displacement of its Indigenous
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inhabitants. Under these conditions, the maintenance of kinship networks between Americans
and Indians retained little purpose. In the interests of settler-driven westward expansion, the
government signed treaties with Indians to gain title to their land; subsequent Indian removals
benefitted settler colonial efforts, as did the institution of federal Indian policy that often focused
both on removal and on restricting access of Indians to their own titled land ownership.
Indian peoples in the Old Northwest actively engaged in organized resistance against
White settlement. Contingencies of the region’s history help to contextualize the complex
relationships between Indians and Whites. The dynamic interplay of local, regional, and national
events during the antebellum era of the Old Northwest militates against a victim/victor polarity
and calls for a narrative that identifies shifting powers between groups, and the story of these
power shifts is never over.

86

Chapter 3
A Crossroads of Identities:
Lafayette’s 1824-1825 Visit to the United States

Wherever the Marquis de Lafayette appeared during his year-long tour of the United
States, he often did so before adoring audiences that ranged from mere handfuls to many
thousands. Word of this widely paraded figure spread enthusiastically throughout the nation’s
twenty-four states, each of which he visited. His presence provided a focus for Euro-Americans
to celebrate the sanctity of their national identity as forged in the Revolutionary War. His travels
also brought him into contact with a number of Native Americans who had served under his
command in the war. They too revered him as a leader primarily because he treated Native
warriors as having a stake equal to that of the Americans in the fight to secure independence
from Britain. However, as Lafayette became reacquainted with some of his old Indian friends, he
learned that their service in the revolution appeared forgotten as they grappled with the federal
government’s increasingly aggressive Indian removal policy.
Lafayette had returned to a trans-Atlantic world much changed since his years as a
general in the Continental Army. Political and cultural identities among both Euro-Americans
and Native Americans were marked by vulnerability and insecurity, though for different reasons.
For both groups, however, the forging of post-war identities entailed ideas of nationhood that
shared some common ground, but at the same time differed dramatically. And Native Americans
who began to incorporate national identities into existing tribal identities simultaneously
contended with the growing resolve of Young America to deny their quest for sovereignty over
their own land and to violently remove them from it. Lafayette’s year-long journey provides a
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vantage point from which to view rising antagonisms between Native Americans and EuroAmericans in the early national period, a view best seen through a world historical lens,
especially because of the trans-Atlantic connections made possible through him.
Beneath the surface of Euro-America’s enthusiasm for Lafayette’s return lurked certain
fears. Would he see a revolution betrayed?1 For them, Lafayette emerged from out of an
increasingly idealized past. As Fred Somkin argues, the idealization sometimes reached such
shrill levels it seemed more as a refuge from an uncertain future than as the result of honoring a
national hero. Because he reappeared during the political and economic shift from the age of the
founders to the age of steam, “a disturbing feeling was abroad that the American world of the
1820s, with its dedication to a cheerful commercialism, might have parted company somewhere
with the shades of the ‘ancient worthies.’”2 The notion that Americans felt compelled to revere
Lafayette suggests a confidence gap between revolutionary ideals and changing economic and
political realities as the nation neared its fiftieth anniversary. For example, an editorial in Niles'
Weekly Register nearly commanded its readers to love Lafayette:

No one like La Fayette has ever re-appeared in any country. To us he is like a venerated
father, returned from the grave, to bless and receive the blessings of a mightily increased
and joyous posterity. [. . .] It is impossible to doubt the good dispositions of La Fayette’s
heart—it is impossible to suppose that the people of the United States should not love
him, if they love themselves and their country.3
Risen phantomlike from out of a fiercely imagined time, Lafayette performed before
White audiences that saw in him their individuated dreams of American nationhood. For some,
1
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founders blurred into gods. But benefitting from the 1783 Treaty of Paris, a progeny of flawed
mortals at least inherited sovereignty. Others went unmentioned in that treaty. Nonetheless, they
too demanded their own rights of sovereignty, at times invoking the same documents and ideas
upon which the United States constructed its nation. Built then on differing foundations of
political reality arose Euro-American and Native American concepts of nationhood. This chapter
uses Lafayette as a narrative vehicle because his interactions with Indians left documentary
evidence regarding the sovereignty they claimed as benefactors of the Revolutionary War in
which they fought under the command of Lafayette himself or under other Revolutionary War
commanders, and his records lend insight into Native national sovereignty claimed through
treaties entered into with British signatories.
Such evidence, along with the laudatory press accounts of his journey, and the voices of
statesmen who perhaps praised him as a means for bolstering their visions of a shining America,
also raises the question: to what degree was the quest for an American national identity
dependent on the momentum of the rhetoric produced by local boosters who introduced him to
podiums across the country, by newspapers, and by the speeches of politicians? Similar
questions can be asked regarding the formulations of Native national identities. How did the
Indian leaders rhetorically manage the rationale for incorporating republican innovations into
existing tribal political structures? At the very least, these questions bring to the surface the
dependency of political realities upon words. Arguably then, the national identities explored in
the present study were talked into being as much as they were forged through the act of a
revolutionary war.
Returning to the world history lens through which this chapter peers, Lafayette’s visit
viewed as a trans-Atlantic travel narrative builds on Patrick Manning’s argument that “the world
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historian’s work is to portray the crossing of boundaries and the linking of systems in the human
past.”4 Lafayette’s visit placed him in contact with people in nearly every corner of the United
States. His experiences with Iroquois, Choctaw, Creek, and Cherokee men and women, with
African American slaves, Euro-American laborers, traders, and farmers, as well as with
Presidents and congressmen all occurred during a period of rapidly escalating Indian removal
policy, of a nation economically dependent on slavery, and of a new era launched by the 1823
Monroe Doctrine.
On his own side of the Atlantic, Lafayette had seen his efforts to steer the French
revolution into a constitutional monarchy lead him only to exile, his wife’s imprisonment, and
the state confiscation of his fortune. When political winds shifted, he briefly recovered, fell prey
again to his enemies, and then decided to make one last American visit. Indeed, he had remained
forever enamored of Young America, even landscaping his entire French estate with flora and
fauna indigenous to the United States.
But French fascination with the United States depended not only on Lafayette. Indeed,
the number of scholarly publications immediately preceding his voyage suggest an almost
fashionable curiosity with the young republic. The journal, Nouvelles Annales des voyages de la
géographie et de l’histoire (New Annals of Travel, Geography, and History) published four
issues a year starting in 1819 and extensively covered the United States; Résumé sur l’histoirie
des Etats-Unis (Summary on the History of the United States) by Charles-Ogé Barbaroux
appeared in 1824, with republication in 1826; and Arnold Scheffer’s L’Histoirie des Etate-Unis
de L’Amérique septentrionale (History of the United States of North America) appeared in 1825.
Thus Lafayette’s French biographer Jean-Pierre Bois saw no coincidence in the 1826 publication
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of what until then was the most famous French book on the United States, Voyage en Amérique,
(Journey to America) by François-René de Chateaubriand.5

One Final Journey to America
In February 1824, Lafayette lost his re-election to the Chamber of Deputies, crushing his
liberal efforts to turn France against the Bourbons. Furthermore, his financial support for
republican causes throughout Europe to overthrow the Holy Alliance wiped out his once sizable
personal fortune. Perhaps another visit to the United States would shift European attention to the
example provided by that nation’s success story. So he enlisted his son, George Washington
Lafayette, (named in honor of Lafayette’s wartime friend and first president or the United States)
and a liberal ally, Auguste Levasseur, to accompany him across the Atlantic and to send regular
reports back to France celebrating America’s republican glories that, he hoped, would provide a
template for the liberal transformation of not only France but of all Europe.6 Financing the
venture remained thorny until Thomas Jefferson came to Lafayette’s aid by prevailing upon
President Monroe to convince Congress for an adequate appropriation.7 Thus granted a township
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and $200,0008 -- a portion of which he sent to assist French, Spanish, and Italian political exiles
in London9 -- Lafayette left for America on 25 August 1824. He returned to France on 8
September 1825.
Lafayette’s place in the pantheon of revered revolutionary figures rested on three pillars –
the military campaigns he led against British forces; his friendship with George Washington; and
his diplomatic instrumentality in convincing Louis XVI to throw France’s full military and
economic support to the American cause, likely assuring its victory over British forces. No friend
of republican ideals, Louis XVI desired primarily to inflict pain on his arch nemesis England as
payback for his empire’s North American loses in the Seven Years’ War.
Lafayette’s leadership and diplomacy inspired not only Euro-American forces. Early in
his campaigns he recruited Oneida warriors into battle against the British, though most Iroquois
nations allied against the Americans.10 In 1784, during his initial post-revolution return to the
United States -- and as prelude to events further played out in his 1824 visit -- he hoped his
influence might benefit all Iroquois nations whose leaders gathered for the 1784 Treaty of Fort
Stanwick.11 Negotiations for this treaty occurred within a context dramatically different from the

XVIII which had probably taken place or soon must do so, will produce a crisis in his own
country from which he could not absent himself by a visit.”
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pre-revolutionary 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix covered in Chapter 1. Largely discounted by the
American officials was the recognition of Iroquois power that British negotiators displayed
sixteen years before. Of particular relevance to the current chapter is a speech made by Mohawk
chief Karonghyontye regarding Native sovereignty. Relevant too is speech made by Lafayette in
which he reminds the Iroquois diplomats that British/Iroquois alliances made during the war
complicate their demands for the United States to now recognize Iroquois sovereignty.
Accompanied by James Madison, Lafayette travelled the three hundred miles from New
York City to the fort, which he had not seen since the war. The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwick
provided opening gambits for three powers in the post-revolutionary world. The Iroquois, the
State of New York, and the federal government all demanded recognition of their sovereign
status. On 11 January 1784, General Schuyler told tribal leaders at Schenectady that the 1783
Treaty of Paris said nothing about Indians; “they are therefore left to settle matters with
Congress.”12
But during treaty negotiations in October, the Mohawk chief Karonghyontye claimed
otherwise. “We have hitherto been bound by the Great King,” Karonghyontye intoned. “But he
having broke the chain and left us to ourselves, we are free again and independent.” The treaties
entered into by the two nations existed only between them. Perhaps inferred, The United States
at best inherited only broken contracts from England. Karonghyontye reminded The United
States of its obligation to recognize Mohawk independence, and proclaimed: “Upon this
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principle we wish that the Commissioners would consider what we say of ourselves.” The
principle of Mohawk independence stood on the nation’s freedom to conduct its own national
affairs, which in turn inferred its rights of sovereignty over its own lands. Karonghyontye then
admonished both the United States and England for neglecting Native interests altogether in the
1783 Treaty of Paris: “You also assured us that the Great King, in settling peace with the United
States made no mention of us, but left us to treat for ourselves. Certainly the Great King did not
look up to that Great Spirit, which he had called as a witness to that treaty.” Here, probing deeper
into the issue of neglect, Karonghyontye broached its attendant hypocrisy and charged England’s
invocation of divine validation as false. Had the English king indeed taken sincere guidance from
the Great Spirit, “common justice would not have suffered him to be so inattentive, as to neglect
those who had been so just and faithful to him.” Karonghyontye leveled the same charge against
the United States. “We think that our brothers, the United States did not think of the Great Spirit,
otherwise they would have mentioned to the Great Spirit those persons who had been so faithful
to him, when they found that he had entirely neglected them.” 13 Categorically, Karonghyontye
staked out the Mohawk position. He admonished Americans for shirking moral obligations and
religious convictions without which their political decisions cannot rise to the level of
magnanimity they claim as defenders of liberty.
One of the commissioners shot back and denied Native independence: “It is not so. You
are a subdued people; you have been overcome in a war which you entered into with us. [. . .]
The great spirit, who is at the same time the judge and avenger of perfidy, has given us victory
against all our enemies. We are at peace with all but you.”14
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While the federal government claimed the Iroquois possessed no sovereignty, the state of
New York claimed that the federal government possessed no right to treat with the Iroquois: the
state alone possessed sovereignty in this matter. New York’s Governor Clinton based his
argument on advice he solicited from James Duane who provided his interpretation of Indian
policy according to constitutional law. He argued that according to the 9th Article of the Articles
of Confederation, Congress claimed the right to declare peace,

and if the Tribes are to be considered as an independent Nation, detached from the State,
and absolutely unconnected with it, the Claim of Congress would be uncontrovertible.
[However,] there is then an indispensible Necessity that these tribes should be treated as
antient Dependants on this State, placed under its protection, with all their territorial
Rights, by their own Consent publicly manifested in solemn and repeated Treaties. On
this Ground the Tribes in Question may fall under the Character of Members of the State
with the management of whom Congress hath no Concern. [. . .] These tribes should be
reconciled to the Idea of being members of the State, dependent upon its government, and
resting upon its protection. If we adopt the disgraceful System of flattering them as great
and mighty Nations, [the] Revolution, in my Eyes, will have lost more than half its
Value.15

The Articles of Confederation adopted in 1781 by the states gave to Congress, by the
provisions of Article IX, “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining peace and war”
[and of] “entering into treaties and alliances.” The article also granted Congress the exclusive
right of “regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of
the states, provided that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or
violated.” New York’s action raised a constitutional issue by entering into a treaty with the
Indians. How could either the federal or state government enter into treaties with its own
citizens? But the article does not use the term “citizen.” Rather it enlists the ambiguous phrase,
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“not members of any of the states,” following the equally ambiguous “all affairs with the
Indians.”
On April 6, 1784, the New York State Legislature authorized Governor Clinton and three
Indian commissioners to negotiate a peace and land cession treaty with Iroquois nations. As
these nations possessed territory that fell within the state’s boundaries, New York claimed
jurisdiction over them. Though both federal and state governments merely continued legal
concepts of sovereignty inherited from the colonial era, no European power ever conquered or
occupied more than slight portions of Iroquois territory that fell within state boundaries of New
York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. But the Iroquois defined themselves as an independent sovereign
power, not as subjects to any colonial or state power. Their concept of sovereignty remained
incompatible with the European, and consequently, American view.16
Arthur Lee, one of the commissioners appointed by Congress, expressed misgivings over
New York’s action. He wrote to the chairman of the Committee of the States of the Continental
Congress: “How far this State as a right to hold such treaties the Committee must judge.” The
action placed the state in competition with Congress. “While the Indians are induced to believe,
by such proceedings, that there are distinct, independent and perhaps jealous Powers to treat with
them, they will certainly avail themselves of it, much to the disadvantage of the general
Confederacy.”17
Within the context of these competing claims to sovereignty, and serving no official
capacity regarding the treaty, Lafayette spoke when negotiations opened on 3 October. What he
had to say did not endear him to American negotiators.

16

Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1972), 273.
17
Ibid.
96

“The American cause is just, I told you then,” he proclaimed, referring to his attempts to
dissuade Iroquois nations from alliance with British forces during the Revolutionary War. “At
least remain neutral, and the brave Americans will defend their liberty and yours. [. . .] ‘Do not
listen to Kayeheanla,’ they cried to you before.” Using the name given him by the Iroquois, he
recalled that the British promised them Washington “would be forced to leave the country. [But]
my predictions having been fulfilled, listen to the new advice of your father, and may my voice
resound among all the nations.” Congressman Arthur Lee, among other federal dignitaries, likely
grew alarmed by this point in Lafayette’s address, and certainly what followed fueled the
disdainful comments that Lee would later register, as “The Nation’s Guest” took the opportunity
to remind the Iroquois of the greatness of Onontio, their French father, the king.

Do not forget that the Americans are close friends of your fathers the French; this alliance
is as enduring as it has been fortunate. The great Onontio gives his hand forever to your
brothers who offer you theirs, and by this means we shall form a salutary chain. To assure
yourselves of this, trade with the Americans and with those of your fathers who cross the
great lake. The products of France are known to you, and you are clever enough to prefer
them. They will be for you the symbol of your alliance. In selling lands, do not consult a
barrel of rum to give them up to the first who come, but let the American chiefs and
yours, joined together around the fire, conclude reasonable bargains.18
Indeed, Arthur Lee’s disdain for Lafayette’s presence on the treaty grounds is
underscored by Lafayette in a letter to his wife, a letter that also mentions the French commercial
relationship that Lafayatte hoped to establish with the Iroquois.

Although the congressional ambassadors were led by Mr. Arthur Lee, who certainly did
not care to be under obligation to me, they were obliged to have recourse to me, [. . .] and
18
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Mr. Lee’s final observation to me was that the savages had been too occupied with me to
pay attention to the commissioners. They made me great promises, and I love to think
that I have contributed to a treaty that will give us a small commercial outlet and will
ensure the tranquility of the Americans.19
The Mohawk chief, Karonghyontye (Captain David Hill); an unidentified speaker from
one of the Native American allied nations; an unnamed Huron chief; and the Seneca chief,
Cornplanter responded to Lafayette. Karonghyontye expressed regret for the Mohawk alliance
with the British: “My father, [we] acknowledge having been led astray and enveloped in a black
cloud, but now we return so that you will find in us again good and faithful children.” He
affirmed that the “alliance between France and America was an indissoluble bond that would
never be broken,” and he hoped for Lafayette’s words to “spread throughout all of the Six
Nations, [as] they are bound to renew and strengthen the bond of friendship that we wish to see
endure forever.” The unidentified speaker invoked the 6,000 bead wampum belt presented by
General Montcalm in 1757, recalling it as the belt that “was given us twenty years ago by our
fathers. They told us that we must hold one end of it and France the other, and that one day their
voices would be heard among us again.” The Huron chief recalled that the “nations of the north
have been the children of the great Onontio for a long time,” and added that “we received
exhortations from the governor of Canada [. . .] to speak only soft words at the treaty
negotiations that are going to be held with the thirteen United States.”20
This perhaps smoothed the open secret that General Hadimand promised the Mohawk
and other Iroquois nations a permanent home in Canada to reward their loyalty to the Crown,
though he indeed duplicitously counseled cooperation with Congress. Of greater complexity,
Hadimand’s geopolitical strategy counted on Iroquois military allies to buffer potential American
19
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campaigns and as loyal warriors for potential offensive attacks against the southern neighbor.
Working in concert with Hadimand for a Mohawk removal to Canada, Joseph Brant first
approached Sir John Johnson and proposed settlement in the St. Lawrence River region, with
Loyalists settled nearby to aid the development of his people. Lord North not only approved the
plan, he promised farming implements for them and sent Hadimand the king’s desire to offer
Canadian settlement for all friendly tribes. As argued by Barbara Graymont, American
negotiators at Fort Stanwix, keenly aware of British plans and of Joseph Brant’s political
acumen, attempted to steer a diplomatic course that maintained Iroquois settlement peacefully on
their land within the United States, until White settlement cleared land, drove away game, and
attained density enough to make livelihoods untenable for Indians, driving them to sell their land
cheaply.21
Cornplanter’s reply to Lafayette also sent a message to the American negotiators. He
acknowledged “no nation is free from error, and we have been led into very great mistakes, at
Great Britain’s instigation, in uniting against the American states.” But he went further, choosing
his words to address not only the Frenchman, but, with more precise political measure, to remind
the American negotiators of their obligations:

We were vanquished, but it is fitting for all nations to be concerned about each other in
misfortune, and it especially becomes the victors to show their compassion to those who
are vanquished. You have heard our voice, my father. Our ideas are all brought together
around this council fire lit by Congress, whose representatives are here at this moment.
Our hopes, our trust, are concentrated in this treaty negotiation. If the Americans speak to
us kindly, all will go well and peace will spread over all the nations.22
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Acerbic responses to Lafayette demonstrate the range of Native opinion, as illustrated by
Mohawk leader David Hill:

. . .we thank you Father for the fine Speech you thought proper to make to us, we
understand you what you mean, and do not disown of having acted for our King for we
do not slight or forget old Engagements and agreements which have been handed down to
us by our Ancestors, which they made and entered into with our ancient protectors and
Friends the Great Kings of England; and we now tell you we always joined them when at
War against you the french for you always begun unjust Disputes; and now have joined
those Bostonians against their King, who never were your Friends and hated you french
mortally and we the Indians only begun to fight hearty when you espoused their unjust
Cause. These Father are our sentiments with regard to you for we Indians love what is
just and honest.23
Thirty years later, Lafayette’s tour took him back to the Fort Stanwix region in Western
New York, though by then little remained of the long-abandoned post. One of his stops included
Buffalo, the city prospering again after its near total destruction by British forces. Tens of
thousands of cheering citizens turned out for his grand reception, after which he and his
entourage retired to their lodgings at the Eagle Tavern. There, among the dignitaries pressing
around him, appeared the Seneca leader Red Jacket. Lafayette immediately recognized him from
the Fort Stanwix treaty grounds, but jokingly, as Levassuer related, asked him “if he knew what
had become of the young Indian who had so eloquently opposed the burying of the tomahawk.”
Red Jacket answered: “He is before you.”24 As Rosemary K. Bank argues, Red Jacket’s presence
at the Eagle Tavern “testified to a history that had, in the forty years separating the
Revolutionary War from Lafayette's return, located the Senecas outside the national past of
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which Lafayette was the living emblem.”25
Three Oneida chiefs, Taniatakaya, Sangouxyonta, and Doxtator, who fought for the
rebels reacquainted themselves with Lafayette in Utica, yet another paraded stop on his western
New York itinerary.26 Taniatakaya struck a diplomatic tone:

“The chase is no longer productive, it does not supply our wants, and we are obliged to
provide for our subsistence by agriculture, which renders us very unhappy; but it is not owing to
our white brothers of the state of New York; they act generously towards us; they permit us to
live in peace near the bones of our fathers, which they have not obliged us to transport to a
strange land; and the government often succours us when our harvests fail; hence we sincerely
love our white brothers, the Americans. We formerly fought for them against the English, and we
are still ready to raise the tomahawk in their favour, whenever occasion requires it.”27
The Oneida chiefs privately recounted to Lafayette the failing fortunes of their nation, but
their discussions were interrupted by a group of White Oneida County officials who invited him
to lay the cornerstone for a monument commemorating Major General Baron de Steuben in
nearby Steubenville. Lafayette declined the invitation, citing an obligation elsewhere. The
monument illustrates a certain irony of a county named after a Native nation allied with the
rebels but whose service garnered large-scale removal far to the west. However, the citizens
enshrined the disinterred bones of the Prussian general (originally buried in 1795) beneath a
stone monument to preserve his memory for the ages.28 Baron de Steuben famously trained the
Continental Army and with Lafayette wrote the Blue Book, the army manual used until the war
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of 1812.29 Less famous but still living, Taniatakaya, Sangouxyonta, and Doxtator, grew only
increasingly marginalized in the county’s selective memory.
The next day, Lafayette and his entourage embarked for Schenectady on the recently
opened Erie Canal. When their horse drawn barge passed beneath a bridge a few hundred yards
outside Utica, a young Oneida man, who had been running along the towpath hailing the vessel
already for some distance, sprinted ahead to the bridge and jumped aboard from it. “Where is
Kayewla? I wish to see Kayewla.” Lafayette walked toward him, smiling while the young man
excitedly explained, “I am the son of Wekchekaeta, of him who loved you so well, that he
followed you to your country when you returned there after the great war; my father has often
spoken to me of you.”30 Lafayette first met Wekchekaeta (Peter Ostiquette) at Fort Stanwix in
1784 and noted in his 10 October letter to Adrienne: “I’ll confide to you that I may well bring
back a young Iroquois Indian, but that negotiation is not yet completed.”31 His letter to Jeremiah
Wadsworth in Boston the following April sheds light on this “negotiation.” “There is a young
Indian, Son to a french Man By the Name of Stephanus, whom I intend to take with me to France
as a favourite Servant. The Young Man Has a Regard for me, as I was Spoken off to Him By His
deseased [sic] father. [. . .] The whole family who are Oneidas, Consented to His Coming with
me.”32
But Oneida genealogist Amelia Cornelius (1938-2016) provided evidence for a more
complicated story. In 1784 Lafayette asked the Oneidas for permission to take two of their young
men to France. Probably the children of his former clerk, Otsiquette, and an Oneida woman,
29

Paul Lockhart, The Drillmaster of Valley Forge: The Baron de Steuben and the Making of the
American Army (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010), 169.
30
Levasseur, 196.
31
Idzerda and Croat, Lafayette. . . , “Et je vous confierai que je pourrois bien ramener un jeune
sauvage iroquois: mais cette négociation n’est pas encore terminée.” 417.
32
Idzerda and Croat, Lafayette. . ., 319.
102

Sarah Hanyost, they lived with their mother after Otsiquette returned to France. The Oneida
granted permission; however, one of the boys, Edward (Neddy), “ran off into the woods and
rebelled by throwing stones at those who pursued him.” So Lafayette took only his brother,
Peter, across the Atlantic. Peter learned French fluently, received a classical education, and spent
several years as a member of Lafayette’s household. But when he received word that the Oneida
nation faced a growing range of problems, he returned, only to find himself involved with the
French trader, Peter Penet, “who attempted to weasel his way into Oneida affairs and secure a
personal empire in the late 1780s.” Neddy eventually rose to the leadership of the First Christian
party and in 1823 brought an early group of Oneida’s to their Duck Creek Reservation near
Green Bay, Wisconsin.33
Peter Otsiquette died in March 1792 in Philadelphia. His funeral procession took on the
dimensions of a respectful and stately affair as it wound through the city toward the Presbyterian
cemetery on Mulberry Street. Ahead of the coffin marched a detachment of light infantry,
weapons reversed, muffled drums playing a dirge; behind the coffin walked 49 Iroquois leaders
and warriors, “clergy of all denominations,” the Secretary of War, federal army and state militia
officers, and a multitude of Philadelphia citizens. By one estimate, the procession included over
10,000 people.34
The number of Euro-American and Native American dignitaries present resulted from a
previously scheduled meeting that brought the two groups to the city to seek “confirmation of
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former treaties, and the promotion of peace and good understanding between Whites and the
Indian tribes of the Five Nations.”35 Coincidence aside, the attendance of these many officials at
Peter Ostiquette’s funeral underscores his story as one that links Native American, EuroAmerican, and French national histories. His association with Lafayette lent to him accolades
and political clout, credentialing that likely played into his role as one of the Iroquois leaders
who travelled to the Philadelphia to meet with federal officials, including George Washington.
Otsiquette died only days after meeting Washington. His Lafayette connection raises the
question: when Americans buried Peter Otsiquette, to what degree did the reverence they
exhibited include a note of something they lost of Lafayette?

Lafayette and Native Leaders in Washington D.C.
On Wednesday, November 24, 1824 in Washington D.C, the Choctaw leaders
Pushamata, Mushalatubbee, and Robert Cole left their rooms at Tennison’s Hotel and headed
down Pennsylvania Avenue to Gadsby’s hotel, there to confer with “The Nation’s Guest,” the
Marquis de Lafayette.36 They regarded Lafayette highly, but what initially led them to
Washington concerned Secretary of State John Calhoun’s request to renegotiate the 1820 Treaty
of Doak’s Stand. Original negotiations revealed deep fissures in Choctaw politics, and the
federal government’s bid to renegotiate merely accentuated them. Ironically, from out these
divisive strains arose outlines of Choctaw nationalism, the story of which involves details the
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delegation shared with Lafayette that revealed Choctaw national identity relied in part on the
same Revolutionary War touchstones as did Euro-American national identity. Those
thouchstones included George Washington and The Marquis de Lafayette himself.
Mushalatubbee placed both within the context of Choctaw relations with European
powers preceding the creation of the American state.

You are one of our fathers that fought in the war with general Washington. We take you
here by the hand as a friend and a father. We have always walked in the White paths of
peace; and in those paths we have travelled to visit you. We offer you pure hands, which
have never been stained with the blood of Americans. We live in the south, where the sun
shines hot upon us. We have been neighbors to the French, neighbors to the Spaniards,
and neighbors to the English; but now our only neighbors are the Americans, in the midst
of whom we live as friends and brothers.37
Pushamata went into greater detail:
About fifty years ago you drew your sword, the companion of general Washington. With
him you travelled and warred against the enemies of America. In spilling the blood of
your foes, you generously shed your own, thereby consecrating your devotion to the
cause in which you were engaged. After the termination of the war, you returned to your
country, and now you revisit this land, blessed by the benedictions and honored with the
grateful attentions of a numerous and powerful people. You see everywhere around you,
crowding in your presence, and clasping your hands with filial affection, the children of
those with whom you fought in defense of their country. We had heard of these things,
even in our remote habitations, and our bosoms were depressed with anxiety to see you.
We have come. We take you by the hand and are satisfied. It is the first and the last time.
We shall meet no more. We part, on earth, forever. This is all I have to say.38
Finally, Robert Cole added:
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I am a man of mixed blood. I consider all white men as my fathers. You come from a far
distant land. I salute you as my father, because you are a white man and the old and
constant friend of America.39
Mushalatubbee underscores both the history of Choctaw military alliance with the
Americans and the desire to live in peace with them. Lafayette, as friend and father, as first
among equals, the Choctaw “take by the hand,” and they regard the Americans too as
“neighbors,” or, again, as equals. In times past, they lived – or hoped to live – as equals to the
Spanish, French, and English. Now, however, the Choctaw recognize only the United States as
equal to the Choctaw, a relationship likely inferring that the Choctaw nation claims for itself the
same sovereign status as that accorded to young America.
The leaders seated in Lafayette’s room represented the interests of only one Choctaw
faction, which has been termed “primoridalist,” that stood in opposition to the “cosmopolitan”
faction.40 The former adhered to a traditional kinship-based polity, and the later generally
envisioned a nation-state based not on kinship but on merit. Therefore, the historical context of
the delegation cannot be adequately understood without surveying the multiple dimensions of
Choctaw politics.
As had been the case for generations, the Eastern, Western, and Southern divisions of the
Mississippi Choctaw were governed by division chiefs and councils. All chiefs inherited their
positions based on kinship. Mushulatubbee, leader of the Eastern division, adhered to a longestablished Mississippian system of divisional autonomy and redistribution of prestige goods.
His allies included James and Peter Pitchlynn, his nephews; Pushmataha, chief of the Southern
division; Puckshunubbee, chief of Western division; and Robert Cole, Puckshunubbee’s council
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speaker. But David Folsom, Greenwood LeFlore, and others championed constitutional
government and sought to replace divisional governments with a unified national government.
They saw ethnic identities and kinship affiliations as divisive and advocated for civic
membership in a Choctaw state. This concept of a nation was modeled on the constitutional
republic of the United States.41
Fearing that reform-minded Folsom threatened the authority of division chiefs, James
Pitchlynn initiated correspondence with Andrew Jackson. One letter reads:
I take this pleasure to inform you I have got several families of the Choctaws who are
willing to move west of the Mississippi; and I believe, if there was a treaty held in the
nation, there would be one-third or half of the nation would move his fall. I find all the
rich white people living in the nation; they give bad talks to the Indians; they tell them
not to exchange lands, and some public men in the nation. Some of the Indians has
threatened to knock me in the head on this account. I have never heard from you nor the
President of the United States about my business. You wrote for me at your house. I hope
you will write to me soon as you receive answer. Excuse my bad writing, as I told you I
never went to school but six months.42
Pitchlynn lobbied President Monroe as well, claiming that “It is the wish of [the Six
Towns district] of the Choctaw Nation to cede their lands to you for lands west of the
Mississippi.”43 However, on 13 September 1820, Edmund Folsom informed Andrew Jackson
that the Six Towns “generally appear to be in complete opposition toward selling or making any
exchange of their lands.”44
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Pitchlynn’s campaign led in part to the aforementioned Treaty of Doak’s Stand, by
which the Choctaw exchanged about six million acres of their nation for about thirteen million
acres in Arkansas Territory.45 During treaty negotiations in October 1820, Andrew Jackson who,
along with Thomas Hines, had been appointed by President Monroe to represent the interests of
the United States, did not recognize the Choctaw nation as sovereign, as would become
abundantly clear during his future presidency. Therefore, some comments he made to Secretary
of War John C. Calhoun must be measured accordingly, for at variance stood the definition of
“nation.” Jackson wrote:

The wish of the real Indian chiefs is (as I am advised) to perpetuate the existence of their
nation, by concentrating the whole of a country that will support them as a nation. At
present, they are scattered and wandering over a great space of country, and, if not shortly
united, will be lost to their nation in other tribes. The pride of a real Indian is in the
strength of his nation; and this is a chord I mean to touch, to obtain the object in view. I
therefore wish to have it in my power to point to the land, and to describe its bounds
where their father the President of the United States means to settle his red children,
concentrate and perpetuate them as a nation, and thereby make his children happy.46

The phrase “real Indian chiefs” references Choctaw factionalism noted above, and in his
correspondence with Jackson, Pitchlynn positioned himself in alliance with those chiefs who
obtained their status by kinship, and -- supplying Jackson’s advisement parenthetically noted by
him -- he argued their legitimacy as “real” chiefs according to Choctaw tradition. Next, Jackson
argues that only by concentrating the “scattered and wandering” Choctaw into a smaller area
could their nation survive, a nation based, on “pride,” a word choice suggesting that Jackson

45

Clara Sue Kidwell, Choctaws and Missionaries in Mississippi, 1818-1918 (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 48.
46
Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, Nashville, 19 June 1820, American State Papers 2: 231.
108

believes he understands the key to the identity of a “real Indian.” Moreover, Jackson’s logic
foreshadows a central element in the as yet unpenned Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and invokes
an already established rationale for removal based on White largesse. First, “pride” not, by
inference, political autonomy, defined the Native nation in Jackson’s estimate. Hence will
Marshall’s concept of Indians as members of “domestic dependent nations” also sidestep Native
national sovereignty. Second, Jackson’s call for the geographic concentration of Indians builds
on the notion of a moral obligation for Whites as purveyors of Christianity and Civilization to
lead the wandering “red children” paternalistically to happiness, at least as defined on EuroAmerican terms. Moreover, Jackson rhetorically compounds his logic by twice repeating both
the word “real” and forms of the word “concentrate,” and though he repeats the word “nation”
five times, the repetition perhaps only disguising the difference he sees between Native
American and Euro-American nationhoods.
The 1820 Treaty of Doak’s Stand provided that fifty-four sections of good land out of
the ceded territory should be sold “for the purpose of raising a fund, to be applied to the support
of the Choctaw schools, on both sides of the Mississippi.”47 But shortly after Puckshunubbee,
Pushmataha, Mushulaatubbe, James Pitchlynn, and Robert Cole signed the treaty on 18 October
1820, the federal government called for a renegotiation. American citizens, it turned out, already
claimed some of the Arkansas land that been ceded to the Choctaws. Thus Secretary Calhoun
invited the Choctaw leaders to Washington in order to retrocede the occupied portion of the
Arkansas parcel. Mushulatubbee and Pushmataha possibly recognized this as an opportunity to
discharge the heavy debts they had accrued at the federal factory, where they purchased goods
for distribution to their partisans. However, Chief Puckshunubbee carried no debt and saw no
47
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value in retrocession. Though David Folsom opposed the Treaty of Doak’s Stand, he hoped now,
at least, to gain concessions to finance Choctaw schools.48
The three chiefs along with Robert Cole, John Pitchlynn, and David Folsom left for
Washington by stagecoach in early October 1824. On 10 October, shortly after they arrived in
Maysville, Kentucky, Puckshunubbee went out for a walk, slipped, fell down a steep bluff, and
died of his injuries two days later. In a ceremony attended by some six hundred locals, the chief
was buried with full military honors that included a fife and drum corps and three musket rounds
fired by the Maysville militia.49
The delegation arrived in Washington on 27 October 1824. Mushulatubbee and
Pushmataha spent much of their time touring Washington taverns, which scandalized Folsom,
and likely as result of his expeditions, Pushmataha sickened. Doctors doubted he would long
survive. Indeed he died a few days after meeting with Lafayette. Perhaps remembering
Puckshunubbee’s funeral honors, he requested that he too receive a military funeral, but on a
grander scale than what Maysville had mustered. Thus he was interred in the Congressional
Cemetery in his American military uniform, and cannons—not mere muskets--fired in salute.50
The two funerals represent yet another example of Native American and Euro-American
entanglement. Both chiefs fought under American Commanders in the Revolution, and they
remained proud of their service, as signaled even in their deaths.51 Moreover, only the early
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nineteenth century did the Choctaw begin to practice internment and move away from the
previous century’s scaffolding and bone-picking rituals. George Gaines, a trader who spent two
decades working among the Choctaws, believed they adopted the practice after the Creek War
(1813-1814):
Previous to the late war the ancient custom of scaffolding their dead until decomposition
had progressed to the point where the services of the professional Bone Picker was
required, unanimously prevailed. But the services of the Choctaw volunteers with our
troops on the eastern frontier seemed to convince them that burying the dead was better
than scaffolding. Etc. They relinquished their ancient custom and buried, though they did
not believe this mode as respectful to the memory of the deceased.52
Burials, however, were accompanied by ceremonies that reflected the continuing
importance of the scaffolding rites. Kinfolk buried the deceased in a sitting position either near
his or her home or under the bed inside the house, a practice common among the Chickasaws.
The bone pickers of each moiety continued to play an important role, but they no longer handled
the corpse. Instead, at the beginning of the mourning period they erected around the grave
several red poles eight feet long and a fifteen-foot pole topped with a white flag. Female
mourners gathered around the graves, shrouded in blankets, and uttered, one missionary
commented, “the most piteous lamentations.” They despaired of the sundering of their
matrilineal lines by death and. asked aloud, “O! Why did you leave us. Were you not content
with your children? Did you not have corn enough here?” During the time of the pole setting,
Choctaws took great care to appease the spirit of the dead. Family members kept a fire burning
near the deceased’s home lest “their departed friend might be distressed or angry, especially if
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the nights were cold, dark, or stormy.” At the end of mourning, the bone pickers pulled down the
poles to signal the departure of the spirit. What LeFlore and Folsom sought to end through law
was the pole pulling, because the ceremony perpetuated the moity system that divided their
society in half. In an effort to further unite the Choctaws as a nation, the cosmopolitans tackled
the complicated rites of Choctaw funerals.53
Mushalatubbee would be the only surviving Chief of the Choctaw delegation to
Washington, and he would return to Mississippi fearing for his life. As he sat in Lafayette’s
room, his precarious political entanglements must have weighed on his mind, and he perhaps
hoped that Lafayette might lobby president Monroe on his behalf, as Lafayette certainly
understood what had brought the delegation to Washington in the first place. At least, according
to the Niles Register, “During these addresses from the Indian chiefs general La Fayette was
agitated by strong emotions, and was evidently much affected at the marks of respect which they
shewed him. He several times cordially pressed their hands.” The paper also noted that “The
chiefs accompanied the general on his departure from Gadsby’s, beyond the capitol, on the road
to Baltimore, when mutually bowing farewell, they parted.”54 However, Pushalamata died a few
days after the Gadsby’s meeting. According to Lafayette’s secretary and biographer Auguste
Levasseur, Pushalamata “expressed a desire that the Americans would bury him with the honors
of war and fire a salute over his grave, which was promised.”55
The rest of the delegation and John C. Calhoun signed a treaty on 2 January 1825 that
extinguished the debts of Pushmataha and Mushulatubbee and retroceded the inhabited Arkansas
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land to the United States in exchange for financial considerations. The delegation also obtained a
guarantee of Choctaw sovereignty and the right to determine for themselves when they were
ready to become citizens of the United States. Although he regretted ceding the Arkansas land,
Folsom also obtained from Calhoun more funding for the missionary schools, particularly for the
construction of a Choctaw secondary school. 56
Vilified for having agreed to yet another land cession, and facing efforts by David
Folsom to remove him as chief, Mushulatubbee resigned as chief in April 1826. Because Folsom
promised that he would sell no land and that he would support mission schools, the council
installed him ad chief for a four-year term. Many people in the Western division demanded that
Chief Robert Cole step down because of his opposition to Folsom and to the mission school’s
program of agricultural education. Instead, Cole advocated for the Choctaw to learn trades like
blacksmithing or carpentry. Folsom prevailed, removed Cole from office, and engineered the
appointment of his nephew Greenwood LeFlore to serve a four-year term as chief. The newly
installed leadership of the Choctaw divisions jointly opposed land cession and removal and
hoped to reinvigorate the Choctaw through education. So in August 1826, the East and West
division councils established a constitutional government that united the divisions in a a complex
chiefdom, one focused on agricultural education and the refusal to either cede land or remove
from Mississippi. Indeed, when Senator Powhatan Ellis of Mississippi succeeded in passing his
bill to negotiate Choctaw removal, the national council remained firm in their resolve, refusing to
consider either cession or removal. By 1829, the Choctaw national government had passed
twenty-two laws. Many of these laws were designed to aid and to regulate the Choctaws
engagement with the American market economy and to bring Choctaw culture into conformity
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with American norms. Control of Choctaw land was illustrated by one law that required that
prospective American husbands secure permission from the division chief and a license from the
federal agent before proceeding with the marriage. These measures prevented Americans from
marrying Choctaws simply to establish claims to land and asserted some control over the pace of
intercultural interaction. As James Taylor Carson argues, the appropriation of Anglo-American
political culture assisted the creation of a new Choctaw polity, and as David Folsom stated, “Our
nation,” is beginning to wear a different aspect—As a Nation she is easing and is already high as
to look down with contempt upon dissipation.”57

Lafayette’s Journey Through Indian Territory
Lafayette’s journey from Washington in February of 1825 led through North and South
Carolina to Charleston, to Savannah and Augusta, Georgia. This itinerary put him in contact with
members of the Creek Nation that, like the Choctaw, were confronting removal. Levasseur
remark repeatedly on the high productivity of Creek agriculture, the comfort of Creek homes,
and the permanence of their villages. This led him in turn to question the removal rhetoric that
characterized Indians as primitive and savage wanderers. The presence in Indian Territory of
fugitive slaves repaying refuge with labor fueled removal sentiment among local whites.
Significantly, local newspapers covered Lafayette in detail, but Levasseur noted that the press
showed little to no interest in their time with the Creek and “passed lightly over this part of the
journey.”58
When Lafayette's party forded the Chattahoochee River and entered Alabama, they
crossed the western boundary of the thirteen original states. Levasseur recorded Lafayette’s
57
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reception by the Creek leader Chilly McIntosh and his people as being staged as a royal progress,
“his carriage borne palanquin-like from the Chattahoochee into the Creek village, [and hailed] as
“one who, in his affection for the inhabitants of America, had never made a distinction of blood
or colour,” and called “the honoured father of all the races of men then dwelling on that
continent.”59
Chilly McIntosh joined the white Alabamans escorting Lafayette from Augusta, Georgia,
through the Indian Territory in Alabama to Montgomery. Levasseur described the Indian
presence in detail, refuting accounts of Indian women as abused and subservient chattel and
commending the courtesy of Indian men in assisting Lafayette's party over flooded roads and
bridges. McIntosh, who interpreted for the Indians they met along the way, explained the Creek
identification of Lafayette with freedom from English tyranny and so their own identification
with the Revolutionary past that their forebears had supported. Levasseur’s account condemns
exploitation of Indians by territory whites, whose behavior in many instances, he observes,
excelled “in cruelty and want of faith.”60 His journal, however, carefully differentiates between
these whites and the American government, and extends Lafayette's council to the Creeks to live
in harmony with their American “friends and brothers,” as Levasseur characterizes the federal
government:

The conduct of the American government is of an entirely different character, as regards
the Indian tribes. It not only protects them against individual persecution, and sees that
the treaties made with them by the neighbouring states are not disadvantageous to them,
and are faithfully adhered to, but it also provides for their wants with a paternal
solicitude. It is not a rare circumstance for Congress to vote money and supplies to those
tribes, whom a deficient harvest or unforseen calamity have exposed to famine.61
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Levasseur's fatherly democratic government stands in sharp contrast both to the federal
government's history with respect to Native Americans by 1825 and to the conditions under
which the Indians Lafayette encountered during his travels were actually living.
Sovereignty stands as the supreme political power from which all other legal, social,
cultural, and economic powers emanate, and its attainment by the United States figured as the
most significant outcome of the American Revolution. Yet as Article 1 of the 1783 Treaty of
Paris established that “His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States [. . .] to be
free sovereign & Independent States,”62 the sovereign status historically retained by Native
American nations grew increasingly challenged in the face of subsequent expansion into Indian
Country by the United States. Indeed, two month’s before the signing of the 1783 Treaty of
Paris, the July 23 council between American officials and a number of Iroquois chiefs initiated a
line of reasoning that would become increasingly prominent. Abeel, a Seneca Chief, recalled the
speech that General Philip Schuyler made before a number of Iroquois Chiefs that day:

I am directed by Congress to call you together & in form you that Peace is at last agreed
on between the Kings of Great Britain, France, Spain and the Americans. [. . .] As we are
the Conquerors we claim the lands & property of all the white people as well as the
Indians who have left & fought against us. We enquired of the King what he intended to
do for the Indians, as we expected that he would have been very particular about them.
He being the person who should have considered their situation; but the King answered,
What can I do? Nothing ! You have conquered me therefore do with them what you
please.”63
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Schuyler embodied the will of the nascent republic and declared its resolve to reset the
national stage. He likely elicited a range of reactions from his Iroquois audience that day. But the
threat to seek retribution for Iroquois alliance with Britain by taking their land as spoils would
not be passively met.64
And elsewhere, immediately following the 1783 Treaty of Paris, Alexander McGillivray
(1750-1793), an Upper Creek chief, used that document to leverage a case for Creek
independence.65 Alarmed by the treaty’s complete silence on Indian rights, and by Great
Britain’s agreement in Article 1 to relinquish “all Claims to the Government Propriety and
Territorial Rights,”66 McGillivray sought protection from the Governor of Spanish West Florida,
Arturo O’ Neil, to help defend Creek land from American settler incursions. In his January 1,
1784 letter to the governor he wrote:

Having received Information a few days ago by letter from St. Augustine that the
Definitive Treaty of Peace between their Britanick & Most Catholic Majestys Was
ratified and Signed on the 3d day of September last in Paris, I take the liberty to
Congratulate Your Excellency on the happy event. As the Floridas are Confirmed to the
Crown of Spain by the Peace, I solicit in behalf of the Creek Nations his Majestys most
Gracious Protection for themselves and Country, as is by them claimed and now held in
actual possession. If in the event of War Brittain has been Compell’d to withdraw its
protection from us, She has no right to transfer us with their former possessions to any
power whatever contrary to our Inclination and Interest. We Certainly as a free Nation
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have a right to chuse our protector and on our Search what power is so fitting as the
Master of the Floridas.67
The 1784 Treaty of Pensacola formalized relations between the Creek Nations and Spain.
By it, Spain promised to serve as a Creek protector; however, a Creek war council’s April 1786
decision to drive all Americans from Indian lands tested Spain’s willingness to abide by the 1784
Treaty and in so doing risk war with the United States by aiding Creek military endeavors
against Georgian and Cumberland settlers. So by early 1787, Spain had significantly curtailed
support for the Creek war effort. As Thomas D. Watson argues, Spain’s equivocation strained its
relations with the Creeks to the point that McGillivray began to entertain ties with the United
States, but only if the young nation could guarantee protection equal to that of Spain’s.68
McGillivray’s negotiations with the federal government led to the 1790 Treaty of New York.
Representing the interests of both Upper and Lower Creeks, McGillivray signed the treaty,
satisfied that he had secured Creek sovereignty. He died twenty years before the Creek civil war
and forty years before Creek removal, but as Melissa A. Stock argues, these later affronts to his
efforts do not undercut his achievements as a champion of Indigenous sovereignty.69
The historical conditions that led to the rise of the Creek nation as a hybrid construction
entailing indigenous kinship and governing structures with elements of republicanism provides
just one example of Native nationhood. Subsequent chapters will examine the conditions that led
to the development of Mashpee and of Cherokee nations. The specter of removal hung the over
the evolution of these and of other Native nations, more so with each passing year. And as the
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pace of White settlement only accelerated over the course of the nineteenth century, Indian
policies transformed as well. Indian policy from the early years of the republic have been
characterized by historian Robert Berkhofer as an attempted “expansion with honor” that
appeared to rest on the optimistic possibility that White frontier settlement could be achieved
through peaceful nation-to-nation treaties with Indians by which the sale of their land would be
negotiated.70 Secretary of War Henry Knox and others believed that land transfer by treaty, in
which the Native American “occupancy” type of ownership would be replaced by titled
ownership by Whites, would be most effectively achieved if Indians would adopt “civilization.”
This could be achieved, it was thought, if Indians learned from their White neighbors and by
their example become Christianized, take up settled agrarian lifestyles, give up their tribal
identities, and eventually become American citizens. The desired result of these transformations
would be that the Indians would realize that they needed less land as settled agriculturalists than
as hunters who migrated across the landscape for their survival. Therefore, they would be willing
sell their excess acres to White settlers.71 But this policy premised on ideas of bringing
civilization to Indians was never without its critics, and the America that Lafayette left on 8
September 1825 was rapidly transforming into a nation shaped by notions of Manifest Destiny.
Moreover, that nation’s growing belief in its God-given right to appropriate Native land was
accompanied by an accelerating White appropriation of Native histories and cultures. As noted in
this study’s Introduction, this appropriation through various media -- through novels and theatre,
for example – constitutes yet another type of entanglement, one that will be examined in the
following chapter.
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Chapter 4
Cultural Appropriations:
American National Identity and the Genre of the Indian Play in the Early Antebellum Era

As Young America attempted to find its place politically and culturally in the world, and
as the Euro-American population swelled, the project of appropriating Indian land grew apace
with the incorporation of a growing body of stereotyped notions about Indians into the nation’s
self-image. In short, American national identity relied partly on the appropriation of certain
aspects of Native American culture and history. But as the infant republic groped its way in the
dark, all good bets were placed on its early demise, and it suffered from profound insecurity in
terms of its own identity, an insecurity arguably masked by brash swagger. After all, it had
thrown off the yoke of not only British tyranny but had sent the hoary old institutions of Europe
packing.
This chapter argues that the appropriation of Native American identities by EuroAmericans divests Indians of their own histories and cultures as understood on their own terms
and replaces them with sanitized, essentialized, and commoditized Indian images for
consumption by White audiences. My argument builds on Kathryn W. Shanley’s idea that
“cultural appropriations” belong to an overall “totalization” effort in “the domination of
indigenous peoples by the West, politically and economically.”1 The Indian Play was one means
by which this “totalization” and “domination” gained traction in the decades following the
American Revolution. Moreover, through content, theme, and performance the Indian Play arose
as an entanglement of cultural appropriations that attempted to convey a uniquely American
1
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sense of national identity. But the Indian Play was a paradoxical vehicle here because its frequent
idealizations of Indians were staged while the contours of American national identity was also
forming through the violent reality of Indian removal.
Salient features in the genre of the Indian play are perhaps best detected and analyzed
through a world historical lens. To begin with, the performance of these plays on the American
stage is only incidental and reveals only part of the story. Indeed, as will be seen, British
dramatic conventions permeated the theatrical world in the United States during much of the
Antebellum era. Though the discussion of what constitutes a uniquely “American” play is
beyond the scope of this study, the quest for an American national identity led straight through
the nation’s theatres where its definition was sought by playwrights, performers, and critics.
Independence from British cultural influence went hand in hand with the struggle for political
independence from the former mother country, and in many ways the former took much longer
to establish than did the later. But the British/American cultural entanglement involves yet
another strand, one drawn from the Native American world, and its influence on American
national identity significantly differed from anything of British origin. For as much as American
cultural brokers attempted to gain distance from English influence, they eagerly embraced and
appropriated aspects of Native American cultures into something supposedly uniquely
“American.” The genre of the Indian play demonstrated this appropriation in action. Because of
its hybrid nature involving American, British, and Native American elements, the Indian play
embodies an array of connections, and the examination of such connections is a core goal of the
world historian.
The great number of Indian plays written -- at least 75 by one count -- in the nineteenth
century tells much about the evolving quest for an identity that would set Americans apart from
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the world on the other side of the Atlantic.2 Before turning to examinations of some of the most
significant plays, beginning with the next section’s focus on plays deeply invested in the
mythologization of Pocahontas, an overview of some early Indian plays will provide context for
later developments in the genre.
Though never performed, the first Indian play was likely Ponteach: Or the Savages of
America. A Tragedy (1766) by Major Robert Rogers. Since it was published in England during
the colonial era, the play should probably be considered more English than American. The play
recounts Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763 -1766) and employs the stereotype of the noble savage in its
portrayal of the Ottawa leader. This sets the direction, as Roy Harvey Pearce argues, in which the
genre of the Indian play would continue to move.3 Ponteach’s speech at the end of the play
provides an example of Roger’s use of the noble savage stereotype, but it deserves examination
for what it reveals about the appropriation of Native American culture and history:

And though I fly, ‘tis on the Wings of Hope.
Yes, I will hence where there’s no British foe,
And wait a Respite from this Storm of Woe;
Beget more Sons, fresh Troops collect and arm,
And other Schemes of future Greatness form;
Britons may boast, the Gods may have their Will,
Ponteach I am, and shall be Ponteach still.4
This speech strikes a defiant note. However, I argue that it and others like it, as will be seen, only
superficially express Native resolve in the face of wrongs committed against them by Whites.
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Rather, Indians served as metaphors for Whites reflecting on the struggle against tyranny in the
Revolutionary War, or against such struggles in general. American identity, in James Axtell’s
words, was forged on an Indian anvil. “Without the steady impress of Indian culture, the
colonists would probably not have been ready for revolution in 1776, because they would not
have been or felt sufficiently Americanized to stand before the world as an independent nation.
The Indian presence precipitated the formation of an American identity.”5 Moreover, White
Americans could see themselves as Indians from the comfort of their own Whiteness.
London composer James Hewitt worked with librettist Ann Julia Kemble Hatton to
produce the opera Tammany (America Discovered); or the Indian Chief, first performed in New
York by the Old American Company on 3 March 1794. Its subject was likely meant to appeal to
the Tammany Society, named for the legendary Delaware chief. Its score was based on the
British operatic models long familiar to American audiences.6
Tammany tells the story of doomed love between an Indian man and woman, Tammany
and Manana. In their death song, she sings:

Beneath the morn’s pale light to rove,
The aloed wood or palmy grove,
These, these are sweet; but not to me
So sweet as is my Tammany.
To which he responds:
Fury swells my aching soul,
5
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Boils and maddens in my veins;
Fierce contending passions roll
Where Manana’s image reigns.7
Of course, the dramatic convention of the time meant that characters were in general cast
in similar melodramatic modes. But the general arc of Indian plays to ennoble Indians speaks to
deeper -- and more troubling -- cultural motivations to present Indians as having such high
degrees of nobility that they were doomed to extinction in the face of White malevolence. And
according to this line of logic, Whites, however undeserving, will prevail. The convention of
melodrama does not cancel out the convention of the noble savage.
In Joseph Croswell’s A New World Planted (1802) noble Indians come to the aid of
struggling Pilgrims, one of whom, Hampden, falls in love with the Indian princess, Pocahanta.
Because she is the member of a royal family, his fear of miscegenation is somewhat tempered.
He nonetheless complains: “I know she’s browner than European dames / But whiter far, than
other natives are.” He concludes that Pocahanta needs further ennobling. She needs to be
whitened by becoming civilized. Pocahontas figures in a number of Indian plays, and in the next
section, she is at least returned to Virginia; otherwise, as in A New World Planted, the plot
revolves upon a love story with her at it center.

Pocahontas and the Staging of American National Identity
John Nelson Barker’s The Indian Princess; or, La Belle Sauvage did much to elevate the
Pocahontas story to the level of a national foundation myth, and however much Barker hoped to
write the first uniquely American play, as an operatic melodrama it belonged to a popular British
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musical genre in addition to the American genre of the Indian play. Thus the play combined a
Native American story with a Georgian theatrical model. This combination underscores the
ironic interplays of intention, content, and form that makes The Indian Princess well suited for a
discussion concerning the post-revolutionary quest for an American national identity.
The Indian Princess premiered at the Chestnut Street Theatre in Philadelphia on 6 April
1808,8 and it opened in New York’s Park Theatre later that June.9 Looking back on his play’s
popularity, in 1832 Barker told theatre historian William Dunlap that it had been performed, at
least by his own estimate, in “all the theatres of the United States.”10 The play also fell prey to
pirating by British theatres, a fate common to American stage productions. Perhaps most
famously, in 1820 the Drury Lane Theatre mounted it under a different title and produced it
without Barker’s permission. This also made The Indian Princess the first American play “to be
exported to a British stage after first opening in the United States.”11 Moreover, the play’s
appeal to English audiences speaks to their familiarity with the genre of the operatic melodrama
to which the play belonged. The genre, in a sense, had come home.
What drew American audiences to The Indian Princess cannot be definitively
ascertained. However, two central elements in the play’s content likely charmed them -- its
romanticized myth of Pocahontas as the love interest of two Englishmen, and that myth’s
association with Jamestown, regarded by Euro-Americans at the time as the country’s first White
settlement, through later generations in the North would shift the location of its founding myth to
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Plymouth as sectional divisions sharpened between North and South.12 Nonetheless, the
Pocahontas/Jamestown combination likely made for a compelling means to help establish a
national identity through the telling a supposedly unique American tale. And however much the
play’s production as an operatic melodrama owed its origin to the British stage, American theatre
was at the time generally a British derivative.13 Therefore, the familiarity of the genre as the only
one that American audiences knew likely meant that they saw little or no irony in it as a dramatic
vehicle for an “American” story.
The attempt to tell an American story may, as Jeffrey D. Mason and J. Ellen Gainor
argue, rely on a “broad capacity for self-invention and self-contemplation.” And as they further
argue, the stage is “an explicit site for performing national identity, one that serves to focus [its]
issues, rhetoric, and images,” and through creative freedom it takes risks to “encourage attempts
to develop, explore, test, and dispute conceptions of national character. In the performance arena,
in the interchanges among artists and spectators, we can enact narratives of nation.”14 As will be
seen below, Barker sought to “enact a [narrative] of nation” through The Indian Princess on a
number of levels. As such, his production was a site of cultural entanglement that combined
Native American, Euro-American, and British strands. These strands will be separated for the
sake of analysis, but the theatrical experience of the play itself must be kept in sight as one
woven together into whole cloth as a form of entertainment and, circuitously, why it succeeded
as entertainment must also be considered.
Barker likely experienced some degree of “the anxiety of influence,” to employ Harold
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Bloom’s concept,15 through which he felt the need to clear space in order to express his own
artistic vision outside of British influence, but he could not function very far away from the
center of British cultural gravity. However much he hoped to produce an “American” play, The
Indian Princess was inescapably British in form, yet Barker’s choice of a storyline did gain some
distance for him. This choice could not be otherwise, since the use of traditional British
characters, themes, or situations would be antithetical to a purportedly American play. On the
other hand, these could not be entirely dismissed from Barker’s stage, since he needed to
package his play in terms familiar to his audiences lest he risk alienating them by presenting
ideas too novel for their tastes.16
In an attempt to remedy what he termed British “mental colonialism,” Barker looked to
Native American material to forge a national myth.17 And as one scholar notes, Barker wrote at a
time when “interest in American history was enjoying a new popularity, especially as postRevolutionary Americans searched the archives and their own memories for traces and traits that
would foster some sense of national identity.”18
Barker’s interest in colonial history was “manifest by his return, time and time again, to
Colonial records for dramatic material,” and fittingly Barker chose Jamestown as the site of his
drama, at the time celebrating the bicentennial of its founding.19 Captain John Smith’s The
Generall Historie of Virginia (1624) provided Barker with his historical material. Coyly
admitting to his significant departures from Smith’s record, he said he adhered as closely “to
15
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historic truth [. . .] as dramatic rules would allow.”20 But Barker constructed his own myth of
national origin on Smith’s mythology of colonialization, so his manipulation of Smith's work
must, as theatre historian J.H. Richards argues, “be read in the context of mediating arts,
primarily the theatre, and the forms through which mythologies of colonialization were
practiced.”21
But Barker’s loyalty to Smith’s account is of less interest than are his inventions of
people, places and events, for through them the issues of American national identity of his own
time emerge.22 For example, John Smith appears not as an English colonial but as a patriotic
American as, for example, through his criticism of “stagnant Europe.”23 He also alludes to an
expression perhaps evocative of American revolutionary resolve against the British: “let not any
mutinous hand unravel / Our close knit compact. Union is its srength: / Be that remember’d
ever.”24 Moreover, Smith’s crew apparently sailed with him to the New World not in search of
wealth but to build a new society, a vision emphasized by John Rolfe in the opening lines of Act
One,

Let our dull, sluggish countrymen at home
Still creep around their little isle of fogs,
Drink its dank vapours, and then hang themselves.
In this free atmosphere and ample range
The bosom can dilate, the pulse play,
And man, erect, can walk a manly round.25
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Smith's reply to Rolfe upon their having “a noble stage, on which to act / A noble
drama,”26 seems as much a plea to audiences to recognize the play as American, not British, as it
is a tribute to the integrity of American nationhood. One critic writing in 1827 addresses what by
then had become a prevailing notion regarding the political mantle that American theater should
assume: the theatre must appeal “directly to the national feelings. [. . .] There is no object more
worthy the exercise of the highest attributes of the mind, than that of administering to the just
pride of national character, inspiring a feeling for the national glory, and inculcating a love of
country.”27
The “stage” upon which this drama is to be acted is also a gendered space. On the one
hand it is the feminized landscape of Virginia: "Is’t not a goodly land? Along the bay, / How gay
and lovely lie its skirting shores, / Fring’d with the summer's rich embroidery!” On the other
hand, tt is a land seen as receptive to masculine self-assertion, a land where "The bosom can
dilate, the pulses play, / And man, erect, can walk a manly round.” And the the stage is one
history as well as one of masciline adventure: “for ye are men / Well worth the handing down;
whose paged names / Will not disgrace posterity to read.” America, the “empty” land awaited the
heroic action of European settlers. The theatrical stage provided the imaginative space in which
the American national identity could be molded according to culturally familiarized roles of male
and female domains.28
The land is an undomesticated wilderness, a “devil of a country, where there's never a girl
nor a house.” Following this to its rhetorical conclusion, romantic love and the assertion of
domestic values will conquer that wilderness. Indeed, the play’s romantic plot involves several
26
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intertwined courtships. Moreover, they lend the element of romantic comedy, and this helps to
obscure the violence of conquest by translating it into domestic terms of love and marriage.
Indeed, the central national conquest, as represented through Pocahontas, is accomplished
through the love that she feels for John Rolfe, her Euro-American conqueror, and his culture.29
Once transformed through Christianization and through her zealous embrace of EuroAmerican cultural values, Pocahontas serves not only as the model “good” Indian but as a
national hero as well. This heroic status also relies on her gendered role as a mother protecting
her White settler family, as suggested in his preface to The Indian Princess. There Barker
stresses the play’s significance as an American production, and he underscores the national pride
that the audience must feel as they watch the drama unfold on stage. “Dramatic genius, with
genius of every other kind, is assuredly native of our soil, and there wants but the wholesome
and kindly breath of favour to invigourate its delicate frame, and bid it rapidly arise from its
cradle to blooming maturity.” Yet Barker also reveals the uncertainty of young nation’s cultural
identity, referring to the “children of the American drama” as orphans doomed “to wander,
without house or home, unknown and unregarded.” But just as the nation was born through
rebellion against the mother country, the “orphan” play goes out into the world as an
“independent urchin.”30 Though independent of parental authority, this orphan still seeks
legitimacy in a new home. And regarding the play’s orphanhood, Barker appeals directly to the
women in the audience who must feel a special maternal responsibility for it: “To your bosoms,
ladies, sweet ladies! the little stranger flies with confidence for protection; shield it, I pray you,
from the iron rod of rigour, and scold it yourselves, as much as you will, for on your smooth and
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polished brows it can never read wrinkled cruelty.”31 And as one critic argues, Barker’s
invocation of “maternal responsibility” anticipates the play’s story of Pocahontas, who shields
John Smith, and in the words of the play serves as ‘foster mother’ protecting the ‘infant colony’
of Jamestown from famine and Indian attack, thereby achieving mythic stature as heroic mother
preserving, nurturing and legitimizing what will become the American nation. “Thus the play
and the nation are made equivalent metaphorically and the survival and legitimacy of both
depend upon the maternal power and domestic virtues of women.”32
Pocahontas proves herself as a “true woman,”33 according to nineteenth-century EuroAmerican standards, through her recognition of European superiority over Native culture.
Moreover, demonstrating an apparently innate sense of Christian mercy, she pleads for the
release of Captain John Smith. Indeed, his first response upon being freed through her famous
intercession is, “O woman! angel sex! Where’er thou art, Still art thou heavenly. The rudest
clime Robs not thy glowing bosom of its nature.”34 Pocahontas is legitimized through feminine
virtues as defined by Euro-American culture. She is the mother of the “infant colony,” and she
embodies innocence and fruitfulness. As such, she is well positioned for adoption as a national
hero.35
In terms of nationalistic rhetoric, formerly colonized Americans attempted to formulate a
national identity independent of British influence. Pocahontas provided an ideological means
through which this effort could be legitimized. As an object of conquest and as a maternal
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symbol of the new nation, she united her citizens/children in a national family.36 Through the
domestic themes of love and marriage Barker negotiates the dangerous political realities of his
time regarding Indian removal and the long history of White violence perpetrated upon Native
Americans. Such issues are dissolved through melodramatic conventions and comedy.
Concerning the later, Barker’s subplots involving love and marriage between invented White
characters in Jamestown add to this deflection, as will be seen below.
Barker uses not only Native Americans to establish a national American play. In a further
departure from historical verisimilitude, European women also appear on the stage, likely for a
combination of political, economic, and artistic reasons. As J.H. Richards speculates, Barker
hoped to fill the theatre with as many paying customers as possible, and “female customers often
meant the difference between success and failure.”37 Barker’s band of “sweet ladies.” Kate,
Geraldine and Alice, left their European homes for a new life in America, the same as did the
men in Smith’s crew. (Of course, historically, that crew contained no women.) For example, in
response to her husbands question regarding her level of happiness in the “Wilds of Virginia, she
responds:

In this wild wood will I range; [...]
Nor sigh for towns so fine, to change,
This forest, forest drear:
Never, never weary,
And while love is in thine eyes,
Ever, ever cheery.38
She recalls her abandoned homeland, no without some nostalgia, but asserts her resolve
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to leave it behind. America is now her home.
Furthermore, Barker employs a plot device with decidedly English roots as Kate and
Geraldine, disguised as male pages, play out roles of false identities in manners commonly found
in Shakespeare’s comedies. As John S. Bak argues, “When both men prove faithful to their
women, their unions promise peace and prosperity in the New World.”39
In addition to the European women, Barker adds Irish immigrants to the Pocahontas
myth, likely, as Richards argues, in order to “recognize the new ranks of Irish [political]
supporters.”40 And as Alan Ackerman argues:

The social and musical harmony with which Barker’s play begins reflects the optimism
of a burgeoning “republican” society, but it also glosses a crisis in early American public
policy indicated by the Naturalization Act (1798) and the Alien Act that were largely
targeted against immigrants from Ireland. The merits of Irish immigrants are a major
theme of The Indian Princess. Moreover, while the United States government largely
favored a policy of assimilation towards Native Americans until 1820, that policy was
neither successful nor enforceable, nor was it desired by many native peoples
themselves.41

For example, when the Irishman Larry meets an Irish pageboy (the disguised Kate), he
asks, “What say you, master page, isn’t this a nice neat patch to plant potatoes -- I mean, to plant
a nation in?”42 As Richards further argues, “the playwright tries to make Larry serve two
competing ends: the ‘brave’ Irish member of the American national founding and thus a good
republican; and the comic stage Irishman, present in the play for laughs.”43
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The political implications of the domestic drama are apparent in wedding preparations for
Pocahontas’ marriage to the Susquehannock Prince Miami. Pocahontas underscores the political
nature of the marriage because it benefits the designs of Powhatan, her father. “The
Susquehannocks are a powerful nation,” she remarks, “and my father would have them for his
friends.” Pocahontas' marriage to John Rolfe is a twofold political act. It establishes ties between
Powhatan and the English, and it establishes Pocahontas as free agent in control of her own
destiny. Though Powhatan eventually acknowledges her right to marry Rolfe, Initially, in
choosing him over Miami she defies paternal authority, an act echoing America’s origins through
an act of Revolution.44
Pocahontas falls in love not only with John Rolfe but with European culture as well.

O! 'tis from thee that I have drawn my being:
Thou'st ta'en me from the path of savage error,
Blood-stain'd and rude where rove my countrymen,
And taught me heavenly truths, and fill'd my heart
With sentiments sublime and sweet and social...
Hast thou not heaven-ward turn'd my dazzled sight,
Where sing the spirits of the blessed good
Around the bright throne of the Holy One?
This thou hast done; and ah! what couldst thou more,
Belov'd preceptor, but direct that ray,
Which beams from Heaven to animate existence,
And bid my swelling bosom beat with love!
As the good Indian, Pocahontas instinctively recognizes the superiority of EuroAmerican beliefs, values, and customs. Furthermore, the gifts of civilization, especially the gift
of Christian salvation, are considered by Pocahontas to be more than just recompense for the
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losses Indians suffered through their contact with Euro-Americans. “Thou art my life!”
Pocahontas exclaims to Rolfe, “I lived not till I saw thee, love.”
Her new love of European “civilization,” leaves her repulsed by the “savagery” of
Miami, her Indian suitor, so she rejects him: “Thine eyes are as the panther’s; thy voice like the
voice of the wolf. Thou shouldst make my heart beat with joy; and I tremble before thee. Oh no!
Powhatan shall give me to my lover [Rolfe]. I will be my lover's bride!” To seek vengeance for
losing Pocahontas, Miami’s declares war against Powhatan, and this means that the first violence
in the play involves “good” and “bad” Indians.
Pocahontas represents the American land -- that “fairy land of fertility” with its “gay and
lovely . . . skirting shores” hiding treasures for adventurous explorers to discover and claim. The
conqueror wins the Indians' treasures, this metaphor suggests, not through the power of superior
military force but through the power of love inspired by the conqueror's cultural superiority.
With the death of the Indian warrior, Miami, the primary barrier to the resolution of the
romantic comedy has been removed. As Pocahontas and Rolfe embrace, Geraldine, an
Englishwoman who has come to the New World disguised as a page to defend her virtue and
reclaim her husband, reveals herself and flies to her husband's welcoming arms. At the same
moment, another settler, Robin, declares that he plans to marry the Indian woman Nima. As
Smith calls all the couples to join in a circle, he steps forward to announce the new social order
that is the culmination and resolution of the play's action:

Wild Nature smooths apace her savage frown,
Moulding her features to a social smile.
Now flies my hope-wing'd fancy o'er the gulf
That lies between us and the aftertime,
When this fine portion of the globe shall teem
With civilized society; when arts,
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And industry, and elegance shall reign,
As the shrill war-cry of the savage man
Yields to the jocund shepard's roundelay.
Oh, enviable country! thus disjoin'd
From old licentious Europe! may'st thou rise,
Free from those bonds which fraud and superstition
In barbarous ages have enchain'd her with;
Bidding the antique world with wonder view
A great, yet virtuous empire in the west!45
The new social order that Smith announces is distinctly American. Leaving behind the
“savage cry” of the native inhabitants of the New World and the vices of “old licentious
Europe,” this “virtuous empire” is indeed a new nation. The song that ends the play, a hymn to
"Freedom," points to the American Revolution through which the United States achieved its
official status as a nation by declaring its political freedom from England. This historic moment
of founding, however, is imagined not in the past but in the future as a prophecy to be fulfilled.
In the play’s final lines, Barker locates the roots of American national identity in its
earliest colonial history and marks the revolution as a predestined outcome. As the fulfillment of
prophecy, the separation from “old licentious Europe” achieves divine sanction. Even the natural
world approves the founding of the American nation, from play’s first lines when [She] "dimples
o'er with smiles" upon the colonists' arrival to the final scene when she “mould[s] her features to
a social smile” as Smith envisions a "virtuous empire in the west.”
The final scene illustrates his melodrama’s ability to simplify complex political and
cultural problems and to provide mere emotional and romantic resolutions to them. This leaves
no room for the reality of greed, violence, and treachery that characterized Native- and EuroAmerican relations. Even Powhatan is forgiven for his betrayal of the settlers, and celebrates the
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marriage as the curtain falls on a scene of social integration that dissolves distinctions of race and
class. Only the “bad” Indian, Miami, has been removed.

Cultural and national issues find their resolve through the marriage of John Rolfe and
Pocahontas. As Susan Scheckel notes, the princess is asked “to represent and legitimize
American colonialist and nationalist projects, to serve both as the implicitly sexualized object of
conquest and as the sanctified figure of the nation, the mother who unites all her citizens/children
in a unified national ‘family.’”46 All these bonds combine to become the metaphor of America,
with Smith's final benediction announcing the building of a nation: “A great, yet virtuous empire
in the west!”47

George Washington Parke Custis’ Pocahontas
The success of Barker’s The Indian Princess encouraged other nineteenth-century
playwrights to adapt the Pocahontas story, including George Washington Parke Custis’
Pocahontas; or, The Settlers of Virginia (1830) and John Brougham’s Po-ca-hon-tas; or, The
Gentle Savage (1855). These melodramas were more than entertaining love stories for audience
of their time. They were also about nation building, as A. Ackerman argues:

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the uncertainty about just what constituted
“America” or “Americans” was at the crux of a disturbingly fluid and often intransigent
set of historical problems. Any understanding of the importance of genre [of the Indian
play] must begin with a radical contextualizing [of] the repressed hybridity of early
American society.48
Scheckel 1996: 235
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This recalls that however much Barker hoped to create an American national drama, what he
eventually staged was a hybrid of British and Native American elements. Yet at the same time,
the play’s popularity appeared to legitimize it as an American cultural product, if only because it
appeared on American stages before American audiences.
George Washington Parke Custis, step-grandson and adopted heir of George Washington,
originally adhered to federalism, later became an avid Jacksonian, and finally added the Whig
Party to his collection of political sympathies.49 Responding to the political climate of Indian
removal, Custis developed his own version of the national story of Pocahontas with a play
entitled Pocahontas, or The Settlers of Virginia, which premiered on 16 January 1830. He
presented his Captain John Smith as an idealized Andrew Jackson. Indeed, Smith/Jackson only
reluctantly defeats the Indians as he attempts to resolve his sympathy for their plight.50
The national myth that Custis constructed relied a romanticized tale of Pocahontas to
voice his views of Indian policy issues in his own time. As did Barker, Custis played freely with
historical events and characters for both political and artistic reasons. For example, he ended his
play not with Rolfe’s marriage to Pocahontas, as might be expected, but with Captain John
Smith’s so called “rescue” by Pocahontas, an arrangement that Custis thought would make the
best dramatic sense.51 Custis also altered history in order to place John Smith and John Rolfe in
Jamestown at the same time. Moreover, he places Pocahontas’s conversion to Christianity as an
event preceding the arrival of Smith and his Jamestown settlers, when historically Christianity
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remained as yet unknown in Virginia.52 Though Pocahontas had been portrayed in previous
Indian plays primarily as a love interest and as a benefactor to White settlers, Custis turned her
into a saintly Christian. This eliminates any role Rolfe played in her conversion – which
historically occurred in conjunction with her marriage to him and to their journey to London. As
Robert S. Tilton argues, her former “wantonness” is excused because her relationship with Rolfe
is decidedly dignified and non-sensual because Custis dared not offend prominent Virginians
who claimed ancestry from Pocahontas through Rolfe. Indeed, The biracial marriage of Rolfe
and Pocahontas is excluded from the play. Instead, love affairs between minor characters
invented by Custis end in biracial marriages. As a Virginian, Custis retold the Pocahontas story
as a national story to please Virginia’s assertion as the birthplace of the nation.53
Powhatan’s defeat at the end of the play insinuates that the Indians have only themselves
to blame for their removal. Failure to assimilate, like his daughter, means that he is doomed to
vanish, enabling the advancement of Anglo-American civilization.54 Powhatan speech at the end
of the play peers optimistically into the rise of the American nation:

And may the fruits of this union virtue and honour be a long line of descendants,
inheriting those principles, gifted with rare talents, and the most exalted patriotism. Now
it only remains for us to say, that looking thro' a long vista of futurity, to the time when
these wild regions shall become the ancient and honour'd part of a great and glorious
American Empire, may we hope that when the tales of early are told from the nursery, the
library, or the stage, that kindly will be received the national story of Pocahontas, or the
Settlement of Virginia.
Indians have only two choices. They can either resist Euro-American settlement and suffer the
consequences – removal, and in the thinking of time, extinction -- or they can be good Indians,
52
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like Pocahontas, and assimilate completely and vanish by other means into the White world.

John Brougham’s Po-ca-hon-tas; or, The Gentle Savage
On 24 December 1855, John Brougham’s Po-Ca-Hon-Tas; or, The Gentle Savage
premiered at Wallack’s Lyceum Theatre in New York. From then until 1884 it remained a staple
not only at Wallack’s, but in the Bowery and National theatres as well.55 As a burlesque, the play
provided social and political commentary on White notions of superiority over Indians and on
the violent reality of Indian removal.56 Moreover, Brougham satirized the stereotype of the
Noble Savage, especially as it had been used as a politically expedient tool by which to help
formulate both a myth of national origin and a romantic dream of ongoing westward expansion.57
The play parodied the Pocahontas myth, and in the process lampooned her conversion to
Christianity, her renunciation of her own people, and her marriage to an English colonizer.
Accordingly, Brougham set out to satirically attack the genre of the Indian play that had
proliferated on the American stage, for aside from the two particularly popular Indian plays,
Nelson Barker’s The Indian Princess and George Washington Parke Custis’s Pocahontas: or,
The Settlers of Virginia examined above, dozens of similar plays had proliferated over the
decades. Also, as suggested by the subtitle of Po-Ca-Hon-Tas , “a Per-Version of Ye Trewe and
Wonderrefulle Hystorie of Ye Rennownned Princesse,” he satirized the blatant disregard for
historical accuracy that characterized the genre by providing absurd “historical” details of in the
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Prolegomena: “The deeply interesting incident upon which the Drama is founded, occurred in
Virginia, on Wednesday, Oct. 12, A.D. 1607, at twenty- six minutes past 4 in the afternoon.”
Following this, the “Song of Pocahontas,” parodies Longfellow's recently published
poem The Song of Hiawatha. Brougham substitutes Longfellow’s Noble Savage stereotype with
a comic commentary on the conquest, violence, greed of White settlers in their ongoing
displacement of Native Americans from their land. For example:

Now the natives knowing nothing
Of the benefits intended
By this foreign congregation,
Who had come so far to show them
All how much they'd been mistaken;
In what darkness they were dwelling,
And how much obliged they were to
These disinterested people,
Who had journeyed to enlighten
Their unfortunate condition,
Through these potent triunited
Anglo-Saxon civilizers,
Rum, Gunpowder, and Religion.58
Through humor and irony, Brougham undermines not only White notions of Indians as racially
inferior but also the idea that they are child-like and in need of radical readjustment to the
“civilized” life of the dominant white culture. And as Smith reveals to the King (Powhatan), the
acquisition of wealth was the only motivation for White settlement in the New World:

King.

What iron fortune led you to our shores?

Smith.

Ironic Monarch, 'twas a pair of oars.
Between ourselves, though, if the truth be told,

Po-Ca-Hon-Tas; or, The Gentle Savage in Richard Moody, ed. Dramas from the American
Theatre, 1762 – 1909 (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1966), 405.
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Our goal we' ll reach when we have reached your gold. (...)
My very noble and approved good savage,
That we are come out here your lands to ravage,
It is most true: for this you see us banded.
Moreover, Brougham dispels the sanitized romantic idealism that attached only altruistic goals to
Smith and his colonial ambitions, and by extension he critiques the appropriation of Indian land - the displacement of the already existing inhabitants -- in the service of American republican
interests:

King. Conquering lands without a single resident,
Such a Republic’s clearly without precedent!
Smith’s rescue by Pocahontas is presented with absurd humor, undercutting
melodramatic convention and the supposed dignity of her action:

Smith.

It's a hard pill — but a much harder pillow!
[Reclining. Pocahontas rushing in heroineically distressed and dishevelled,
followed by sailors]

Poca.

Husband! For thee I scream!

Smith.

Lemon or Vanilla?

Brougham satirically dismantles the image of Pocahontas produced by the White
American imagination that celebrated the supposed rejection of her Indian identity and her full
embrace of Euro-American values. Brougham deconstructs of the myth of Pocahontas and her
position as a national symbol by exposing the romaticized version of the encounter between
Pocahontas and the English colonizers, Smith and Rolfe, and the American playwrights' license

142

to distort the facts in any way they pleased. By exposing the essential discrepancy between myth
and reality in white-Indian relations, Po-Ca-Hon-Tas inverted a romantic tradition that had
blurred the historical reality of settler colonialism’s political and economic machinery that drove
Indian removal.

Metamora
Even by 1819, after the national fervor of the war of 1812 had died down, playwright
Mordecai Noah still felt the need to defend American plays, writing in the preface to his play She
Would Be a Soldier; or, the Plains of Chippewa (1819):

National plays should be encouraged. They have done everything for the British nation,
and can do much for us; they keep alive the recollection of important events, by
representing them in a manner at once natural and alluring. We have a fine scope, and
abundant materials to work with, and a noble country to justify the attempt.59
Nor would the success of John Augustus Stone's Metamora (1829) improve the image of
American drama. An 1827 American Quarterly Review demanded a national drama that would
appeal “directly to the national feelings” and portray “those great and illustrious peculiarities of
situation and character” that distinguished America from other nations.60 Stone’s play was a
conscious answer to that call, but Metamora's vast appeal did little to chase British plays from
US theatres. Although “much of the prejudice against republican plays had subsided by 1830,”
Harold Nichols concludes, “[i]mported pieces still composed the greater part of the repertory and
were welcomed by the public.”61 As Nathaniel Parker Willis, author of Tortesa, The Usurer,
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would note as late as 1839, American drama was doomed to literary vassalage: “Farewell
nationality! The English language now marks the limits of a new literary empire, and America is
a suburb.”62 Most early nineteenth-century American plays contained prefaces that apologized to
their audiences for any dramatic shortcomings and called for critics to establish new standards by
which to judge them.63
The most famous Indian play, John Augustus Stone’s Metamora; or the Last of the
Wampanoags (1829), illustrates the ironies involved in the removal of Indians on one hand and
their idealization on the other. Metamora represents Metacom (1638–76), the sachem of the
Wampanoags who lived in southern New England. Known also as King Philip, he led an attack
against English settlers in 1675, sparking the so-called King Philip’s War. When word of
Metacom’s death reached Captain Benjamin Church, a principal leader of colonial forces in the
war, Church commanded his soldiers to drag Metacom’s corpse from the swamp where he had
been slain. Church declared that since the sachem “had caused many an Englishman’s body to be
unburied, and to rot above ground, not one of his bones should be buried.”64 Thus he had the
body hacked into quarters, ordered his men to hang each limb on four neighboring trees, and then
hauled the sachem’s head to Plymouth. The Indian’s severed head, hung high above the ground,
provided the thanksgiving centerpiece.65 Fifty-five years earlier, Massasoit, Metacom’s father,
attended the 1621 thanksgiving, the gathering now memorialized every November in the United
States as the “Pilgrims’ First Thanksgiving.”66
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Though denigrated through his representation as a murderous savage throughout the
colonial period, Metacom’s identity shifted following the American victory in the War of 1812.
Sally L. Jones provides one argument that might account for this transformation: “The romantic
imagination combined with the urge to create a mythic past separate from England’s, and the
Indian came to stand as a symbol for past virginity of the continent.” Consequently, within an
environment of increasing nationalism, American actor Edwin Forrest advertised for a play with
an “aboriginal” hero, and Stone won the commission. Stone characterized Metacom
sympathetically; he gave the sachem a conscience and a sense of righteous indignation over the
wrongs committed against him and his people. In redface, Forrest played the lead role as
Metamora for over forty years, work that won him fortune, fame, and the title of “the American
tragedian.”67
The play’s long run coincided with the early decades of the Indian Removal Era.
Arguably then, Metamora served the nationalist interests of Jacksonian America. In Jones’s
words, Forrest’s performance “refracted through Jacksonian sensibility [by combining] both the
‘pesky injuns’ and ‘noble savages,’ advancing the ideology of a necessarily vanishing race.”68 It
seems likely that Metamora confirmed the preconceptions of its audiences that Indian removal,
however tragic, remained essential to the larger project of nation building. The play’s popularity
may have relied on telling the audience something it already believed. Americans did not have to
be convinced that Indians would vanish as “civilization” advanced across the continent.
Moreover, the play’s recognition of White aggression against Indians may have allowed
audiences to first acknowledge and then to cathartically dismiss any associated guilt for such
of the Indian in American Popular Culture, ed. S. Elizabeth Bird (Boulder: Westview Press,
1996), 14.
67
Ibid., 15.
68

Ibid., 22.
145

injustices; the goodness of the nationalist project outweighed any evil committed along the way.
At the same time, questions about the play’s reception linger, fueling critics to speculate
on the multiple levels of significance that Metamora may have had for its audiences. For
example, Scott C. Martin argues against a nationalist reading of the play, citing the historical
absence of audience response data that might support it. He rejects Jones’s argument as an
overstated distortion, claiming instead that Edwin Forrest’s own celebrity primarily accounted
for the play’s long-lived popularity by raising an otherwise shallow melodrama to the level of
tragedy through his powerful stage presence. However, Martin does allow for the possibility that
the play offered Jacksonian audiences an “opportunity to celebrate” their national identities and
suggests that “the Indian theme” probably assisted in the play’s appeal.69
By the time of Stone’s 1829 play, Metacom transformed in the popular imagination from
a “bloody and crafty wretch,”70 as Puritan divine Increase Mather wrote in 1702, into a
sentimentalized tragic hero. Felled by Church and his soldiers, Metamora (Metacom) utters a
curse at the end the play:

My curses on you, white men! May the Great Spirit curse you when he speaks in his war
voice from the clouds! Murderers! The last of the Wampanoag’s curse be on you! May
your graves and the graves of your children be in the path the red man shall trace! And
may the wolf and panther howl o’er your fleshless bones, fit banquet for the destroyers!
Spirits of the grave, I come! But the curse of Metamora stays with the white man!71
Here, and throughout the play, Stone establishes a relatively sympathetic understanding of
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Metacom. However overwrought dramatically, the sachem at least possesses a voice, a
conscience, and a sense of righteous indignation over the wrongs committed against him and his
people. Most previous histories denied him these human qualities and did not miss opportunities
to venomously condemn him, although the level of sadistic violence committed by both Whites
and Indians during King Philip’s War made it difficult to discern which side committed the
greater evils. At the same time, fulfilling the Nobel Savage stereotype, Metacom was doomed as
being too noble to live since he was faced the ever-westward advancement of rapacious Whites.
This allowed the audience to respond emotionally to the melodramatic tragedy and to feel safe
pangs of guilt for an added sentimental reaction to the play.
Approvingly or not, critics noted Stone’s transformation of Metacom from demon to
tragic hero. However, they tended to focus less on the historical figure of Metacom and more on
the actor Edwin Forrest, identified in the play’s epilogue as “a native actor,”72 not because he
possessed a Native American heritage, but because he stood on the stage as a native-born
American. Forrest saw his performance as a statement of American artistic independence from
British culture. Indeed, one critic noted in 1848: “He has created a school of art, strictly
American, and he stands forth as the very embodiment, as it were, of the masses of the American
character.”73 Forrest appropriated a historical Indian figure and retooled him for the nation’s
ongoing quest for an identity separate from old Mother England and from Europe in general.
Forrest played Metamora for over forty years, work that won him fortune, fame, and the
title of “the American tragedian.”74 Stone’s play made him a nineteenth-century superstar.
Stylistically, he relied on an expansive and forceful stage presence, while English actors of the
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time tended to deliver their lines in a reserved and somewhat cerebral fashion. But aesthetic
differences in stage presence also embodied potent political statements in the often bitter
antipathy between England and the United States that continued to simmer long after the
revolution. Indeed, rivalry between Forrest and his equally famous British counterpart, Charles
Macready, came to a head on the night of May 10, 1849. That night Macready starred in
Shakespeare’s Macbeth at the Astor Opera House in New York. An estimated 10,000 people
filled the streets outside the theater, all fueled to one degree or another with nationalist disdain
for the British, and Macready provided a ready focus for their energies. The mob laid siege to the
theater, pelting its windows with rocks, attempting to burn it to the ground, and terrifying the
audience trapped inside. Macready managed to finish his performance. Meanwhile, the Astor
Place Riot left at least 22 people dead and 150 wounded.75
A redface performance stood at the heart of the combat, as did the issue of the purported
“authenticity” of that performance. According to one of his biographers, “When [Forrest] came
to impersonate Metamora . . . it was the genuine Indian who was brought up on the stage. . . .
The counterfeit was so cunningly copied that it might have deceived nature herself.”76 Other
critics joined in the chorus over the decades to sing the praises of Forrest’s “authentic portrayal”
of the Wampanoag sachem. Thus at the center of a nationalist effort to identify the United States
as a country uniquely separate and even superior to hoary old England stood not a living Indian
but a White Indian. That White Indian, Forrest’s Metamora, focused his mighty curse on
England itself. Put another way, the Indian made Forrest authentically American.
Matamora, as well as the great number of other Indian plays like it, depended on the
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mythologized stereotype of the noble savage to define the characteristics of a distinctly
American national identity. In the service of that identity, the Indian symbolized American ideals
of freedom, virtue, and democracy. However, the actual historical presence of Indians proved
problematic because they were regarded as counterproductive to expansion, progress, and
civilization. The solution to this problem was to stereotype Indians as doomed to destruction and
elimination. On the American stage, the stereotype of the Noble Savage blurred the Indians’
historical reality and promoted the Euro-American desire to establish a homogeneous national
identity to the exclusion of all other cultures. As White America accrued greater and greater
degrees of political and cultural capital, the ability to appropriate Native land and Native identity,
and then to utilize both according to their designs, speaks to the inherently nonequivalent nature
of both political and cultural entanglements. Witness to this is the long record of violence and
discrimination practiced by Euro-Americans against Native Americans. However, as will be seen
in the following chapter, Native political and cultural forces also wielded the power to shape
national identities based in part on selective elements of Euro-American origin.
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Chapter 5
A Quest for Political and Religious Sovereignty: The Mashpee Revolt of 1833

Until the early nineteenth-century encroachment by Euro-American settlers, the Mashpee
tribe on Cape Cod had enjoyed control of about 10,500 acres of well-watered forestland for
several centuries.1 So seeing their land base increasingly jeopardized, the Mashpee launched an
eventually successful effort to establish tribal sovereignty, thus providing the tribe with the legal
right to regulate its borders. The characterization of these efforts in 1833 as a “revolt” arose from
the pages of the local and national press. For example, fueled by alarmist reports of an
insurrectionary uprising against Whites, one headline blared “Hostilities Commenced in
Marshpee!”2 But, as will be seen, reports of Native violence were highly exaggerated. The
Mashpee fought their battles with language. Their spokesmen and their allies also used
newspapers and published columns to defend their aims. Other fields of Mashpee battle included
pulpits, podiums, and, of course, courts of law.
But how the Mashpee Revolt figures as an example of entanglement becomes a
particularly complicated question when it also attempts to take Mashpee religious affiliations
into account. For equally significant to the control of its land was the tribe’s victory in its
campaign to expel Congregationalist minister Phineas Fish in preference to the Mashpee Baptist
preacher “Blind Joe” Amos. Pequot minister William Apess also played an instrumental role in
the tribe’s legal and religious struggles. Indeed, by the early nineteenth century, if not earlier, the
Mashpee sought their religious identification in Christianity to the exclusion of any indigenous
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belief systems. This situation raises another question: what distinctions, if any, can be drawn
between entanglement and assimilation for the early nineteenth-century Mashpee? The same
question can be asked of William Apess. For that matter, what is meant by the problematic term
“assimilation” itself?
As noted in the Introduction, I place entanglement within the rubric of world history, and
as such this study has often employed the concepts of syncretism and hybridity. But assimilation
appears to elude both concepts, especially as they may lack the precision for discussing its
continually fluid and individually specific nature. Indeed, as William B. Taylor argues,
syncretism runs the risk of reifying otherwise dynamic historical processes and “miss the loose
ends, reworkings, conflicts, and contradictions,” and it further risks the focus “on an end state of
completion and wholeness.”3 Similar hazards may also attend hybridity, at least as argued by
Carolyn Dean and Dana Leibsohn who question its conceptual precision and consider it an
unwieldy tool for exploring the complexity of cultural exchanges, since most cultures “are
inherently heterogenous,” made so through “millennia of travel and trade [that] have insured that
mixing and interaction is the norm.” This leads them to ask why “certain mixtures become
naturalized over time, losing their visibility and potency as mixtures?” Regarding Indigenous
cultures, Dean and Leibsohn also underscore the problem with the notion that their indigeneity
relies on a pre-European contact state and argue that this “denies the radical transformations of
the lives of indigenous people brought about by colonization [and] betrays desires to freeze
indigenous people in the past” as romanticized relics.4
In brief, the terms syncretism and hybridity are not beyond interrogation as analytical
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tools for the world historian, and the story of the Mashpee provides one example for testing the
conceptual limits of these terms. Moreover, the term “assimilation,” often applied pejoratively,
runs the risk of painting over syncretism and hybridity -- however problematic they may be -with too wide a brush. For example, Indigenous literature scholar Daniel Heath Justice defines
assimilation as “the wholesale rejection of Indigenous values and their replacement with
Eurowestern values, either through choice, coercion, or violence.”5 His insistence on “wholesale
rejection” denies nuance and runs the risk of negating individual agency, and he collapse
complex historical processes into two actions, “rejection” and “replacement.” So while
remaining sensitive to the highly charged political, economic, and cultural issues surrounding
assimilation, use of that term alone, if applied as an absolute marker, may not be able to contain
the whole story of shifting cultural and political identities of Native Americans over time relative
to their history of interactions with Euro-Americans. The story of the Mashpee Revolt,
particularly its religious dimension, provides an example of why it is necessary to complicate
concepts of hybridity, syncretism, and assimilation. While keeping in mind their problematic
natures, this chapter argues that all three inform aspects of entanglement, specifically of the
entangled history of the Mashpee and the colonial and state governments and religious
institutions of Massachusettes.
The Mashpee did not seek to define themselves as a nation, so their story may seem
anomalous in a study concerning the evolution of Native national identities. Yet the demand to
control their own destinies has been the central issue for Native Americans throughout the
entangled history of Native Americans and Euro-Americans, and by identifying themselves as
nations, Native American tribal identities did not disappear. So this final case study, this fifth of
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five snapshots, examines some of the political and religious influences originating, at least
provisionally, in Euro-America, and how aspects of those influences informed the manner in
which the Mashpee conducted the defense of their sovereign status. The defense of sovereignty
straddles both tribal and national identities, and that defense as an essential thread throughout the
previous chapters also runs through this chapter to further illustrate the complexity of the weave
between Native American and Euro-American political and cultural identities.

The Backstory of the Revolt
To understand the revolt first requires an exploration of the historical relationship
between the Mashpee and the colonial and state governments of Massachusetts. The economic
base of the Mashpee had relied exclusively on the seasonal harvests of food resources on their
land, but beginning in the seventeenth century they supplemented that base by marketing lumber
and handicrafts to English colonials. This economic relationship grew apace with religious and
political connections between the Mashpee and the Puritans. Indeed, religion and politics
intertwined when, recognizing an opportunity to convert the Mashpee to Christianity, Puritan
minister Richard Bourne built not only a church for them, he also assisted in the construction of a
system of Mashpee government. Moreover, Bourne successfully defended Mashpee rights to
their timber resources before the General Court in Boston.6 In 1685 the Court documented the
geographic outlines of 10,500 acres of forestland as the exclusive property of the Mashpee, also
known at the time as the South Sea Indians.
The decision’s unambiguous language would prove vital to subsequent claims of
Mashpee sovereignty:
6
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This Court [confirms and secures] to said South Sea Indians & their children for ever, soe
as never to be given, sold, or alienated from them without all theire consents. [The court]
doth soe far confirme said land to the said Indians, to be perpetually to them & their
children, as that no part of them shall be granted to or purchased by any English
whatsoever, by the Courts allowance, without the consent of all the said Indians.7
But in 1691 jurisdictional changes made by the Province of Massachusetts Bay directly
affected the Mashpee when it extended its borders to include Plymouth colony. This meant an
increase in the legal authority that the General Court in Boston weilded over the tribe. Initially,
this change had little impact on the Mashpee. Indeed, the tribe reformed its own governing
structure to assure that the Mashpee retained control of its land usage that it had historically
enjoyed. In the early 1720s, the Mashpee elected a group of overseers to safeguard inheritance
rights of tribal members known as proprietors. In line with the tribe’s traditional understanding
of land use, a proprietor could leave his land to his children; however, lacking heirs, that land
returned to tribal ownership. But in 1746, the General Court created a system of guardians who
could distribute the tribe’s lands according to their own arbitrary judgments. So guardians could
lease tribal lands to other Englishmen without the Mashpees’ permission as long as rental income
belonged to the tribe. Presumably, the change arose in response to pressure from settlers anxious
to establish at least some precedent for further encroachment.8
Mashpee objections to guardianship culminated when the tribe sent Reuben Cognehew to
London to argue on its behalf, and in 1763 his success there resulted in the Massachusetts
provincial government’s decision to grant the right of self-government to the Mashpee.9
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Massachusetts further declared that only two Englishmen could be elected to the council of five
overseers with the authority to regulate fishing, allot land, and lease surplus land to outsiders.
Also in 1763, the Massachusetts court granted the Mashpee the right to admit tribal status to
African Americans with Mashpee spouses. This took on particular significance following the
Revolutionary War: many Mashpee men died fighting for the rebels. Indeed, by 1820 the
Mashpee population of 320 contained only 50 or 60 who had not married either African
Americans or Hessian mercenaries who remained in the country after the war.10
Mashpee sovereignty took another blow in 1788 when the Massachusetts State legislature
created a board of overseers composed of three men with the power to regulate Mashpee land.
Governor Levi Johnson declared that this would protect the Indians “against the frauds and
wicked devices of unprincipled and profligate white men.”11 The paternalism displayed here
infantilizes the Mashpee, likely in order to lay the groundwork for justifying further
encroachment on their land, as they supposedly lacked the mental capacity to control their own
resources.
In 1827, the Mashpee filed a complaint with the Massachusetts legislature to seek legal
protection from trespassing settlers. White overseers had diverted Mashpee resources by selling
the tribe’s timber and hay to outsiders, and promised state funding for schools for Mashpee
children remained meager. Finding their complaints consistently stonewalled, in 1827 the tribe
took measures that effectively asserted its sovereignty. In town meetings, tribe members took
control of their own municipalities, and they chose their own clerks and overseers. Alarmed,
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White overseers attempted to reassert their control by ignoring Mashpee authority.12 Throughout
a six-year period of legal wrangling, the Mashpee argued that the same rights of sovereignty
claimed by the founders of the United States applied equally to them. More than a rhetorical
device, this compelling tactic lent credence to the Mashpee quest for liberty. By comparing
themselves to the American Revolutionaries who threw off the yoke of British tyranny, the
Mashpee leveraged an argument that gained steady traction in the courts and in the press. But the
political and legal dimensions of the Mashpee Revolt cannot be fully understood without also
addressing attendant religious issues.

Religious Conflicts on Mashpee Land
Following Richard Bourne’s death in 1685, his pulpit went to the Mashpee minister
Simon Popmonit. Henceforth, Native Christians retained spiritual authority on Mashpee land, an
authority that did not go unchallenged by Euro-American ministerial interests. These interests
came in the form of Congregationalist minister Phineas Fish. Funded through a Harvard
endowment designated for individuals desiring to spread the Christian message to Indians, he
began his tenure among the Mashpee in 1811. However, he demonstrated little to no interest in
reaching out to the Mashpee. For the most part, local Whites filled his pews. The Mashpee
preferred their own Baptist preacher, “Blind Joe” Amos. Only a handful of Mashpee ever
attended Fish’s services.13
One of the most significant figures in the Mashpee Revolt was also a significant religious
figure in Massachusetts, William Apess. His compelling sermons, especially those that
championed the rights of Native Peoples, as well as his connections with Boston abolitionists,
12
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expanded the tribe’s network of alliances and solidified its resolve during the 1833 revolt.14 In
his autobiography, A Son of the Forest, William Apess claimed descent from “the royal family of
Philip, king of the Pequot tribe” through his grandmother.15 Though King Philip belonged to the
Pokanoket, not the Pequout, the kinship he felt with the famous leader of the 1637 rebellion
against Massachusetts Bay Puritans reveals an aspect of his identity that helps inform his
involvement in the 1833 Mashpee Revolt. Moreover, perhaps building on this identity, the
condemnation of White aggression against Native Peoples constitutes a central theme in his
conversion narrative, The Experiences of Five Christian Indians. This pamphlet also alludes to
White appropriation of timber on Native land, an issue central to the Mashpee revolt, to be
discussed below.
But in his estimation, their failure to live as Christians comprised the greatest crime
committed by Whites. The theme of this failure runs throughout the pamphlet, and it illuminates
the reasoning behind his own decision to convert to Christianity. He charged Whites as devoid of
principle: “They would think it no crime to go upon Indian lands and cut and carry off their most
valuable timber, or anything else they chose; and I doubt not but they think it clear gain.”16
Painfully aware of the poverty and alcoholism that afflicted many Native Peoples, he advocated
education and preached temperance as the best means for restoring their dignity, and he chastised
White resistance to healing the wounds that they bore direct responsibility for inflicting on
Indians in the first place.
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Perhaps some unholy unprincipled men would cry out, “The skin was not good enough”:
but stop, friends – I am not talking about the skin but about principles. I would ask if
there cannot be as good feelings and principles under a red skin as there can be under a
white. And let me ask: Did not this bad principle proceed from the whites or their
forefathers? And I would ask: is it worthwhile to nourish it any longer? If not, then let us
have a change, although some men no doubt spout their corrupt principles against it, that
are in the halls of legislation and elsewhere.17
Such language marked him as a dangerous man in the eyes of many Whites, as
subsequent press accounts would demonstrate. He perhaps especially raised White ire when by
peering into “an Indian’s Looking-Glass for the White Man” he asks: “Why are we not protected
in our persons and property throughout the Union?” And his answer condemned what he saw as
the political, moral, and religious cravenness and hypocrisy of many White people who regarded
skin color other than their own as a permanent barrier to the freedoms and protections guaranteed
under the Constitution of the United States. Such a mindset he argued stemmed from taking “the
skin as a pretext to keep [us Indians] from our unalienable and lawful rights.” Again, employing
his Looking-Glass, he asked if Whites “would like to be disfranchised from all your rights,
merely because your skin is white, and for no other crime. I’ll venture to say, these very
characters who hold the skin to be such a barrier in the way would be the first to cry out,
‘Injustice! Awful injustice!’”18
Likely of most lethal consequence, he charged White people with turning their backs on
Christ’s message, unable to “imitate him and have his spirit.” He leveraged his attack with
numerous citations from scripture, including the precept: “If any man say, I love God, and hateth
his brother, he is a liar” (1 John 4:20), and asked “Did you ever hear or read of Christ teaching
his disciples that they ought to despise one because his skin was different from theirs?”
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Jesus Christ being a Jew, and those of his Apostles certainly were not whites – and did
not those who completed the plan of salvation complete it for the whites as well as for the
Jews, and others? And were not the whites the most degraded people of the earth at that
time? And none were more so, for they sacrificed their children to dumb idols! And did
not St. Paul labor more abundantly for building up a Christian nation among you than any
of the Apostles? And you know as well as I that you are not indebted to a principle
beneath a white skin for your religious services but to a colored one.19
Direct, logical, and based on the “fact” of scripture, Apess’s argument categorically
refuted any White claim to Christian conduct. Simultaneously, his radicalism demonstrates that
neither his own conversion to Christianity nor his decision to train as a Methodist preacher arose
as acts of assimilation. Rather, they stemmed from a sincere -- even militant -- desire to spread
the messages of Christ and his disciples, messages that cannot be separated from political action,
as revealed through his role in the Mashpee revolt.

Indigenized Christianity
Over the course of the eighteenth century, many Native Peoples in southeastern New
England slowly warmed to Christian ideas and practices. So by the time of the First Great
Awakening in the 1740s, the foundation had been established for a period of rapid, though
eventually unsustained, Native conversion. As with White conversions during the Awakening,
Indians reacted to the emotionally charged preaching of impassioned New Lights who spread
their message of salvation throughout the region.20
For Native Americans, however, conversion -- and the issue of assimilation attending it -was rarely totalizing. Rather, they tended to incorporate Christian ideas into their own belief
19
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systems, and this complicates the term “conversion” itself. For that matter, even among Anglo
Americans, conversion in the context of Great Awakening ideology was the end result of a
highly dramatic spiritual process. The concept of “affiliation” perhaps more accurately applies to
the Native experience with Christianity not only during the Awakening but also in the years
subsequent to it. Indeed, as historian Linford D. Fisher argues, “Native affiliation in the Great
Awakening seems less like a momentous point of religious and cultural disjuncture for Indian
communities -- wholesale conversion -- and more like one more step in the ongoing decades-old
engagement with Christian ideas and Euroamerican culture, all with an eye toward community
and cultural survival and revitalization.”21
The Mahican minister Sampson Occam was the product of the First Great Awakening,
and his involvement with Brothertown exemplifies the complex role played by Christianity in
Native religious identities, a complexity comparable to Appes and the Mashpee, however much
Brothertown and the Mashpee followed different historical trajectories.
In November 1785, about twenty Mohegan, Narrangasett, and Niantic families of
Christian Indians migrated to Oneida land in upper New York and organized a “Body Politick”
named Brothertown. The move represented commitment to a Euroamerican economy based on
subsistence agriculture instead of one based on hunting, fishing, craft making, or the leasing of
tribal land to White farmers. But within a few years both Brothertown and nearby New
Stockbridge, settled by Christian Narrangasett migrants from Stockbridge Massacchusetts, were
shaken to the core by religious discord as well as by political factionalism.
Initially Brothertown coalesced around Samson Occom’s ministry. Occom, after all, had
been one of the town’s principle founders. However, doctrinal divisions soon drove him to
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relocate and serve the Church in nearby New Stockbridge. But even there, Native Christian
factions preferred the ministry of John Sergeant Jr. and not that of Occom. On the other hand,
when Occom died in July 1792, over three hundred Indians from Brothertown and New
Stockbridge attended his funeral.
Fisher argues convincingly that divisions over issues of relocation, accommodation to
European culture, and Christianization followed generational lines, with most Brothertown
leaders born after the First Great Awakening, the period in which Occom’s religious identity
crystalized. For example, James Niles Jr., the nephew of a New Light minister, fell out with his
uncle and criticized Narragansett Separates for their lack of discipline and “Rule of Conduct.”
His outspokenness led to his censure, so for him migration to Brothertown meant escape from
the type of Indian Christian doctrine with which he disagreed.22
Also, migration did not solve problems of land dispossession. Indeed, the Oneida soon
contested the land grant that made Brothertown possible, and within a few years that land began
to fall into the hands of the local White population through long-term leases, rentals, and
purchases. In 1791, Brothertown officials told the New York Assembly that “White People have
Come [with their] Children, Horses, Cattle, Hogs, and Dogs, and they bring Rum, [creating a]
Deplorable situation.” Both Brothertown and New Stockbridge Indians proclaimed their identity
as civilized Christians to leverage ongoing struggles with local and state governments in their
fight for equal rights. For example, in February 1792, Brothertown leaders petitioned the state
legislature asking to “be put on the footing of free white citizens [for] they have been brought up
in a civilized life, and that they profess the Christian religion.” In 1818, in another attempt to
escape ongoing land loss and increasing pressures of White settlement, many Brothertown and
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New Stockbridge Indians again moved westward, first to southern Indiana and then in the 1830s
to the Lake Winnebago region in Wisconsin.23
The experiences of Brothertown and New Stockbridge paralleled that of other postRevolutionary War Native communities as they dealt with religious and economic issues and
shifting national identities during the early years of the American republic. Native peoples across
southeastern New England balanced religious identities as Christians who prized private land
ownership with deeply rooted beliefs in tribal sovereignty and its attendant kinship based cultural
identity. So it is within this broader regional context that the Mashpee revolt can be best
understood.

Apess and the Mashpees
Through the efforts of several sympathetic ministers, Apess received permission from
Phineas Fish, the Congregationalist assigned to the Mashpees, to take the pulpit for a Sunday
service. Eagerly anticipating a meeting house filled with members of the Mashpee tribe, Apess,
however, found pews filled with only white worshipers. As he later discovered, the local white
population had for several years already effectively taken over the meeting house, one originally
designed for the Mashpee Indians when constructed nearly a century ago. Dismayed, he wrote,
“these pale men were certainly stealing from the Indians their portion of the gospel, by leaving
their own house of worship and crowding them out of theirs.”24
Apess soon learned that most Mashpees reviled the Congregationalist Fish. Instead they
flocked to the Wampanoag Baptist minister, Blind Joe Amos. Fish, in turn disdained Amos, and
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in answer to Apess’s inquiries claimed that the Indian lacked proper training as a minster
because he had educated himself by ear -- being blind -- and therefore did the Mashpee more
harm than good. Such censure meant little to Apess. He sought out Amos and within days struck
up a close bond with him as well as with the other Mashpees. Indeed, they readily invited him to
a tribal council meeting, there to apprise him in greater detail of the dire civil and religious
problems confronting them. Moreover, knowing that they had found a sincere ally, they wanted
to hear more about the help Apess proffered.25
The meeting led to his adoption into the Mashpee tribe so that he could more effectively
advocate it interests. Ebenezer Attaquian, one of the prayer leaders, summarized the tribe’s
ethical and religious responsibility to Apess and the political rationale for the adoption: “If we
get this man to stand by us, we must stand by him, and if we forsake him after he undertakes for
us, God will forsake us also.”26
The meeting also led to the drawing up of a petition signed by about 100 Mashpee and
directed to Massachusetts governor, Levi Lincoln:

Resolved, That we, as a tribe, will rule ourselves, and have the right to do so; for
all men are born free and equal, says the Constitution of the country.
Resolved, That we will not permit any white man to come upon our plantation, to
cut or carry off wood or hay, or any other article, without our permission, after the 1st of
July next.
Resolved, That we will put said resolutions in force after that date (July next),
with the penalty binding and throwing them from the plantation, if they will not stay
otherwise.27
Asserting their right as a people to control their own destiny, and echoing Rousseau as in
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turn his ideological shadow falls across the Constitution, Mashpee resolve rested squarely on
republican principles with which no one in their intended audience could argue against lest they
reveal their own hypocrisy. Furthermore, the assertion of their sovereign right to control their
own borders, to reserve to their own judgment the conditions under which outsiders may enter
their land, determinedly warns would be intruders that they will incur Mashpee wrath and will be
summarily expelled.
The Mashpee also put Harvard College on notice with another petition, one that invoked
the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States. The petition’s refrain of “we, as a people,”
drove home the unambiguous message that the tribe claimed the same language, or, more
precisely, it staked claim to the same set of laws held sacred by the United States. The petition
also declared that, as did the United States, the Mashpee will suffer no oppression by Imperial
tyrants. Specifically, the Harvard petition demanded the removal of Phineas Fish, stating, “We,
as a people, have not been benefited by his preaching; for our moral character has not been built
up, and there has been no improvement in our intellectual powers, and we know of no Indian that
has been converted by his preaching.” Turning the tables on its intended audience, the petition
identifies the central irony of Fish’s ministerial tenure: “We wonder how the good citizens of
Boston, or any town would like to have the Indians send them a preacher and force him into the
pulpit and then send other Indians to crowd the whites out of their own meeting house, and not
pay once cent for it.”28
The petition makes yet another connection -- perhaps its most lethal -- when it
mockingly delivers a calculated sting: “Perhaps you have heard of the oppression of the
Cherokees and lamented over them much, and thought of the Georgians were hard and cruel
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creatures; but did you ever hear of the poor, oppressed and degraded Marshpee Indians in
Massachusetts, and lament over them?”29
Resolved, That we will rule our own tribe and make choices of whom we please
for our preacher.
Resolved, That we will have our own meeting house, and place in the pulpit
whom we please to preach to us.
Resolved, That we will publish this to the world; if the above reasons and
resolutions are not adhered to, and the Rev. Mr Fish discharged.
The foregoing addresses and resolutions were adopted by a vote of the tribe,
almost unanimous. Done at the Council House at Marshpee, May the 21st, 1833.30

Alarmed by such language, the governor sent Josiah Fiske to investigate the Mashpee. As
Fiske would soon learn, The Pequot minister William Apess played a central role in advancing
the Mashpee cause, and as Barry O’Connell argues, “The pressing of the Mashpees' grievances [.
. .] might have been tolerated, barely, had Apess not had the genius and the presumption to
expropriate the language of American democracy in the name of Native Americans.”31

The Cherokee Context
On April 29, 1832, Elias Boudinot and William Apess shared the rostrum at the Federal
Street Church in Boston.32 The billing underscores a significant context of the Mashpee Revolt,
as it occurred against the backdrops of the Cherokee Nation’s bid for sovereignty and of the
unfolding consequences of the 1830 Indian Removal Act. The content of their speeches went
unrecorded, yet the symbolism of these embattled figures sharing a stage speaks of the potent
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simultaneity of Native American endeavors for the recognition of national identities. Moreover,
Apess’s comment above regarding the Cherokee suggest that he hoped to elevate the struggle of
the Mashpee to the same level of importance as that of the nationally famous Cherokee case and
to give the Mashpee quest for sovereignty the attention that he believed it deserved. Apess
elsewhere remarked on the relevance of the Cherokee to the Mashpee cause, noting that the
Cherokee have been “sacrificed” by Jackson:

[And] if Georgia, under her union nullifier, Governor Lumpkin, is permitted to set the
process of the Supreme Court as defiance, it will be a foul dishonor upon the country. But
while we condemn the conduct of General Jackson toward the Southern Indians, what
shall we say of the treatment of our own poor defenseless Indians, the Marshpee tribe, in
our own state? [. . .] These Indians fought and bled side by side, with our fathers, in the
struggled for liberty; but the whites were no sooner free themselves, than they enslaved
the poor Indians.33
Significantly, again, Apess took the opportunity in this last sentence to underscore the bond
created between the Mashpee and the White founders during the revolution, the patriot blood that
the Indians shed in the cause of American liberty rewarded by enslavement.
Both the Cherokee and the Mashpee worked through the machinery of state and federal
legislatures and courts to establish sovereignty. Both leveraged their claims to sovereignty by
underscoring their incorporation of Euro-American values – Christianity and property rights –
regardless of how much these values altered as they melded with indigenous belief systems and
concepts of tribal property. Moreover, the Mashpee bid for sovereignty occurred under the
threatening shadow of the 1830 Indian Removal Act and its legal foundation in Johnson v.
M’Intosh (1823), which ruled that the title of the land “discovered and conquered,” belongs to
the conquering nation, and Indigenous Peoples held only “a right of occupancy,” which could be
33
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abrogated. Also looming was the Marshall Court’s decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
(1831) that asked whether the Cherokee Nation constituted a foreign state. Marshall said no and
defined it as “domestic dependent nation.” But since nations exist with inherent autonomy, how
could one nation be dependent on another? Marshall attempted to solve this paradox in
Worcester v. Georgia (1832) in which he wrote that the Cherokee nation “is a distinct
community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws
of Georgia can have no force,” a decision that appeared to affirm Cherokee sovereignty. Since
the 1833 Mashpee Revolt occurred before Cherokee removal, effectively the result of President
Jackson’s decision to ignore Worcester v. Georgia, Apess and the others who engineered the
revolt could have at least have possessed guarded optimism regarding the outcome of their own
bid for Mashpee sovereignty.34

Sovereignty
In June 1833, William Apess and Blind Joe Amos travelled to Boston and delivered their
resolutions to the Secretary of State, the matter to be taken up in the upcoming council session. A
few weeks later, the Mashpee council met and issued a notice “to the former board of overseers,
and the public at large,”

Having heretofore been distressed, and degraded, and robbed daily, we have taken
measures to put a stop to these things. And having made choice of our own town officers
to act instead of the whites [. . .] we acted in accordance with the spirit of the
Constitution. [. . .] And now we would say to our white friends, we are wanting nothing
but our rights betwixt man and man.35
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Not only a declaration of independence, the proclamation also grounds itself in the rights
that the Mashpee believed their due under the protection of the U.S. Constitution. Alarmed by
the tribe’s assertions of sovereignty, The guardians sent Gideon Hawly, a politically influential
local White resident, to Governor Lincoln with a letter from Fish “to whom he represented,” in
Apess’s words, “the state of affairs in colors which we cannot acknowledge to have been
faithful. He stated that the Indians were in open rebellion and that blood was likely to be shed.”36
Alarmed by Fish’s report, Lincon sent Josiah Fiske to investigate and directed him that

If there should be any seditious or riotous proceedings, let the ringleaders be arrested and
delivered over to the civil power, under the ordinary processes of Law, and if more
serious consequences than are now apprehended are like to ensue, advise me by express,
if necessary, or otherwise, as the urgency of the case may require.37
A test to Mashpee resolve arose when two White brothers from the Sampson family
attempted to haul off a cartload of wood from tribal land. They disregarded Apess, who ordered
them to stop, but shortly thereafter the Mashpee landowners themselves arrived and unloaded the
wagon. Infuriated, one of the brothers, a justice of the peace, “threatened to prosecute them for [.
. .] protecting their own property.” Josiah Fiske, as Apess recounted, highhandedly ordered the
Mashpee landowners to meet him at Ezra Crocker’s tavern to resolve the confrontation, a
demand refused by Mashpee president Daniel Amos, who instructed Fiske to instead meet with
the council a few days later -- on July 4. The council would meet with Fiske under its own
conditions, not those imposed upon it by him. Indeed, Amos, and the other council members,
most certainly recognized the symbolism of the date as they prepared to defend Mashpee
36
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sovereignty as absolute.38
Josiah Fiske, John Reed, the high sheriff of Barnstable County, and the state appointed
White overseers spent that Fourth of July confronted by the Mashpee Council’s angry demands
and detailed reports regarding the attacks on their declared sovereignty committed by White
overseers and other local Whites. Furthermore, the Council underscored its long-standing
demand for the removal of Phineas Fish for his ongoing willful neglect of Mashpee spiritual
welfare. Reed summarily dismissed the council’s impassioned testimonies and said, as
paraphrased by Apess in his description of the meeting, “merely declaring a law to be oppressive
could not abrogate it; and that it would become us, as good citizens whom the government was
disposed to treat well, to wait for the session of the Legislature and then apply for relief.” Apess
further noted that “Surely it was either insult or wrong to call the Marshpee citizens, for such
they never were, from the Declaration of Independence up to the session of the Legislature in
1834.” And in response to Fiske’s warning that any intention by the Mashpee to violate the law
would be met by “awful consequences,” Apess demanded that unjust “laws ought to be altered
without delay; that it was perfectly manifest that they were unconstitutional.” For his heated
remarks, Reed placed him under arrest, along with several Mashpee who attended the meeting
bearing firearms, though as Apess noted, they did so merely because they had just returned from
hunting.39
If designed as a warning to Mashpee rebels, his thirty-day sentence and one hundred
dollar fine only reified Mashpee resolve to pursue sovereignty. Moreover, escalating press
coverage of the revolt attracted the attention of a particularly significant ally, William Lloyd
Garrison, who on 25 January, 1834 published an article in his own paper, The Liberator. The
38
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article recognized distinct differences between African American slavery and the oppression
faced by the Mashpees. However, Garrison recognized the Mashpee struggle as righteous, so it
deserved defense by anyone who desired abolition of oppression faced by any marginalized
groups.

There is a small tribe comprising four or five hundred persons residing at the head of
Cape Cod, in Barnstable county. They have long been under the guardianship of the
State, treated as paupers, and subjected to the control of a board of Overseers. [Recently]
they set forth the grievances which are imposed upon them, the injustice [. . .] of the laws
inflicting their tribe, the arbitrary and capricious conduct of the overseers, and the manner
in which they are defrauded of the fruits of their labor; and earnestly [beseeched] the
Legislature to grant them the same liberty of action as is enjoyed by their white brethren,
that they manage their own concerns, and be directly amenable to the laws of the State,
and not to their present overseers.40
Garrison then recounted the woodcart incident and the sentencing of William Apess, acts
he roundly condemned, then he summarized a speech Apess recently made before the legislature:
“Mr. Apes wished to know from whence the right to tax them, without their consent, and at
pleasure, and subject them to the arbitrary control of a Board of Overseers was derived? He
knew not himself; but he feared it was from the color of their skin.” Garrison demanded that the
“spontaneous, earnest upward movement of our red brethren [should not] be stigmatized as
turbulent, but applauded as meritorious. It is sedition, it is true; but only the sedition of freedom
against oppression. [. . .] We protest against the natural order of things; and now that the case has
come under our cognizance, we shall not abandon it hastily.”41
An anonymous letter written by a member of the Mashpee tribe appeared in the July 25
issue of the Barnstable Journal, and it equated the Mashpee cause with that of the Founders. The
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writer asked: “Will not the good people of Massachusetts revert back to the days of their fathers
when they were under the galling yoke of the mother country? when they petitioned the
government for a redress of grievances, but in vain?” The letter then invoked the Boston Tea
Party and compared that iconic act of rebellion enshrined in the American national identity with
the wood cart incident. Indeed, the writer claimed, the Mashpee faced an even greater existential
crisis than that of the American colonial rebels: “And now we ask the good people of
Massachusetts, the boasted cradle of liberty, whom we have petitioned for a redress of wrongs,
more grievous than what your fathers had to bear [. . .] and there was no other alternative but like
theirs, to stake our stand, and as we have on our plantation but one harbor, and no English ships
of tea, for a substitute, we unloaded two wagons loaded with our wood.” Finally, the writer
reminds his readers of the sacrifices made by the Mashpee in their alliance with American forces
during the Revolutionary War:

And now, good people of Massachusetts, when your fathers dared to unfurl the banners
of freedom against the hostile fleets and armies of Great Britain, it was then that
Marshpee furnished them with their bravest men to fight your battles. Yes, by the side of
your fathers they fought and bled, and now their blood cries to you from the ground to
restore that liberty so unjustly taken from us by their sons.42
After months of deliberation, in March 1834 the Massachusetts General Court ruled in
favor of the Mashpee. Thus the “Marshpee District” received the right to govern itself as an
incorporated community, the same as any other Massachusetts community. And two years later,
the Mashpee finally ousted Phineas Fish and installed the ordained Baptist minister E.G. Perry in
his place; moreover, this arrangement allowed Blind Joe Amos to focus on the congregation on
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Martha’s Vineyard that he had been maintaining for several years already.43
The Mashpees’ historical relationship to the land on which they lived, combined with
their own understanding of Christianity, provided bonds central to their tribal identity. Moreover,
they felt entitled to the same benefits of liberty enjoyed by Euro-Americans because of their
sacrifices in the American Revolution. The dynamic interplay of Native American and EuroAmerican political and cultural elements meant that Mashpee history was one of ongoing
innovation.
As active historical agents, their inherent heterogeneity meant that contact with European
colonials and Euro-Americans led to further cultural and political entanglements. However, the
asymmetric power relationship between Indians and Whites meant that such entanglements often
led to a range of conflicts. Attempts at resolution of these conflicts sometimes led to bloodshed,
or, as with the Mashpee, they also relied on the implementation of strategic intellectual tools. As
a community the Mashpee were victors in hard fought battle with the state Massachusetts, and as
such they earned the right to control their own political and religious matters within their own
borders.

43

Gura, The Life of William Apess, 96.
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Conclusion

This study set out to investigate five episodes of political and cultural interactions
between Native Americans and Euro-Americans over the course of approximately two
generations from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries. The explorations of these
episodes have relied on the verb “entangle” to drive them. Reflecting on the meaning of that
word as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, that is “to intertwist (threads, branches, or the
like) complicatedly of confusedly together; to intertwist the threads or parts of (a thing) in this
way,” the term’s core characteristics of complication and confusion in turn seem to define the
historic asymmetries of power between Indians and Whites and to the underscore the fact that
both groups effectively originated in two different worlds, so political and cultural confusions
between them invariably informed their interactions over time. Moreover, as the histories of both
groups grew increasingly intertwisted, it becomes increasingly untenable to understand either
group in isolation from the other.
By exploring various permutations of entanglement and its conceptual possibilities, each
chapter has attempted to tease out some of threads in the interwoven history of Native Americans
and Euro-Americans. But however inextricably linked the two may be in some aspects, their
historical relationship has always been marked by the dissimilar effects of contact between them.
Moreover, during the period covered in these pages, the effects of settler colonialism
increasingly challenged the understandings that Native American held regarding the integrity of
their land base. These challenges accelerated tensions between Indians and Whites, and
negotiations of power between them entered a phase distinctly different from the previous era of
imperial colonialism.
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An Entangled History has attempted to explore some of these differences, some of the
changes in negotiations of power between Indians and Whites, by exploring an episode
emblematic of imperial colonialism in the first chapter, “International Diplomacy and National
Identities: The 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix,” and an episode that explores the transition to settler
colonialism in the second chapter, “Shifting Entanglements: Kinship, Native Politics, and
Colonialism in the Great Lakes Region.” Attending the shifts in negotiations of power, some
Native American tribes adopted aspects of republicanism into their existing political identities,
thus shaping hybrids of national identities. Chapter three, “A Crossroads of National Identities:
Lafayette’s 1824 – 1825 Visit to the United States,” explored such hybrid political constructions
as they evolved among the Creek Indians. Then to examine the role played through the
appropriation of Native American history and culture into the evolving national identity of the
United States, chapter four, “Cultural Appropriations: American National Identity and the Genre
of the Indian Play in the Early Antebellum Era,” concerns the era of Indian Removal (an issue
examined in detail in the previous two chapters) as it gained momentum in the early decades of
the nineteenth century. That chapter addresed the relationship between the settler colonialism’s
appropriation of Native land and the commercialization of Native American histories and
cultures as the marketplace of American popular culture gained traction. Finally, a negotiation of
power explored in Chapter Five, “A Quest for Political and Religious Sovereignty: The Mashpee
Revolt,” concerned the rights of Native sovereignty successfully defended.
An Entangled History also positioned itself as a world history. At the same time its final
chapter interrogated some fundamental terms used by world historians. Thus hybridity and
syncretism were problematized because as much as these concepts can help us understand the
past, ironically, they may potentially interfere with that understanding through an unexamined
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reliance upon them. Similarly, comparative history, also found in the toolkit of world historians,
may also run the risk of examining cultures as static entities because it may artificially freeze the
moving parts of not only one but of multiple cultures in its analytical processes.
This study has been episodic in nature, as it presents five case studies that examine
various permutations of entanglement. Yet there appears no reason why a sustained historical
narrative could not also be cast as an entangled history, since the nature of entanglement, that of
the continually changing complexity of the human story, would appear to possess a relatively
universal application regardless of the narrative form that a historian chooses to produce.
An entangled history should cast a wide net. In itself, it does not possess any encoded
narrative; it is a tool, a way of seeing. On the other hand, the nature of entanglement, as proposed
above, might also possess qualities subversive to the construction of any type of historical
account. At least if taken to its logical limit, entanglement could lead to a labyrinthine density
Joycean in magnitude. However, in sum, this study has proposed the concept of entanglement,
and at the very least, use of this concept has attempted to resist an outcome oriented history and
to suggest the dynamism of the human story which has no stop.
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